Freeman v. State

373 So.3d 1255

Shanta FREEMAN, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D21-3552

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

October 4, 2023

Rehearing Denied November 28, 2023

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Jennie Kinsey, Judge.

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael L. Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Rowe, J.

Shanta Freeman appeals her conviction for aggravated battery with great bodily harm and with a weapon following her no contest plea. She argues that the trial court reversibly erred when it denied her motions to: (1) dismiss on grounds of immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2021), and (2) suppress statements she made to law enforcement. We affirm as to both issues and write only to address Freeman’s argument on the immunity motion.

The trial court denied the motion after concluding that the State overcame Freeman’s prima fade claim of self-defense immunity by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the trial court’s ruling for a different reason—the State had no burden to overcome Freeman’s prima facie claim because Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim in the first place. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) ("[I]f a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record."). The record provides an adequate basis for this Court to conclude as a matter of law that Freeman’s boilerplate motion to dismiss and her arguments at the immunity hearing did not raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity.

Facts

In May 2016, while at her mother’s home, Freeman received a phone call from her son’s school. Freeman’s son was misbehaving and needed to be picked up. After Freeman picked up her son, she was observed in front of the school grabbing him by the arm and "popping him on his butt." Soon after, a Department of Children and Families worker appeared at Freeman’s mother’s home to check on the welfare of Freeman’s son. Freeman became upset and frustrated and began cursing at her mother. Freeman’s actions upset the victim, a friend of Freeman’s mother, who was present during the confrontation.

The victim chastised Freeman for being disrespectful to her mother. An argument ensued. The victim and Freeman began exchanging punches. But the victim tried to walk away from the argument by leaving the house to go to her car. Freeman blocked the victim from closing the door to her car. Freeman then stabbed the victim with a pocketknife, piercing her right earlobe and her neck. Afterward, Freeman tossed the knife towards the street.

Soon, law enforcement arrived on the scene. An officer informed Freeman of her Miranda rights. Freeman confirmed that she understood her rights. Freeman then stated to the officer, "I hope she dies," and "I hope I go to jail for life or even be killed. I don’t care because nothing matters." Freeman told officers that she and the victim had verbal arguments in the past. But that day, Freeman explained that she was in the mood to stab someone.

The State charged Freeman with aggravated battery with great bodily harm and with a weapon. In response, Freeman moved to suppress her statements to law enforcement, arguing she did not freely and intelligently waive her Miranda rights because mental health problems prevented her from making the necessary waiver. At the suppression hearing, the parties presented competing expert testimony on Freeman’s competency. The court also reviewed Freeman’s recorded police interview. The court denied the motion to suppress.

Freeman also moved to dismiss, claiming immunity from prosecution under section 776.032. She asserted that her use of force against the victim was justified and necessary to prevent the victim from harming her. After considering the testimony from the witnesses and Freeman’s police interview, the trial court denied that motion, too.

Freeman then pleaded no contest to the charged offense. But she expressly reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s orders denying the motion to dismiss and the motion to suppress. The trial court sentenced Freeman to fifteen years in prison, followed by ten years of probation. This timely appeal follows.

Analysis

[1–5] Freeman argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the State failed to overcome her prima facie claim of self-defense immunity with clear and convincing evidence. We affirm because Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim in the first place. See Robertson v. Stats, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) ("[T]he ‘tipsy coachman’ doctrine[ ] allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that ‘reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons’ so long as ‘there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.’ " (quoting Dads Cnty. Sch. Bd, 731 So. 2d at 644)). The record before us provides an adequate basis to conclude as a matter of law that Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity in her motion to dismiss,¹ and thus we affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine.² Cf. Fort v. Fort, 951 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (affirming under the tipsy coachman doctrine a trial court’s order dismissing a pleading for lack of jurisdiction and reasoning that the pleading "failed to state a cause of action").

[6] A prima facie claim "is an assertion that, at first glance, is sufficient to establish a fact or right but is yet to be disproved or rebutted by someone." Jefferson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). This Court has explained that prima facie claim of self-defense immunity must include facts that show or tend to show that the movant;

(1) used deadly force; (2) reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another; (3) used such deadly force while resisting the victim’s attempt to murder him, to commit a forcible felony on him, or to commit a forcible felony on or in Edwards’ dwelling; and (4) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in place he had a right to be.

Edwards v. State, 351 So. 3d 1142, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

[7] As depicted below, Freeman’s motion was merely a boilerplate recitation of the applicable statutes and court decisions and devoid of any allegation of fact:

373 So.3d 1259.bmp

Freeman never argued that the victim used force against her or threatened to use force against her. Freeman merely asserted, without elaboration, that "any force or threat of force or force used by Defendant would have been justified under section 776.032 as it was necessary to prevent the alleged victims from causing unlawful harm …. " Freeman’s assertions fall far short of what was required to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity. See State v. Moore, 337 So. 3d 876, 881–82 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2022) (explaining that to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity, the defendant must allege "specific facts that show or tend to show that [the defendant] used deadly force because he had a reasonable belief that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" to himself or another). Because Freeman failed to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity, We affirm the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss.

[8] We also write to address the confusion surrounding when the burden of proof shifts to the State to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome a movants prima facie claim of self-defense immunity. Section 776.032(4), Florida Statutes (2021), requires a defendant to raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity "at a pretrial immunity hearing." Only then must the State seek to overcome the immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence. Freeman presented no evidence at the pretrial immunity hearing in support of her motion to dismiss. Rather, she rested on the boilerplate allegations set forth in her motion. Indeed, at an earlier hearing,³ that is all her counsel argued Freeman had to do: "our position is that what we’ve asserted in our motion puts it to the Government to carry the burden."

The State argued at the final immunity hearing that Freeman had to do more than just rely on the allegations set out in her motion to dismiss, but to avoid creating a potential reversible error on appeal,⁴ the State agreed to proceed first in presenting evidence at the immunity heating:

[T]he defense’s motion wasn’t enough, however, we will still take on the burden despite that and not risk another appellate issue and treat the defendant’s motion as if it were a prima facie argument. I still take the position that it is not. They have not presented nearly enough to establish a prima facie case of Stand Your Ground.

[9] The State clearly placed the sufficiency of Freeman’s motion at issue in the trial court "and was correct in arguing that Freeman could not raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity at the pretrial hearing by relying only on the conclusory allegations set out in her motion. The plain language of section 776.032(4) requires a person seeking immunity to raise their prima facie claim at a pretrial immunity hearing. The Legislature’s clear directive that the person seeking immunity must raise "a prima facie claim … at a pretrial hearing" cannot mean that the person seeking immunity may simply rest on the unsworn allegations in their earlier-filed immunity motion. § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. Rather, consistent with well-established authority, to raise a prima facie claim that could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, a defendant seeking immunity must present "evidence sufficient to establish a fact unless and until rebutted." State v. Kahler, 232 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1970). This is the logical reading of the statute...