Franco-Figueroa v. State Ins. Fund

MANUEL FRANCO-FIGUEROA, et. al., Plaintiffs,

v.STATE INSURANCE FUND, et. al., Defendants.

Civil No. 11-1025 (JAF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Dated: August 14, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

We must decide whether an employee's evidence of discrimination is sufficient to withstand his employer's motion for summary judgment in this political discrimination case.

I.Background

Because we must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party when considering a summary judgment motion, to the extent that any facts are disputed, the facts set forth below represent Plaintiffs' version of the events at issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, where Plaintiffs' asserted facts do not properly comply with Local Rule 56(c) and (e), we deem Defendants' properly-supported statements as admitted. See Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's decision to deem moving party's statements of facts admitted if opposing party fails to controvert properly).

Plaintiffs were employees of Puerto Rico's State Insurance Fund Corporation ("SIFC"), an entity of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico responsible for administering the local workers' compensation program. (Docket Nos. 1 at 10 and 109 at 2.) Plaintiffs' positions were annulled, following an audit commissioned by codefendants Zoimé Alvarez-Rubio, Administrator of the SIFC, and Saul Rivera, formerly the Associate Director of Human Resources at SIFC. (Id.at 9-10.) The audit reviewed 3,835 files and showed that 232 personnel appointments, including Plaintiffs, were made through closed or internal SIFC recruitment announcements, in violation of Article 14 of the SIFC's Personnel Regulations requiring open competition. (Docket No. 109 at 7.) As a result, Alvarez-Rubio ordered the annulment of all the improper personnel transactions. (Docket No. 89-1 at 5.). She made no exceptions. (Id.) Alvarez-Rubio sent a letter to each affected employee, communicating her intent to annul their appointments. All of the letters explained the audit findings, and the policy that the improper appointments violated. Plaintiffs later appealed through the Commonwealth judicial system. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court confirmed that the promotions violated Commonwealth law and that the annulments were legal. Gonzalez-Segarra v. State Insurance Fund Corporation, Offic. Trans. CC-2011-1051 (March 19, 2013).

II.Legal Standard

The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on a claim if they can show that there is no genuine dispute over the material facts underlying the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). We must decide whether a reasonable jury could findfor plaintiffs on each of their claims when all reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in their favor. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III.Discussion

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who, acting under color of state law, violate a plaintiff's constitutional or federal rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4(1980); see, e.g., Barrios-Velázquez v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 84 F.3d 487, 491 (1st Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffs assert that there are triable claims, including violations of the federal constitution and Puerto Rico law. All of these claims lack merit.

Qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs' political affiliation discrimination claim against Defendants. To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a court must decide whether (1) the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230-33 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Government employees who do not occupy policy-making positions of trust and confidence are protected against adverse employment actions based on their political affiliation. Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago, 464 F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir. 2006).

Thus, the sole question is whether Plaintiffs have shown a violation of their constitutional rights. They must, among other things, present evidence: (1) that Defendants knew of their political affiliation, and (2) that their political affiliation was a"substantial" or "motivating" factor in Defendants' decision to terminate Plaintiffs. Id. at 48; Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family Department, 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence of either requirement.

A. Knowledge of Plaintiffs' Political Affiliation

Plaintiffs did not make out a prim-facie case of discrimination, because they presented no evidence that Defendants knew or had reason to know that Plaintiffs were members of the PDP. Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 938-39 (1st Cir.2008) (stating that the plaintiff must show the defendant has knowledge of her political affiliation to establish a prima-face case of political discrimination) (quoting Martinez-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández. 506 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2007). Alvarez-Rubio testified in her deposition that she did not have any knowledge of the Plaintiffs' political affiliations prior to the complaint's filing. (Docket No. 89-2 at 12). She answered the question directly:

Q. Do you know the political affiliation of Zaida from the hospital?

A. No. No, and I refer to the same answer that I gave you at the beginning that I do not know the political affiliation of any of my employees.

(Docket No. 99-1 at 90-1.) Plaintiffs either admit that they cannot affirm that Alvarez-Rubio knows their political affiliations or that they have never talked with her regarding their political affiliations. (Docket No. 109 at 18.) Rivera, as well, did not have knowledge of Plaintiffs' political affiliation prior to receiving the complaint. (Docket No. 89-10 at 13.)

In response to this evidence from the Defendants, Plaintiffs point only to a series of spreadsheets included in the audit report that detail those employees whose promotions were annulled. (Docket No. 89-4 at 18-34.) The spreadsheets include: The names of each employee; their job title and location prior to their promotion; their salary; their position's job announcement number; and the effective date of their promotion. (Id.) Despite Plaintiffs' suggestion otherwise, nowhere does the spreadsheet include information regarding political affiliation.

Plaintiffs also contend that they were well-known and open supporters of the PDP and that their political affiliation was common knowledge at the time of the audit and the subsequent annulments. (Docket No. 1 at 3-8.) We find no support for this assertion adequate to survive summary judgment. While it is true that some of the Plaintiffs have occupied municipal office or trust positions at SIFC or other agencies during PDP administrations, (Docket No. 89-1 at 14, 18, 36), that fact is not sufficient to establish the Defendants were aware of the Plaintiffs' political affiliation. "Evidence that a plaintiff held a trust position under a previous administration of opposing political affiliation, ... may not suffice to show that a challenged employment action was premised upon political affiliation." Ramos-Borges v. Puerto Rico Health Department, 740 F.Supp.2d 262, 277 (D.P.R. 2010) (quoting Febus-Cruz v. Sauri-Santiago, 652 F.Supp.2d 140, 149 (D.P.R. 2009)). Here, such evidence, even allowing for its tenuousness, is insufficient. Absent this complaint, the Plaintiffs claim their political activities and, in some cases, service in elected office, was generally known to Defendants. But those activities tookplace away from SIFC premises and after working hours—in some cases, very long ago. (Docket No. 89-1 at 14, 17, 19, 21, 32, 36, 43, 45, 47, 56.)

Defendants cannot be liable for annulling Plaintiffs' promotions on the basis of their PDP affiliation unless Defendants knew or had reason to know Plaintiffs were members of the PDP. Plaintiffs need to provide more than the juxtaposition of circumstantial evidence of unfair treatment with evidence that Defendants' political affiliation differs from their own. Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo-Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). Therefore, Plaintiffs' political discrimination claim fails on this most basic requirement: That the Defendants knew of Plaintiffs' political affiliation.

B. "Substantial" or "Motivating Factor"

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs had provided evidence that Defendants knew or had reason to know they belonged to the PDP, Plaintiffs still needed to show that their PDP affiliation was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the decision to annul their promotions. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; see Vazquez-Valentin v. Santiago-Diaz, 385 F.3d 23, 30 (Plaintiff bears burden of producing sufficient evidence that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in challenged employment action.) Plaintiffs did not.

To show that their party affiliation was a factor in the annulment of their promotions, Plaintiffs argue that: Alvarez-Rubio requested the audit coincide with the previous PDP administration's years in office; there was a heavily politicized environment at SIFC following the change in administrations; the NPP affiliates included in the annulments were punished for their support of a rival NPP gubernatorialcandidate—otherwise, the annulments had a disproportionate impact on PDP affiliates. Looking at this evidence individually or together, nothing suggests that Plaintiffs' PDP affiliation was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the annulment of their promotions. Defendants provided evidence indicating that Plaintiffs would have had their promotions annulled because the promotions were made in clear violation of Articles 2 and 14.1 of the SIFC Employee Manual.

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