Franklin v. Vannoy

CHARLES FRANKLIN v. DARRYL VANNOY

Civil Action No. 20-01013-WBV

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

April 18, 2022

SECTION D (1)

ORDER

WENDY B. VITTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

The Court, having considered the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ^[1] the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, ^[2] and the Objections filed by petitioner Charles Franklin, ^[3] hereby overrules Petitioner's objections, approves the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and adopts it as its opinion in this matter.

I PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS

On April 2, 2020, Petitioner Charles Franklin filed a Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court.^[4] On October 29 2021, the Court ordered Petitioner to supplement the record with exhibits referenced in his Petition, which were not previously provided to the Court.^[5] Petitioner responded on November 30, 2021.^[6] On January 3, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation to the Court, giving Petitioner thirty days to file objections.^[7] Thereafter, on January 10, 2022, the Petitioner timely filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation based upon: (1) the trial court's denial of a challenge for cause during jury selection; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the same three errors addressed in Petitioner's direct appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit, as well as the basis for his Petition for habeas relief.^[8]

Regarding his objection that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause during jury selection, Petitioner argues that the Court erred in not granting the defendant's challenge for cause for a (then) current law clerk to a judge who had recused herself from the trial.^[9] Petitioner argues that, “Although Mr. Handgartner gave all of the ‘correct' answers during voir dire, he still should have been excused for a number of reasons.”^[10] Petitioner then argues that the potential juror's employment history would cause him to view the case in a pro-prosecution light and potentially unduly influence the jury. Petitioner also contends that the potential juror should have been excused as “he could not help but realize that except for the grace of God, the victim could have been his child.”^[11] Additionally, Petitioner relies on state law to assert that prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause if erroneously denied by the trial court and all of the defendant's peremptory challenges are exhausted.^[12]

Regarding Petitioner's objection of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Petitioner asserts that his appellate attorney raised only a single claim on direct appeal and was ineffective for not bringing up the denial of the challenge for cause of the potential juror on appeal.

Petitioner's arguments regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel are threefold: First, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two subpoenaed witnesses, Crystal Smith and Vincent Williams. Secondly, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly impeach the state's witnesses, particularly fact witness Johnny Perry and New Orleans Police Detective Tim Bender. Finally, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial during the State's closing argument.

II. ANALYSIS

The Court notes that Petitioner's objections are addressed extensively in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, although noted as “claims” rather than objections.^[13] Additionally, Petitioner does not point to any new evidence or testimony in support of his objections that was not provided to the Magistrate Judge. A review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation reveals that she had access to, and referenced, the entire state record and trial transcript, as well as the appellate briefs.

This Court has done the same, conducting a de novo review of the entire record in light of Petitioner's objections even though, as noted, the objections are identical to the issues raised in the Petition.^[14] As to Petitioner's first objection/ground for relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial judge incorrectly denied his challenge for cause of a potential juror. The record reveals that the potential juror indicated “I don't know anything about this case” and further, when questioned about why the judge he clerked for recused herself, responded, “I don't know anything about it. I didn't even know she recused herself.”^[15] He further answered that “If I am selected I will follow whatever law the judge gives me.”^[16] Additionally, the trial court allowed the attorneys to question the potential juror in the judge's chambers as to whether he was aware of the basis of his judge's recusal, namely, that the father of one of the victims was a court employee. During that questioning, the potential juror confirmed that he did not know the victim's father nor was he aware that her father was a court employee and that information would not affect him in any way.^[17] Nothing in the record evinces a bias on the part of the potential juror or any other grounds for removal by the granting of a challenge for cause.^[18] Further, and as correctly noted by the Magistrate Judge, the U.S. Supreme Court has held:

We have long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimensions. They are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.^[19]

Petitioner does not allege that the jury was not impartial; indeed, he makes no claims as to the bias or partiality of any juror. The only objection by Petitioner is to a potential juror who made no prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury venire and, importantly, was ultimately not seated as a juror in the trial. As such, Petitioner's objection regarding the trial court's failure to grant his challenge for cause is overruled.

Petitioner's next objection/ground for relief is that his appellate attorney was ineffective for raising only one ground on appeal and for failing to include as a ground for appeal the denial of the challenge of cause of the juror. This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's analysis. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, ^[20] a defendant must show (1) “that counsel's performance was deficient, ” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”^[21] A finding of deficient performance requires a showing that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”^[22] Further, “The Supreme Court has recognized that one of appellate counsel's core duties is to distinguish weak claims from strong claims and focus the court's attention only on the strong claims on appeal.”^[23] As noted by the Fifth Circuit, “Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.”^[24] No such showing has been made here. Indeed, for the reasons stated above in ruling on Petitioner's objections regarding the denial of his challenge for cause of the potential juror, the Court is convinced that Petitioner's appellate attorney was correct in concluding that this would have been a weak issue to raise on appeal. As noted herein, the potential juror was not seated and nothing in the record supports any claim that a biased or partial jury was seated in this matter. Petitioner's objection regarding his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is overruled.

Petitioner's final objection/ground for relief is a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two subpoenaed witnesses, Crystal Smith and Vincent Williams. Secondly, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly impeach the state's witnesses, particularly fact witness Johnny Perry and New Orleans Police Detective Tim Bender. Finally, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial during the State's closing argument.

As detailed above, the controlling standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is set forth in Strickland v Washington.^[25] In order to prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”^[26] Petitioner has not provided any evidence whatsoever that the result of the proceeding would have been difference had his trial counsel called Crystal Smith, who he had previously been in a romantic relationship with, to testify. In her Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge conducted a very thorough review of the record in analyzing this claim. Indeed, more than half of the report focuses on the exhaustive analysis of this claim. The Magistrate Judge spent over six pages detailing the trial court's detailed findings issued when it denied Petitioner's post-conviction relief.^[27] Those findings are important as the trial judge heard the evidence presented at trial. Petitioner must show that, but for his attorney's failures, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Regarding Petitioner's claim that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to call Crystal Smith as a witness the trial court noted that “This Court...