Freeland v. Findlay's Tall Timbers Distribution Ctr., LLC

681 F.Supp.3d 58

Eric FREELAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FINDLAY'S TALL TIMBERS DISTRIBUTION CENTER, LLC d/b/a Ohio Logistics, Defendant.

Case # 22-CV-6415-FPG

United States District Court, W.D. New York

Signed July 11, 2023

Brian Scott Schaffer, Hunter G. Benharris, Fitapelli & Schaffer LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Christopher Paul Maugans, Goldberg Segalla LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

FRANK P. GERACI, JR., United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff Eric Freeland filed this putative wage-and-hour class action against Defendant Findlay's Tall Timbers Distribution Center, LLC d/b/a Ohio Logistics. See generally ECF No. 1.¹ On January 11, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. Plaintiff filed his response on February 8, 2023, ECF No. 12, and Defendant replied on March 1, 2023, ECF No. 15. As explained below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Defendant is an Ohio-based company that provides warehousing and logistical support services throughout the eastern United States. ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.² From April 2021 through April 2022, Defendant employed Plaintiff at one of its warehouses in Painted Post, New York. Id. ¶ 55. Plaintiff's duties involved, among other things, lifting and carrying equipment and freight, operating heavy machinery, and breaking down ceramic parts by hand. Id. ¶ 58.

Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly wage, and he received his paychecks on a biweekly basis. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7. Defendant also paid Plaintiff bonuses, including attendance bonuses. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff often worked more than forty hours per week and earned overtime pay for doing so. Id. ¶¶ 56-57. His overtime rate reflected one and one-half times his usual hourly rate, but did not reflect the bonuses that he received during the relevant pay periods. Id.; see ECF No. 1-1.

On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). See generally ECF No. 1. He alleges that (1) Defendant violated the FSLA by failing to include non-discretionary bonuses in the rate of pay used to calculate his overtime rate; (2) Defendant violated the NYLL for the same reason; (3) Defendant violated NYLL § 191(1)(a) by paying him on a biweekly basis; and (4) Defendant violated NYLL § 195(3) by providing wage statements that inaccurately stated the overtime rate to which he was entitled. See id. ¶¶ 68-72, 73-76, 77-80, 81-83.

Plaintiff seeks to bring his FSLA claim on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendant as hourly workers (the "FSLA Collective"). ECF No. 1 ¶ 33. Plaintiff seeks to bring his NYLL claims on behalf of himself and all persons who worked for Defendant as hourly workers in New York between February 9, 2016, and the date of final judgment in this matter. Id. ¶ 45.

On January 11, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See ECF No. 8. Defendant has also moved, in the alternative, to strike any class claims outside of the period of Plaintiff's employment. ECF No. 8-4 at 26-27.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it," Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000), such as when a plaintiff lacks standing, Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2016). In considering a facial motion to dismiss for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must "determine whether the [complaint] alleges facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has standing to sue." Carter, 822 F.3d at 56-57. In doing so, the Court must accept as true all material factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 57; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

II. Article III Standing

Article III restricts federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 732, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). "That restriction requires that the party invoking federal jurisdiction have standing—the personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation." Id. The " 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). In order to plausibly plead an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 339, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130).

III. Rule 12(b)(6)

To succeed on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the defendant must show that the complaint contains insufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint is plausible when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts that allow the Court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Plausibility "is not akin to a probability requirement." Id. Instead, plausibility requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A pleading that consists of "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In considering the plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). At the same time, the Court is not required to accord "[l]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness." In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. ECF No. 8-4 at 2. With respect to Plaintiff's overtime claims, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible overtime claim under both federal and New York law. Id. at 21-22. With respect to Plaintiff's untimely pay claim under NYLL § 191(1)(a), Defendant seeks dismissal on three grounds: (1) that Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury-in-fact sufficient to support standing; (2) that the relevant statute does not provide for a private right of action; and (3) that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he was a manual worker to whom the statute applies. Id. at 8-19. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's wage statement claim under NYLL §195(3) for lack of standing on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege an injury in fact. Id. at 7-8. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to represent a class with claims arising outside of the period of his employment. Id. at 23-24. The Court considers each argument in turn.

I. Federal and State Overtime Claims

Plaintiff alleges that during his employment, he frequently worked over forty hours per week and that Defendant did not include certain non-discretionary bonuses when calculating his overtime rate in violation of the FSLA and the NYLL. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 57, 70-71, 74-75. Defendant contends that Plaintiff's federal and state overtime claims should be dismissed because he has failed to adequately allege that Defendant improperly excluded a bonus in calculating his overtime rate or that his overtime pay was improperly calculated. ECF No. 8-4 at 21. The Court disagrees. As explained below, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of the FSLA and NYLL with respect to Defendant's calculation of his overtime rate, and Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's federal and state overtime claims is therefore denied.

Under the FSLA, an employer must pay overtime at one and one-half times the employee's "regular rate" of pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). An employee's regular rate includes "all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of the employee," with certain enumerated exceptions. Id. § 207(e). Whether an employer must include a bonus in determining an employee's regular rate depends on whether the bonus is discretionary or non-discretionary. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.211. A bonus is discretionary, and therefore excludable, if the employer retains discretion as to both the fact of payment and the amount "until a time quite close to the end of the period for which the bonus is paid." Id. § 778.211(b). Bonuses "announced to employees to induce them to work more steadily or more rapidly or more efficiently or to remain with the firm are regarded as part of the regular rate of pay. Most...