Franklin v. Dominion Energy Inc.

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RITA RENE FRANKLIN, Plaintiff, v. DOMINION ENERGY INCORPORATED and PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA INCORPORATED, d/b/a Dominion Energy North Carolina, Defendants.

Civil Action No. TDC-22-0361

United States District Court, D. Maryland

October 18, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THEODORE D. CHUANG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Rita R. Franklin, who is self-represented, has filed a civil action against Defendants Dominion Energy Incorporated (“DEI”) and Public Service Company of North Carolina Incorporated, d/b/a Dominion Energy North Carolina (“PSCNC”) in which she has alleged multiple federal and state causes of action, including a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-168l x (2018), and state law claims of debt collection without a license, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and the unauthorized practice of law. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Having reviewed the Complaint and the briefs, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2010, PSCNC filed a complaint against Franklin in the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina (“the First North Carolina Case”) alleging that that she breached a contract by failing to pay her obligations under a financing contract for a water heater. On April 13, 2010 that court entered a default judgment against Franklin in the amount of $1,685.42, plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs.

Over the next 10 years, Franklin did not pay any part of the judgment, so PSCNC filed a second case in North Carolina on March 16, 2020 to renew the default judgment (“the Second North Carolina Case”). On April 2, 2020 Franklin filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging in part that she was not properly served in the First North Carolina Case that she was not presented with any evidence that PSCNC was a valid corporation, and that the alleged debts were time-barred. In the same filing, Franklin asserted certain claims against PSCNC, which the state court construed as counterclaims (collectively, “the Counterclaim”), including that PSCNC violated the FCRA, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C § 1692, and the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2022), by accessing Franklin's credit report and seeking to collect the debt, all of which caused her credit score to decline. On June 15, 2020, PSCNC filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer to the Counterclaim as well as a Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 5, 2021, after Franklin failed to appear at a hearing on these motions, the North Carolina court dismissed Franklin's Counterclaim for failure to state a legal claim, found that PSCNC was authorized to access Franklin's credit report, and granted summary judgment against Franklin.

Meanwhile, on February 3, 2021, Franklin filed suit against PSCNC in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County (“the Maryland Case”) alleging fraud in securing the judgments in the North Carolina cases, violations of the FDCPA and the “FTC Act,” collection of a debt without a license, and the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland without a license. Five days later, on February 8, 2021, Franklin sent a letter to DEI in Richmond, Virginia requesting information about the relationship between DEI and PSCNC. In response, Franklin received a February 22, 2021 letter from Pamela Keenan, an attorney at the law firm of Kirschbaum, Nanney, Keenan & Griffin, P.A. in Raleigh, North Carolina, denying her request for information. On September 13, 2021, Franklin sent a second letter, to which DEI did not respond. On March 16, 2022, Franklin voluntarily dismissed the Maryland Case.

On February 22, 2022, Franklin filed the instant action in this Court against PSCNC and DEL Construed liberally, the presently operative Amended Complaint alleges various causes of action relating to PSCNC's advancement of the Second North Carolina Case. First, Franklin alleges that Defendants failed to comply with debt collection requirements, see Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-1203 (Lexis Nexis 2020), by having the law firm of Kirschbaum, Nanney, Keena & Griffin, P.A. seek to collect a debt when the firm was not licensed as a debt collector in Maryland, and by failing to provide required documentation to validate the debt and the right of PSCNC and DEI to collect the debt. Franklin also asserts that the debt was no longer subject to collection because it is over 12 years old and that any action to collect it is time-barred.

Second, Franklin alleges that Defendants engaged in fraudulent misrepresentations, in violation of Maryland criminal law, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-402 (Lexis Nexis 2021), based on the filing in April 2019 of an Assumed Business Name Certificate (“ABNC”), pursuant to North Carolina law, which was signed by individuals who were not authorized signatories. Franklin also alleges that the use of the ABNC constituted a violation of her right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018).

Third, Franklin asserts a claim of fraudulent concealment, based on Keenan's refusal to provide proof of Defendants' standing to collect the debt in response to Franklin's February 8, 2021 and September 13, 2021 letters and Defendants' overall efforts to collect a debt not owed to them.

Fourth, Franklin alleges that Defendants violated the FCRA by improperly accessing and misusing her credit report without permission.

Fifth, Franklin alleges that Keenan engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, based on her response to Franklin's letters as an attorney for Defendants while not licensed to practice in Maryland or Virginia. See Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. §§ 10-601, 10-602 (Lexis Nexis 2018).

DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Franklin's Amended Complaint on the grounds that (1) the claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; and (2) Franklin has failed to state a plausible claim for relief.

I. Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Id. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party's complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).

II. Res Judicata

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in an earlier decision “precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345,354 (4th Cir. 2004). Federal courts give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that would be given to that judgment under the law of the State in which it was rendered. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Where the judgment asserted to have preclusive effect was a judgment of a North Carolina state court, the Court applies North Carolina law relating to res judicata. See Id. Under North Carolina law, “a prior adjudication on the merits in a prior suit bars a subsequent, identical cause of action between the same parties or their privies, and also prevents re litigation of claims that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have been presented for determination in the prior action.” Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. AU. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 846 S.E.2d 701, 708 (N.C. 2020) (internal citation omitted). “The essential elements of res judicata are: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.” Id. at 708-09.

Here, res judicata bars most of Franklin's claims. The first element is met because a final judgment was rendered in the Second North Carolina Case when the North Carolina court granted summary judgment to PSCNC on its claims and dismissed Franklin's counterclaims for failure to state a claim. “In general, a cause of action determined by an order for summary judgment is a final judgment on the merits.” Green v. Dixon, 528 S.E.2d 51, 55 ( N.C. Ct. App. 2000), aff'd, 535 S.E.2d 356 (N.C. 2000) (per curiam). Similarly, it is “well-settled” that a dismissal for failure to state a claim “operates as an adjudication on the merits unless the court specifies that the dismissal is without prejudice.” Hill v. West, 657 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); see also Whedon v. Whedon, 328 S.E.2d 437, 443 (N.C. 1985) (stating that “[o]rdinarily an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication upon the merits and ends the lawsuit”). Therefore, the Second North Carolina Case resulted in a final judgment on the merits on both PSCNC's claims and Franklin's counterclaims.

Next the second element of res judicata is met as to Franklin's claims...