Francois v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.

107 F.4th 67

Manoucheka FRANCOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee,Hudson Valley Transportation, Michael T. Cellante, Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees.^*

Docket No. 23-776

August Term 2023

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Argued: March 12, 2024

Decided: July 11, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Carter, J.)

Brian J. Isaac, Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York, NY (Marc T. Wietzke, Flynn & Wietzke, PC, Garden City, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Beck S. Fineman, Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP, Bridgeport, CT (Alan Muraidekh, Metro-North Rail Road, New York, NY, on the brief), for Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee.

Suzanne M. Halbardier, Barry McTiernan & Moore LLC, New York, NY, for Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Cabranes, Wesley, and Lohier, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Manoucheka Francois was injured in a car crash. She was riding in a taxi hired by her employer, Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, to transport Francois back to her work headquarters after her shift as a train conductor ended. Unbeknownst to Metro-North or Francois, the taxi driver had downed four to five shots of alcohol before he picked Francois up.

Francois sued Metro-North under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, claiming that Metro-North bore direct liability (for negligently hiring the taxi driver) and vicarious liability (on behalf the taxi driver, as its agent) for her injuries. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Carter, J.) concluded that no reasonable juror could find Metro-North liable under either theory; it granted summary judgment in favor of Metro-North.

We affirm as to Metro-North's direct liability. No reasonable jury could find that Metro-North itself acted negligently by hiring the taxi driver to transport Francois back to headquarters. Francois introduced no evidence suggesting that Metro-North had reason to foresee that the taxi driver would drink alcohol before picking her up.

We vacate and remand as to Metro-North's vicarious liability. The district court concluded that the taxi driver removed himself from the scope of his agency by drinking alcohol. In our view, the scope of the driver's agency presents a triable issue of fact. A driver who seeks to further his principal's core objective—driving a passenger to her destination—can do so on behalf of his principal even when he does so unsafely. In FELA cases, plaintiffs enjoy a relaxed burden of proof. Courts in such cases must therefore exercise caution before taking issues of agency (and thus liability) away from the jury.

BACKGROUND

Francois worked as a train conductor for Metro-North. Late one night, after completing the final run of her shift, Metro-North hired a taxi company, Hudson Valley Transportation, to transport Francois from the end of the train line back to her headquarters. The taxi company dispatched a driver, Michael Cellante, to pick Francois up.

When the trip began, Francois had no indication that Cellante had been drinking. But as the taxi proceeded onto the interstate, Francois noticed that Cellante was speeding and losing control of the vehicle. The taxi crashed into a ditch; Francois was injured.

A police officer investigating the accident cited Cellante for driving at an unsafe speed. Cellante, smelling of alcohol, told the officer that he had consumed four to five shots about an hour before he began to drive—and he subsequently failed a sobriety test with a blood alcohol content of 0.10%. Cellante was ultimately convicted of driving while his ability was impaired. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(1).

Francois sued Metro-North for negligence under FELA, a federal statute that makes railroad employers liable for certain of their employees' injuries. Although her complaint alleged a single FELA count, Francois asserted two theories of liability to support that count: First, that Metro-North bore direct liability for negligently hiring an impaired taxi driver to transport its employee; second, that Metro-North bore vicarious liability for the negligent driving of that taxi driver.¹

The district court, while acknowledging "that it is extremely rare in a FELA case to take the issues of agency or foreseeability away from a jury," granted summary judgment in favor of Metro-North on both theories. Francois v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., No. 20-CV-4439, 2023 WL 2711434, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Regarding direct liability, the district court noted that Francois introduced no evidence that Metro-North could have foreseen that Cellante would drink alcohol before driving Francois. Id. Regarding vicarious liability for the actions of Cellante, the district court determined that no reasonable jury could find that Cellante acted as Metro-North's agent by driving under the influence—because Metro-North's "goal of having the plaintiff transported safely from one location to another is undermined, not furthered, by its agent downing 4 to 5 shots of alcohol one hour before getting behind the wheel." Id.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a district court grants summary judgment for the defendant, we review de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Elliott v. Cartagena, 84 F.4th 481, 495 (2d Cir. 2023).

Under FELA, a railroad bears liability for injuries to one of its employees stemming from the negligence, "in whole or in part," of another one of the railroad's "officers, agents or employees." 45 U.S.C. § 51. "FELA does not make an employer strictly liable for workplace injuries." Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus "the plaintiff must prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation." Ojeda v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 41 F.4th 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

All the same, Congress passed FELA to broaden traditional tort remedies against railroad employers. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561-62, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987). We have observed that under FELA, a railroad employer "is potentially responsible for risks that would be too remote to support liability under common law." Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1994). "[T]here is a considerably more relaxed standard of proof for determining negligence in FELA cases, and a strong federal policy in favor of letting juries decide these cases." Sinclair, 985 F.2d at 76-77 (cleaned up). That means the jury's "right to pass upon the question of the employer's liability must be most liberally viewed." Ojeda, 41 F.4th at 71 (quoting Gallose v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1989)). At the summary judgment stage, a FELA action "must not be dismissed . . . unless there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a jury to find for the plaintiff." Syverson, 19 F.3d at 828.

This case presents two theories of FELA liability. Francois argues that Metro-North bears (1) direct liability for negligently hiring an impaired taxi driver, and (2) vicarious liability, also known as respondeat superior, on behalf of its agent,² the impaired driver, for that agent's own negligence which caused the accident. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Metro-North as to the first theory, but the second theory warrants a trial.

I. Direct Liability.

Francois's theory of direct liability fails because Metro-North had no notice that the taxi driver would decide to drive while impaired. To establish direct liability under FELA, the plaintiff must show that the railroad employer knew or had reason to know of an unsafe condition or that its agent might commit the relevant tort—in other words, what "a reasonably prudent person would anticipate in light of all the surrounding circumstances." Gallose, 878 F.2d at 86 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

There is no evidence that Metro-North knew, or should have foreseen, that the taxi driver would drive while impaired. Nothing in the record suggests that drivers dispatched by the taxi company (or indeed, this particular driver) had a propensity to drink before driving, or that Metro-North had any reason to suspect that the taxi driver would drive unsafely. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision as it pertains to direct liability.

II. Vicarious Liability.

By contrast, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on Francois's theory of vicarious liability. At the outset, we note several concessions by Metro-North that guide our analysis. For one, Metro-North concedes that the taxi driver acted as its agent by driving Francois. And although the taxi company served as an intermediary—it dispatched the taxi driver, Cellante—Metro-North does not argue that the intermediary severs or otherwise affects the agency relationship between Metro-North and Cellante. Finally, Metro-North concedes that Cellante drove negligently.

Still, a railroad is vicariously liable for its agent's negligence only when "the particular act performed negligently was also in the scope" of agency delegated by the railroad. Id. at 83 (quotation marks omitted). Vicarious liability asks both whether the act was within the scope of the tortfeasor's delegated agency and whether that act was generally foreseeable to the railroad as the principal. We address each inquiry in turn.

A. Scope of Agency.

An agent's scope of agency encompasses any acts "within the limits" of the agent's duties that can be construed as "attempting to further" the principal's "interests." Id. at 84. Conversely, it does not...