Franks v. Chairperson & Members of the Ohio Adult Parole Auth.

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JERRY FRANKS, Plaintiff, v. CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS OF THE OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-5804

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

February 6, 2023

JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jerry Franks, an inmate at the Pickaway Correctional Institution (“PCI”) (ECF No. 1) who is proceeding without counsel, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that all other pending motions, with the exception of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 48) be DENIED AS MOOT. Defendants' Motion to Strike the Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 48) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on September 1, 2021, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “Chairperson & Members of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority,” Stacy Blankenburg, Supervisor & Officials of the Ohio Bureau of Sentence Computation and Annette Chambers Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following. Plaintiff was convicted on July 12, 1997, of aggravated murder with firearm specifications and was sentenced to “an aggregate and indefinite sentence of 33-years to life.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Following an appeal and remand, he was resentenced on January 29, 1999, to an “aggregate sentence of 23-years to life making [him] eligible for parole in ... 2019.” (Id. at ¶ 12.) In 2018, Plaintiff “noticed” that Defendants had miscalculated the Sentencing Entry and his parole eligibility, increasing the date by five years to 2024. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Upon this discovery, he “submitted written correspondence” to BOSC requesting that this miscalculation be corrected. (Id. at ¶ 14.) The BOSC refused to correct the error. (Id.) After he exhausted his state remedies, he filed a second habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 4, 2020, in the Northern District of Ohio “seeking an order directing the State to provide him with a parole hearing in accordance with his minimum sentence.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) That court determined that the petition was “second or successive” and required authorization from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (Id.) On April 15, 2021, the Sixth Circuit vacated the transfer and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice to filing a § 1983 claim. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff's co-defendant, who had received the same 23-year sentence, was provided a parole hearing in 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff characterizes his claims as arising under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.

On May 13, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer setting forth various affirmative defenses including a statute of limitations defense. (ECF No. 12.) Defendants' counsel specifically noted that they were “unable to respond on behalf of Plaintiff's named defendants ‘Members of the Ohio Parole Authority' and ‘Officials of the Ohio Bureau of Sentence Computation' as these descriptions are too vague to identify any specific individuals'” but that, to the extent any response is deemed necessary, “any allegations against the unidentified individuals are DENIED.” (Id. at n.1.)

Following these pleadings, several other filings have been made, including Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed on September 2, 2022, asserting that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations and, as to Defendant Chambers-Smith, for failure to state a claim and pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. (ECF No. 26.) For his part, Plaintiff has made numerous filings, including a “Motion for Stipulation, Joinder and Consolidation of Defendants being Sued in their Official Capacities” (ECF No. 18); a letter dated June 29, 2022, alleging the “confiscation of original court documents” (ECF No. 19)^[1]; a Motion for Leave to Supplement the Complaint (ECF No. 36); a Motion to Strike Insufficient Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations (ECF No. 38); a Motion for Leave, or as a Matter of Course, for an extension of time to File Reply to Defendants' Opposition Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement Complaint/Pleadings (ECF No. 39); a Motion Requesting Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts (ECF No. 40); a Motion for Leave, as a Matter of Course, for an Extension of Time to Extend Discovery Deadline (ECF No. 41); a Motion Requesting Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis for Service of Process of Supplemental Complaint Upon Counsel for Defendants (ECF No. 45); a Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 46); and a Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 47).

Most recently, on February 2, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Supplemental Complaint, (ECF No.48), citing Plaintiff's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 15 and, therefore, this Motion (ECF No. 48) is GRANTED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

At the outset, the Court must address the circumstance of Defendants' having filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after having filed an Answer. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Further, “‘[w]hen the allegations show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, dismissal is proper under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.'” Father Flanagan's Boys Home v. Donlon, 449 F.Supp.3d 739, 743 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting G.G. Marck & Assocs. v. Peng, 762 Fed.Appx. 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2019)). However, Rule 12(b) further provides that such a motion “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit has determined, however, that, “‘as a matter of motions practice, such a motion may be properly considered as one for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and evaluated, nonetheless, under the standards for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).'” Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, Inc., 2013 WL 623495, *2 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 19, 2013) (quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc. 859 F.2d 434, n.1 (6th Cir.1988)); see also 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice And Procedure § 1368 (2016) (“Because of the similarity between the Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b) standards, courts typically will construe. . . a late Rule 12(b) motion. . . as if it were brought under Rule 12(c).”). Accordingly, the Court will construe Defendants' Motion as one for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) and evaluate it under the standards for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) as set forth below.

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to “move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Jackson v. Prof'l Radiology, Inc., 864 F.3d 463, 465-66 (6th Cir. 2017).

To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff's “factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. Of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). To show grounds for relief, Rule 8(a) requires that the complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Rule “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pleadings offering mere “labels and conclusions' or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. In fact, “courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court “must take all the ‘well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party' as true.”Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Beazer Homes Invs., LLC, 594 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006)). But the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Jackson, 864 F.3d at 466 (quoting Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Accordingly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim is plausible where “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n] - ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,'” judgment on the pleadings shall be granted. Id.

Finally “[p]ro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and therefore are liberally construed.” Olivares v. Michigan Worker's Comp. Agency, No. 18-2369, 2019 WL 2299250, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2019) (citing Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th...