Freeman v. Harris

ANTONIO FREEMAN

v.BOBBY HARRIS, et al.

NO. 3:10-0071

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

Dated: November 18, 2010

REPORT AND RECOMENDATION

TO: Honorable Aleta A. Trauger, District Judge

By Order entered February 10, 2010 (Docket Entry No. 7), this action was referred to the Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.

Presently pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 25), to which the Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Docket Entry No. 31). Also before the Court is the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 43) and motion for leave to file an amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 40).¹ Set out below is the Court's recommendation for disposition of the motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff is an inmate at the Sumner County Jail ("Jail"). He brought this action pro se and in forma pauperis on January 21, 2010, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil rights. Named as defendants are the Gallatin Police Department and Gallatin Police Officer Bobby Harris.

The Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Harris on November 21, 2008. Defendant Harris, in an attempt to make a controlled drug purchase from the Plaintiff, had sent a confidential informant to an apartment with marked currency and equipped with a transmitting/recording device. Shortly after the informant entered the apartment, the device became inoperable and Defendant Harris made a forced entry into the apartment with his weapon drawn. In addition to the Plaintiff and the informant, a female occupant and a young baby were inside the apartment. Defendant Harris secured the apartment and arrested the Plaintiff after finding him in possession of the marked currency. Defendant Harris then transported the Plaintiff to the Jail.

At the Jail, Defendant Harris went before a judicial commissioner and swore out an affidavit of complaint against the Plaintiff for the offense of intent to sell a schedule II controlled substance, specifically crack cocaine, based upon the events of that day. See Attachment to Complaint. Defendant Harris also swore out an affidavit of complaint against the Plaintiff for the offense of possession of a schedule II controlled substance, specifically, crack cocaine, based upon events occurring the prior day when Defendant Harris and another officer had found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the apartment after searching it.² See Docket Entry No. 31-3. The judicial commissioner found probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff on the offenses, set a composite bond of $50,000.00, and scheduled a further hearing before the Sumner County General Sessions Court. Id. The Plaintiff was unable to make the bond and remained in custody. After a preliminary hearing on January 21, 2009, the charge of intent to sell was dismissed. However, the Plaintiff remained in custody on the other criminal charges.³

The Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of a warrantless and illegal search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and in violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. He also alleges that he was falsely arrested as evidenced by the dismissal of the intent to sell charge at the preliminary hearing, that he was illegally detained and falsely imprisoned in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the bail set in his case was excessive. Finally, the Plaintiff contends that he had numerous items of personal property stored in the apartment, which was being rented by his brother, that were stolen or lost because Defendant Harris did not secure the property after arresting the Plaintiff. He seeks compensation for the value of this property.

In lieu of an answer, the Defendants have filed the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations because his action was not timely filed within one year after the date of his arrest. The Defendants also contend that, although the complaint does not specifically set out claims under state law, to the extent that the complaint can be construed to assert claims under state law, any such claims are barred by either the applicable statute of limitations and/or by Tennessee's Governmental Tort Liability Act ("TGTLA"), Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-20-201.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on his claims until the preliminary hearing conducted on January 21, 2009, rendering his complaint, which was filed exactly one year later, timely. In his motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 43), the Plaintiff argues that his acquittal on all of the charges which were brought against him evidences the merit of his claims and that he has provided sufficient evidence supporting his claims to warrant a trial.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Defendants filed their motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff's response includes as supporting exhibits copies of documents which were outside the pleadings. Further, the Plaintiff has filed his own factual declarations in support of his claims, as well as a motion for summary judgment. The Court shall not exclude this evidence in its review of the Defendants' pending motion and, in accordance with Rule 12(d), shall treat the Defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(2). To prevail, the moving party must meet the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the opposing party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001).

In determining whether the moving party has met his burden, the Court must view the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). "The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matters asserted, 'but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, LLC, 219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case with respect to which he has the burden, however, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 187 F.3d 533, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1999). To preclude summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Shah v. Racetrac Petroleum Co., 338 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). If the evidence offered by the nonmoving party is "merely colorable," or "not significantly probative," or not enough to lead a fair-minded jury to find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52. "A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate." Hill v. White, 190 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49).

III. CONCLUSIONS

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed because they were not timely filed. Congress did not establish a limitations period applicable to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; therefore, federal courts look to analogous state statutes of limitations to determine the applicable statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 262, 268-71, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Southerland v. Hardaway Mgmt. Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 250, 253 (6th Cir. 1995). For all Section 1983 actions, federal courts apply the personal injury statute of limitations which would apply under state law. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280; Eidson v. State of Tennessee Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The statute of limitations for personal injury arising in Tennessee and brought under federal civil rights statutes is one year. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997); Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1992); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986).

Although the duration of the applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is governed by state law, the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run is determined by federal law. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268-71; Eidson, 510 F.3d at 635; Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1986). Generally, a limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should...