The federal corollary to the oft-blogged about “substantial right doctrine” in the North Carolina appellate courts is the “collateral order doctrine.” As is the case under North Carolina law, the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals is generally limited to final decisions of the district court. Therefore, a federal appellate court ordinarily cannot review interlocutory orders. But, as in North Carolina, there are exceptions. One of these exceptions is the collateral order doctrine, which allows review of certain orders “that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2018).
One of the most common situations in which the collateral order doctrine is applied is when a defense of qualified immunity is asserted (similar to North Carolina, where the defense of governmental immunity often triggers the application of the substantial right doctrine). That was the situation in Williams v. Strickland, decided by the Fourth Circuit on March 5, 2019.
Williams involved an Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 against two law enforcement officers. The Plaintiff contended that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they used deadly force during his arrest. The facts of the case involved one of the law enforcement officers running the plates on Plaintiff’s car and learning that the plates were stolen. The officer pulled Plaintiff over and other officers arrived on the scene. While the officers were outside of their patrol cars and approaching the Plaintiff’s car, Plaintiff began intentionally driving at two of the officers. Believing they were in danger, the officers opened fire. Plaintiff was hit and crashed into a tree. He suffered permanent injuries as a result.
Plaintiff was ultimately charged with assault and battery related to his acts and pled guilty. As part of his plea, he admitted to intentionally driving at the officers. Importantly, however, he stated in his plea that the officers started shooting at him only after his car had driven past them.
The crux of the issue on appeal was whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their use of force. In the district court the officers had moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and that motion was...
