Friend v. Astrazeneca Pharm.

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ATTA JUSTIN FRIEND, Plaintiff, v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP, Defendant.

CIVIL No. SAG-22-03308

United States District Court, D. Maryland

May 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Justin Friend (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against his former employer, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP (“AstraZeneca”), alleging religious discrimination and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). ECF 1. AstraZeneca has filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF 17. This Court has reviewed that motion, along with the opposition and reply. ECF 24, 33. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, this Court will grant AstraZeneca's Motion to Dismiss, ECF 17, and accordingly will deny Plaintiff's motion to consolidate this case with another pending action ECF 27.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts contained herein are derived from Plaintiff's Complaint and taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Plaintiff began working at AstraZeneca in March, 2020 as a Senior Facilities Engineer of Operations. ECF 1 ¶ 2. He originally worked remotely for several months until he reported back to the workplace part-time. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. In August, 2021, AstraZeneca implemented a COVID-19 vaccination requirement for all U.S. employees. Id. ¶ 2. The requirement allowed accommodations for employees who averred that they could not be vaccinated for medical, religious, or “other” reasons. Id. Under that requirement, when claiming an accommodation, Plaintiff selected “other.” Id. ¶ 16. Beginning in 2022, however, AstraZeneca required its employees to submit written proof of (1) vaccination or (2) a necessary medical or religious exemption. Id. ¶ 3. “Other” was no longer a permissible category for accommodation.

In February, 2022, Plaintiff requested a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement, using AstraZeneca's Religious Reasonable Accommodation Request Form. Id. ¶¶ 4, 18. On the form, when asked for the nature of his objections to the vaccine requirement, Plaintiff wrote: “The current vaccines available are only in the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) state. Recent data shows that the efficacy of the current vaccines is low, specifically for an individual as myself whom has tested positive prior and contains antibodies granting natural immunity against” COVID-19. ECF 17-2. AstraZeneca responded with an email denying his exemption request, stating that Plaintiff was, “among other reasons . . . not qualified for a reasonable accommodation.” ECF 1 ¶ 22. AstraZeneca provided no further elaboration or opportunity to appeal. Id. Instead, AstraZeneca terminated Plaintiff's employment on April 29, 2022. Id. ¶ 29.

Plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in August of 2022, alleging unlawful religious discrimination, and in December of 2022, alleging disability discrimination. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. He received right to sue letters in response to both charges. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. This lawsuit ensued.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55556 (2007).

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions[.]” (quotation omitted)); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). However, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).

Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

Here, AstraZeneca attached Plaintiff's Religious Reasonable Accommodation Request Form to its motion. ECF 17-2. AstraZeneca notes that the form is incorporated into Plaintiff's Complaint by repeated reference. See, e.g., ECF 1 ¶¶ 19, 41. Federal courts may consider documents incorporated into a complaint by reference without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Sec'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the Court may consider documents attached to motions to dismiss as long as they are “integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff has not contested the authenticity of the Accommodation Request Form and refers to it in the Complaint as the premise for his religious discrimination and disability discrimination claims. The form and its contents can therefore be properly considered at the motion to dismiss stage, without converting this motion into one for summary judgment.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Religious Discrimination (Count One)

Plaintiff claims religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because AstraZeneca failed to accommodate his religious objection to vaccination. The elements of such a claim require a Plaintiff to plead facts plausibly suggesting “(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. Of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also Booth v. State of Maryland, 337 Fed.Appx. 301, 308-309 (4th Cir. 2009). While Plaintiff's Complaint asserts that he “had bona fide religious beliefs that conflicted with AstraZeneca's COVID-19 vaccine mandate,” ECF 1 ¶ 36, it alleges no facts to allow this Court to assess what Plaintiff's religious beliefs are and how they conflict.

Even more importantly, when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true except where they are contradicted by an exhibit. Veney v. Wyche 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002). While Plaintiff asserts that he “informed AstraZeneca of this belief in his request for religious accommodations,” ECF 1 ¶ 37, on its face, Plaintiff's form makes no reference to any religious belief or basis for his exemption request. Rather, it cites his views on the effectiveness of the vaccine and the current status of its FDA approval. ECF 17-2. And he expressly declines in the form to provide any information about his religious beliefs or the way in which they might conflict with the vaccine policy. See Id. (“Disclosure of the extent of my Religious practice is...