Frazier v. Maynard

Everett Frazier, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. Teresa Maynard, Director and Chief Hearing Examiner,Office of Administrative Hearings, and Clarence Sigley, Respondents Below, Respondents

No. 19-0362

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

November 5, 2020

(Kanawha County 19-P-47)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The petitioner herein, Everett Frazier,¹ Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General Elaine L. Skorich, appeals from an order entered March 12, 2019, by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. In its order, the circuit court denied as premature the writ of prohibition requested by the DMV against the respondents herein, Teresa Maynard, Director and Chief Hearing Examiner of the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"), by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey, Assistant Solicitor General Thomas T. Lampman, and Assistant Attorney General Mark S. Weiler, and Clarence Sigley ("Mr. Sigley"), by counsel Todd F. La Neve.

This Court has considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the appendix and supplemental appendix records on appeal. Upon consideration of the standard of review and the applicable law, we find no substantial question of law has been presented nor is there prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In this license revocation case, the driver, Mr. Sigley, was arrested and charged with DUI of a controlled substance on April 5, 2017. The DMV issued an order revoking his driver's license, Mr. Sigley timely requested an administrative hearing to challenge his license revocation, and thecase remained pending, with numerous hearing continuances requested by both the DMV and Mr. Sigley.

As a result of this incident, Mr. Sigley also faced criminal charges as to which he signed a plea of guilty to DUI (controlled substances), with the adjudication thereof deferred for one year and with the charges ultimately to be dismissed if he complied with the terms of the deferment. Although Mr. Sigley signed the plea agreement on March 21, 2018, the magistrate presiding over his case did not sign or enter the guilty plea; therefore, Mr. Sigley has not been convicted of his criminal charges,² and the magistrate court ultimately dismissed the criminal charges against Mr. Sigley upon his successful completion of the terms of his deferred adjudication on March 21, 2019.³ Following Mr. Sigley's signing of his guilty plea, the DMV issued an order revoking his driver's license based upon a conviction of DUI (controlled substances) by guilty plea. Mr. Sigley timely requested a hearing before the OAH to challenge this license revocation, which request the OAH denied, in part, because he had been granted a hearing with respect to his first license revocation for this incident. Ultimately, the DMV withdrew its first license revocation order, leaving the second license revocation order, based upon Mr. Sigley's guilty plea, intact. As a result, the OAH rescinded its denial of Mr. Sigley's request for an administrative hearing regarding his second license revocation and allowed Mr. Sigley's administrative appeal of his second license revocation to proceed to hearing.

While the matter was pending for an OAH hearing as to Mr. Sigley's second license revocation, the DMV filed the underlying petition for writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on February 12, 2019, seeking to prevent the OAH from conducting its hearing. The DMV claimed that the OAH could not hold a hearing in this matter because the scope of OAH hearings regarding license revocations based upon a conviction, here ostensibly by way of guilty plea, is limited to an identity determination of whether the driver whose license is revoked is the same person as the defendant named in the judgment of conviction pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-1a(c).⁴ Before the OAH or Mr. Sigley could respond to the DMV's petition, however, the circuit court denied prohibitory relief finding the DMV's request to be premature since the OAH had not yet held a hearing in this matter. Specifically, by order entered March 12, 2019, the circuit court found that the DMV was attempting to preempt the OAH from conducting an administrative hearing in accordance with its express statutory authority⁵ to do so; that the OAH should be allowed to conduct the administrative hearing in this case; and that the DMV could then appeal to the circuit court should the OAH render an adverse decision. From the circuit court's ruling, the DMV now appeals to this Court.

On appeal to this Court, the DMV challenges the circuit court's denial of its petition for a writ of prohibition. We previously have held that "[t]he standard of appellate review of a circuit court's refusal to grant relief through an extraordinary writ of prohibition is de novo." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Callahan v. Santucci, 210 W. Va. 483, 557 S.E.2d 890 (2001). To determine whetherthe DMV is entitled to the prohibitory relief it seeks, we consider the factors governing the issuance of a writ of prohibition:

In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). Application of these factors to the facts of this case establishes that the circuit court correctly denied the writ of prohibition requested by the DMV because it has not demonstrated that it is entitled to the extraordinary relief that it seeks.

The first Hoover factor requires us to determine "whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief." Syl. pt. 4, in part, id. Because the underlying proceeding stems from the driver's appeal of the administrative revocation of his driver's license, it is governed by the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") which "generally provides for judicial review of contested administrative cases." Johnson v. Comm'r, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 178 W. Va. 675, 677, 363 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1987). In relevant part, the APA directs that "[a]ny party adversely affected by a final order or decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter[.]" W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) (emphasis added). The parties do not dispute that this matter satisfies the contested case requirement, and the APA specifically allows "any party," without limitation or qualification, to request judicial review of an adverse administrative ruling. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the DMV has not satisfied the first Hoover factor because it has other adequate means, through a direct appeal to the circuit court, to obtain the relief it seeks herein. See Syl. pt. 4, in part, Hoover, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12.

Likewise, the DMV fails to meet the second Hoover factor: "whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal." Syl. pt. 4, in part, id. As noted in the preceding discussion, the APA contemplates the procedure to be followed when a party desires to seek relief from an administrative decision. That procedure specifically permits the aggrieved party to apply for "judicial review" of the adverse decision, W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) (emphasis added), not extraordinary relief. Therefore, it is apparent that the Legislature, when adopting this specific provision of the APA, deemed an appeal to be an adequate remedy for a party to obtain relief from an unfavorable administrative ruling such as the OAH hearing that theDMV tried to prevent in this case. As such, the second Hoover factor is not satisfied in this case. Syl. pt. 4, in part, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12.

The third Hoover factor finds prohibition to be appropriate where "the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law." Syl. pt. 4, in part, id. The circuit court's ruling denying the DMV's requested writ of prohibition is not erroneous for three reasons. First, with respect to the present procedural posture of the case, we previously have held that

"[p]rohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from proceedings in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are exceeding their legitimate powers, and may not be used as a substitute for [a petition for appeal] or certiorari." Syl. Pt. 1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W. Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953).

Syl. pt. 3, Hoover, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (emphasis added). As explained in the foregoing analysis, the Legislature specifically has designated judicial review, i.e. a petition for appeal to the circuit court, as the method by which to challenge a decision rendered by an administrative tribunal, such as the OAH in this case. See W....