Francis v. Wyckoff Heights Med. Ctr.

177 F.Supp.3d 754

Pauline Francis, Plaintiff,

v.Wyckoff Heights Medical Center and Betty O'Hagan, Defendants.

13-cv-2813 (DLI)(MDG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 30, 2016

Adriene Holder, Karen Cacace, Katherine Greenberg, The Legal Aid Society, Danielle Vrabie, Kenneth W. Taber, Amanda H. Freyre, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Alison L. MacGregor, Barbara E. Hoey, John Mattiace, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DORA L. IRIZARRY, United States District Judge:

After filing charges of disability discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Plaintiff Pauline Francis (“Plaintiff”) commenced the instant action against her former employer, Wyckoff Heights Medical Center (“Wyckoff” or the “Hospital”), and one of her former supervisors, Betty O'Hagan (“Ms. O'Hagan”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of disability, and failed to accommodate her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. , the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 et seq.¹ (See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 32-54, Dkt. Entry No. 1.) Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing this action in its entirety. (See Defs.' Mem. In Supp. of Mot. For Summ. Judgment. (“Defs.' Mem.”), Dkt. Entry No. 46-83.) Plaintiff opposes. (See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Judgment (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), Dkt. Entry No. 47.) Also before the Court is Defendants' motion to strike the Declaration of Neil Steinkamp, dated January 15, 2015 (“Steinkamp Decl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 47-79, which Plaintiff opposes. (SeeDkt. Entries No. 43 and 45.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted to the extent that the Court dismisses Plaintiff's ADA claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims. Defendants' motion to strike is denied as moot.

BACKGROUND²

I. The Parties and Relevant Non-Parties

Plaintiff is a survivor of breast cancer. She was stricken with the disease and treated for it during the time she was employed at Wyckoff, a not-for-profit teaching Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff began her employment at Wyckoff in 1994, when she was hired to work in the housekeeping department. (Def.s' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Defs.' 56.1”) ¶ 1, Dkt. Entry No. 46-82; Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1 Response to Def.s' Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.'s 56.1 Resp.”) ¶ 1, Dkt Entry No. 47-1.) In 2002, Plaintiff became a nursing technician in Wyckoff's emergency department, a position re-designated in 2010 as an Emergency Department Technician (“EDT”). (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 2; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was assigned to the night shift, which ran from 11 P.M until 7 A.M., and worked in that role until her employment was terminated on July 15, 2011. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 1-3; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 1-3.)

As an EDT, Plaintiff's routine responsibilities included drawing blood, checking patient vital signs and blood glucose, transporting patients around the hospital, performing CPR when necessary, monitoring psychiatric patients, and maintaining documentation in electronic medical records. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 67; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 67.) An EDT was expected to be able to perform these functions in emergency situations, as the Hospital often treated patients suffering from heart attacks, strokes, gunshot wounds, and other traumatic, life-threatening injuries. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 69; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 69.) Dependent on the day and patient volume, Wyckoff's emergency department would have anywhere from four to five, and sometimes six, EDTs on staff during a typical overnight shift. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 71; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 71.)

For some duration prior to 2009, Plaintiff was supervised by an Assistant Patient Care Manager in the emergency department named Digna Ignacio (“Ms. Ignacio”). (Declaration of Digna Ignacio, dated January 14, 2015 (“Ignacio Decl.”) ¶¶ 1-2, Dkt. Entry No. 47-77.) In September 2009, Ms. O'Hagan was appointed Director of Nursing in the emergency department and replaced Ms. Ignacio as Plaintiff's supervisor. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 13.) As Director, Ms. O'Hagan managed daily operations in the emergency department, which included overseeing EDTs and other emergency department personnel. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 13-15; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 13-15.) Certain aspects of personnel management also were overseen by Joseph Foti (“Mr. Foti”), the Labor Relations Manager in Wyckoff's Human Resources Department beginning in October 2010. (Declaration of Joseph Foti, dated Dec. 5, 2014 (“Foti Decl.”) ¶ 1, Dkt Entry No. 46-74.)

II. Wyckoff's Policies

As a part of her job, Ms. O'Hagan enforced Hospital policies in order to ensure departmental finances and a high level of patient care. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 14-15.) Mr. Foti also was involved in advising on and administering Hospital policies. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 19-21; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 19-21.) Such policies included, among others, an Employee Attendance Policy (“Attendance Policy”) and a Policy on Employee Lateness or Early Departure (“Time Policy”). (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 14-15.)

The Attendance Policy required Hospital employees “to maintain a high standard of attendance at all times.” (Ex. 17 to the Declaration of Barbara E. Hoey, dated Dec. 8, 2014 (“Hoey Decl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 46-18.) Under the policy, employees were subject to progressive discipline for “excessive absenteeism,” defined as “any chronic, patterned or frequent absence.” (Id. ) The first instance of excessive absenteeism could result in a warning; the second instance, if within 12 months, a final warning/suspension; and the third instance, if within 12 months, termination. (Id. ) In addition, the Attendance Policy required any employee not reporting for work to call a supervisor to explain the absence, or else face disciplinary action. (Id. ) Under Wyckoff's Time Policy, Hospital employees were required to be at work at their scheduled start time and to remain there through the end of their respective shift. (Ex. 18 to the Hoey Decl., Dkt. Entry No. 46-19.) Similar to the Attendance Policy, the Time Policy imposed progressive discipline for incidents of “excessive lateness,” defined as three or more instances of unexcused lateness in a given month, or a single instance of lateness in excess of 30 minutes. (Id. ) After four incidents of excessive lateness within a calendar year, the policy called for termination of the non-compliant employee. (Id. )

Wyckoff's Employee Handbook, distributed to all employees including Plaintiff, set forth standards for employee attendance and timeliness consistent with those in the Attendance and Time Policies. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 50-58; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 50-58; see also Ex. 16 to the Hoey Decl., Dkt. Entry No. 46-17.) In addition to the above policies, Wyckoff also maintained a general disciplinary policy that consisted of four steps: (1) a warning; (2) a final written warning; (3) suspension; and (4) termination. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 50-58; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 50-58.) This progressive scale of discipline was mandated under the collective bargaining agreement maintained with Wyckoff by Plaintiff's union, 1199 SEIU. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 4, 62; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 4, 62.)

Plaintiff does not deny that she received copies of the above policies and, as a general matter, that they were applicable to her as a Hospital employee. (See, e.g., Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 55-58; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 55-58.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains that she was subjected to discipline under these policies with more frequency and severity than other Hospital employees. (See Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 61; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 61.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. O'Hagan had the discretion to make adjustments or exceptions to these policies on a case-by-case basis, but declined to do so in her case. (See Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 45-48); Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 45-48.)

In addition, Wyckoff represents that if an employee were to disclose a disability, it would take that disability into account in accordance with an ADA policy that it maintains before imposing any discipline. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 49; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 49; see also Foti Decl. ¶ 8.) Thus, in the event an employee with a known disability violated the attendance requirements, Wyckoff's policy purportedly was to consider whether the disability caused the violation, and if so, whether an accommodation was required. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 49; Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 49.) Despite that policy, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not consider her disability or offer any accommodation when disciplining and ultimately terminating her in 2011. (Id. )

III. Plaintiff's Claimed Disability

In 2002, Plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent surgery to remove her left breast and several lymph nodes. (Def.s' 56.1 ¶ 82; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 82.) The surgery was successful and Plaintiff remains cancer free as of the filing of this action. (Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.'s 56.1”) ¶ 5, Dkt. Entry No. 47-1; Defs.' Local Rule 56.1 Response to Pl.'s Counter-Statement of Material Facts (“Defs.' 56.1 Resp.”) ¶ 5, Dkt. Entry No. 48-1.) However, as a result of her surgery, Plaintiff claims to have developed a condition known as lymphedema. (Id. ) Lymphedema refers to swelling caused by a buildup of fluid in the body's lymphatic system, which may result from removal of the lymph nodes. (Ex. 8 to the Declaration of Amanda H. Freyre, dated Jan. 16, 2015 (“Freyre Decl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 47-10.)

Since her surgery, Plaintiff allegedly has suffered from symptoms of lymphedema that “flare up”...