Francis v. Doe

BYRAN FRANCIS, Plaintiff, v. KIMBERLY FIACCO and JOHN DOE 1 through10,Individually and in their Official Capacities as Employees ofNew York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Defendants.

9:15-cv-00901 (MAD/ATB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 20, 2016

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

TABNER, RYAN AND KENIRY, LLP

18 Corporate Woods Boulevard

Albany, New York 12211-2605

Attorneys for Plaintiff

OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Albany Office

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

Attorneys for Defendant Kimberly Fiacco

WILLIAM RYAN, JR., ESQ.

BRIAN M. QUINN, ESQ.

MELISSA A. LATINO, AAG

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff Byran Francis ("Plaintiff") commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking monetary damages against the State of New York (the "State"), the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), and John Doe 1 through 10, as unknown employees of DOCCS ("John Does"). See Dkt. No. 1. At a pre-motion conference, the District Court, upon consent of the Parties, dismissed the State and DOCCS from the action. See Dkt. Nos. 4 and 5. The District Court granted Plaintiff's motions to amend the complaint to name Defendant Kimberly Fiacco, also known as Kimberly Davidson, ("Defendant") and to change venue to the Northern District of New York. See Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, 9. On July 31, 2015, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (the "complaint") with this Court, seeking monetary damages against Defendant, in her individual and official capacity, and John Does, in their individual and official capacities, ("John Does"). See Dkt. No. 13. Plaintiff alleges civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and he also asserts claims under state law. See Dkt. No. 13. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). See Dkt. No. 27.¹

II. BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2006, Plaintiff was sentenced, pursuant to a plea agreement, by New York State Supreme Court, County of Erie, (Wolfgang, J.) to an indeterminate sentence of one and one-half years to three years (1½ to 3) to run concurrently with a federal sentence scheduled to be imposed at a later time. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶¶ 14-16. Thereafter, on November 27, 2006, Plaintiff was sentenced to ten years in U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, J.). See id. at ¶ 17; Dkt. No. 27-2 at 12-13. Plaintiff was committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau of Prisons") on November 27, 2006. See Dkt. No. 27-2 at 13. On September 28, 2012, Plaintiff was ordered released from federal custody, but,before he was released, Defendant filed a detainer with the Bureau of Prisons, which instructed the federal facility to continue to incarcerate him pursuant to a certified consecutive New York State commitment. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 20. The detainer was honored by the Bureau of Prisons, and Plaintiff remained in their custody until March 28, 2013. See id. at ¶ 21. On that date, Plaintiff was transferred to DOCCS' custody where he remained until July 19, 2013. See id. at ¶¶ 22-23. After Plaintiff filed a request to be re-sentenced, the original sentencing state court ordered Plaintiff's release at the re-sentencing hearing on July 18, 2013. See id. at ¶ 23; Dkt. No. 27-2 at 23-24.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments together with state law tort claims.² See Dkt. No. 13. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Dkt. No. 27. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's constitutional claims are insufficient, that Plaintiff failed to allege personal involvement of Defendant, and that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See id. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by New York Corrections Law § 24 and that Plaintiff's civil rights claims against Defendant in her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id. For the reasons set forth, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's state law claims as well as the constitutional claims brought against Defendant in her official capacity. With regard to Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendant in her individual capacity, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss because Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face and Defendant failed to established her entitlement to qualified immunity.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). "[T]he Supreme Court rejected the 'oft quoted' standard . . . that a complaint should not be dismissed, 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief,'" Li Xi v. Apple, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 and quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46) and, instead, held that a plaintiff must "plead enough facts 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 467 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although detailed factual allegations are not required in a pleading, a plaintiff must provide the grounds for their entitlement to relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

When considering whether a complaint has facial plausibility, that is to say that a plaintiff has "nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The Court should not credit "mere conclusory statements" or"threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" as well-pleaded facts because they "do not suffice." Id. at 678-79; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, this standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002) (holding that a complaint does not need to contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case). "[T]he Court must also determine whether [the creditable facts] plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Coal. for a Level Playing Field, LLC v. AutoZone, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 194, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Pearson Capital Partners LLC v. James River Ins. Co., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 14-cv-4664, 2015 WL 9450632, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015) (holding that a court's dismissal is not appropriate if the factual allegations rise above the level of speculation).

B. Materials Outside the Pleadings

In support of her motion to dismiss, Defendant submitted a declaration from Richard de Simone, the deputy counsel in charge of the Office of Sentencing Review. See Dkt. No. 27-2. This declaration provides DOCCS interpretation of the relevant state law and a Bureau of Prisons program statement as its applied to Plaintiff's criminal sentences, DOCCS' obligations and designations of primary jurisdiction determinations, and DOCCS' calculation of Plaintiff's sentence.³ See id. at 1-8. Mr. de Simone opines that Plaintiff was always properly in DOCCS' custody based upon his facts in the declaration. See id. In addition, Mr. de Simone's declaration was submitted with exhibits, which included a uniform sentence and commitment form dated September 8, 2006, the judgment from the sentencing district court, Plaintiff'sreception/classification system legal date computation sheet represented to be from DOCCS, uniform sentence and commitment form dated July 18, 2013, and the transcript from Plaintiff's re-sentencing hearing on July 18, 2013. See id. at 9-41. A complaint is deemed to include any documents attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, some of the material submitted by Defendant is outside the pleading, and the Court has several options in proceeding.

"[T]he court may exclude the additional material and decide the motion on the complaint alone or it may convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and afford all parties the opportunity to present supporting material." Fonte v. Bd. of Managers of Cont'l Towers Condo., 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that it is error when a district court considers affidavits and exhibits submitted by the defendants) (citing Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1991)). Even if a document is not incorporated by reference to a complaint, the Court can still consider it if the Court determines that the document is integral to the complaint. See id. If a plaintiff has...