Franklin v. City of Kingsburg

1

VERNON FRANKLIN, Plaintiff v. CITY OF KINGSBURG and DOES 1-20 inclusive, Defendants

No. 1:18-CV-0824 AWI SKO

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 17, 2023

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

(DOC. NO. 51)

This is an employment dispute involving Plaintiff Vernon Franklin (“Franklin”) and his former employer the City of Kingsburg (“the City”). In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which is the operative complaint, Franklin alleges violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940) (“FEHA”), whistleblower retaliation under California Labor Code § 1102.5, invasion of privacy under California Civil Code § 56.20, Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is the City's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

From the FAC, from 2006 to 2018, Franklin was employed as a firefighter/paramedic by the City and was the City's only African-American firefighter/paramedic. At all relevant times, Franklin performed his tasks in an objectively reasonably and satisfactory manner. However, Franklin had experienced disparate treatment in some instances compared to non-African-American firefighters. Further, beginning in late 2015, after Franklin unsuccessfully requested training regarding the care, testing, maintenance, and servicing of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus equipment the City through Fire Chief Ray began to improperly discipline and retaliate against Franklin. This discipline and retaliation ultimately led to Franklin's termination in 2018, even though an Administrative Law Judge found in favor of Franklin and had ordered reinstatement.^[1]

Franklin filed complaints with the DFEH and the EEOC. Franklin received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on December 26 2017, and received a right to sue letter from the DFEH on September 1, 2017.

On March 26, 2018, Franklin filed his Original Complaint in the Fresno County Superior Court. See Doc. No. 1 at Ex. A. The Original Complaint contained only claims for violations of the FEHA, Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. See id.

Franklin presented a California Government Claims Act (“CGCA”) complaint to the City on March 28,2018, pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4.

The City denied the CGCA complaint on April 15, 2018.

On June 14, 2018, the City removed the case to this Court.

On June 21, 2018, the City filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 6.

On July 16, 2018, Franklin filed an opposition that included a proposed amended complaint that added claims under Labor Code § 1102.5 (hereinafter “§ 1102.5”) for whistleblower retaliation and under Civil Code § 56.20 (hereinafter “§ 56.20”) for invasion of privacy

On July 10, 2019, the Court issued an order on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Doc. No. 18. The Court dismissed the first cause of action (FEHA discrimination under § 12940(a)), the second cause of action (FEHA harassment under § 12940(j)), and the fifth cause of action (Title VII discrimination) for failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies. See id. The Court did not allow Franklin to file the proposed amended complaint, but instead required him to follow the formal procedures for filing an amended complaint. See id.

Pursuant to a stipulation, Franklin filed the FAC on September 12, 2019. See Doc. Nos. 21, 22. The FAC contains the same causes of action as the original Complaint, except that it added causes of action under § 1102.5 and § 56.20.^[2] Cf. Doc. No. 22 with Doc. No. 1 at Ex. A.

On May 29, 2020, the Court issued an order on a second Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by the City against the FAC. See Doc. No. 32. The Court again dismissed the first, second, and fifth causes of action because those claims had inadvertently been included in the FAC. See id. The Court also stayed the case pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. See id.

On April 2, 2021, Franklin filed a motion to amend. See Doc. No. 37.

On June 30, 2021, the Court denied the motion to amend and lifted the stay. See Doc. No. 42.

On July 21, 2022, the City filed a third Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 43.

On March 17, 2022, the Court granted the third motion in part and dismissed the third cause of action (FEHA retaliation under § 12940(h), the fourth cause of action (failure to provide a workplace free of harassment, retaliation, and discrimination in violation of FEHA § 12940(k)), the seventh cause of action (§ 1981), and the eighth cause of action (§ 1983). See Doc. No. 49. Following this order, the remaining claims in the FAC are the sixth cause of action (Title VII retaliation), the ninth cause of action (whistleblower retaliation under § 1102.5), and the tenth cause of action (invasion of privacy under § 56.20). See Doc. Nos. 18, 49.

On April 27, 2022, the City filed this Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Doc. No. 51. The City seeks judgment on the § 1102.5 and § 56.20 causes of action. See id.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK - RULE 12(c)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion applies to a Rule 12(c) motion. Gregg v. Department of Public Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017). The non-moving party's allegations are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-moving party's favor. See Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020); Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2019). Any allegations made by the moving party that have been denied or contradicted are assumed to be false. See MacDonald v. Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989).

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

Defendant's Arguments^[3]

The City argues that Franklin's ninth claim (whistleblower retaliation under § 1102.5) and tenth claim (invasion of privacy through § 56.20) should be dismissed because Franklin did not comply with the requirements of the CGCA. Specifically, to comply with the CGCA, Franklin was required to submit a tort claim with the City and receive a rejection notice before commencing suit. However, Franklin commenced his suit prior to the City's April 17, 2018 denial of his CGCA complaint. Because amendment cannot cure this non-compliance with the CGCA, judgment should be entered against Franklin on the ninth and tenth causes of action.

In reply, the City argues inter alia that Franklin's position that only claims that are expressly labeled “cause of action” in a complaint are considered properly alleged is contrary to California law. In California, a complaint will be adequate if its factual allegations support a cause of action on any available legal theory, irrespective of whether the legal theory is identified or not. The Original Complaint filed in state court contained the factual allegations that served as the bases of Franklin's CGCA complaint and the express § 1102.5 and § 56.20 claims in the FAC. Because these facts were alleged in the Original Complaint, the Original Complaint contained the § 1102.5 and § 56.20 causes of action. Also, in his oppositions to prior motions to dismiss Franklin admitted that invasion of privacy was pled and a recovery was sought for this injury in the Original Complaint. To accept Franklin's position would nullify the entirety of the CGCA, whose purpose is to provide a public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them (if appropriate) without the need for the expense of litigation. The City has not been spared the litigation for the two CGCA claims in this case because it is incurring litigation costs for covered claims before a CGCA complaint was even filed.

Plaintiff's Opposition

Franklin argues that the City is misreading the applicable requirements of the CGCA. Government Code § 945.4 prohibits a party from bringing a cause of action against a public entity until after the cause of action has been presented and the claim acted upon by the public entity. However, no causes of action subject to the CGCA were alleged in the FAC until after the City denied the CGCA claim. The causes of action alleged in the Original Complaint were not subject to the CGCA. The FAC was filed because the City had finally denied the CGCA claim. That is, the ninth and tenth causes of action appeared in the FAC, and the FAC was filed after the City denied the CGCA claim. Therefore, the ninth and tenth causes of action comply with the CGCA. The City cites no case law that holds that a complaint that contains only CGCA exempt causes of action cannot be amended to include CGCA applicable causes of action after a governmental entity denies a CGCA claim.

Legal Standard

Suits for money or damages against a California public/governmental entity are regulated by the CGCA. DiCampli-Mintz v County of Santa Clara, 55 Cal.4th 983, 989 (2012). In part, the CGCA provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or has been deemed to have been rejected . . . .” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4; DiCampli-Mintz, 55 Cal.4th at 990. That is, “[o]nly after the public entity's board has acted upon or is deemed to have rejected the claim may the injured person bring a lawsuit alleging a cause of...