Froling v. City of Bloomfield Hills

WILLIAM P. FROLING and MARILYN FROLING, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BLOOMFIELD HILLS, Defendant.

Case No. 12-12464

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Date: June 11, 2013

Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.

ORDER

In this civil action, the Plaintiffs, William and Marilyn Froling, have generally complained that the natural water flow patterns onto their property have been substantially modified and exacerbated by their neighbors in violation of existing municipal ordinances. They also complain that this conduct by their neighbors was impliedly authorized by the Defendant, the City of Bloomfield Hills in Michigan ("City"), which, in turn, adversely affected the fair market value of their property interests.

The Plaintiffs, acting upon the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, have cited violations of the First Amendment, as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Currently before the Court are the City's motions for (1) the entry of a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) and 56, and (2) the imposition of sanctions against the Plaintiffs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

I.

The Plaintiffs claim to have initially noticed flooding on their property in 1989, after the grade was raised on the adjoining property during the construction of their neighbor's house. They allegedly brought the flooding issue to the attention of the City without any resolution of the problem. According to the Plaintiffs, construction in their subdivision and on the nearby golf course continued to cause a redirection of the natural water flow toward their property.

Believing that their entreaties to the City would continue to be fruitless, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in a state court on November 8, 2004, in which they accused (1) several neighbors of maintaining and committing a wrongful trespass against their property, and (2) the City for negligence. They also sought a mandamus which, if granted, would enforce the City's ordinances. However, their claims against (1) the City were dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity, and (2) their neighbors were also dismissed because, in the opinion of the state court, the petitioners had violated the relevant statutes of limitations.

It should also be noted that in 2004, the City entered into a consent decree with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, which required it to prevent an overflow of sanitary sewers. In 2008, Bloomfield Hills successfully sued the Plaintiffs in state court, forcing them to (1) disconnect their sump pump that had been illegally connected to the City's sewer system and (2) remove a berm that had been constructed on their property without a permit. This decision was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals.

On November 11, 2008, the Plaintiffs submitted an application for a permit to install a second berm on their property. However, the parties disagree as to whether this proposed berm was different in size and location from the original one that had been removed by the City. In followingthe recommendation of its engineer, James Burton, the City rejected the Plaintiffs' application on December 23, 2008 - a decision that was challenged by the Plaintiffs with the filing of a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the City forwarded a letter in which the City Manager wrote, "I believe that it is more expeditious to place the entire matter before the City Commission which we can accomplish for the February 10, 2009 meeting if you submit your materials to the City by January 16, 2009." The Plaintiffs did not reply to the City's letter until June 19, 2009, when they requested the City Commission to place this issue on its September 2009 agenda. Shortly thereafter, the City rejected the Plaintiffs' request on two grounds; namely, (1) it interpreted the Plaintiffs' silence during the preceding six-month period as a waiver of their appellate rights, and (2) the berm application described the exact berm that had been previously rejected. This decision was not appealed to the state court.

In 2011, after another episode of flooding, the Plaintiffs filed a claim pursuant to the Public Act 222 of 2001, Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1416 et seq. ("Act 222 claim"), for compensation for the allegedly defective drainage system along Rathmor Road. This claim was denied by the City, which (1) contended that it has no responsibility for this drainage system and (2) refused to compensate the Plaintiffs for their claim. No appeal was undertaken by the Plaintiffs regarding this issue.

In May 2012, one of the Plaintiffs, William Froling, removed some rocks from the Rathmor Road right-of-way that, according to him, had been placed there by a neighbor for the purpose of diverting water into the culvert. Shortly thereafter, he was informed by the City, through its police department, that the rocks must be returned immediately and that he would face arrest if any further work was conducted in the right-of-way without a permit. In July 2012, the Plaintiffs submitted a Freedom of Information Act request relating to their neighbor's permit to work in the right-of-wayand were told that no such permit exists. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a permit application, in which they requested permission to block the Rathmor Road culverts. When this application was denied, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal to the City Commission, which denied their application for relief on September 11, 2012. The Plaintiffs appealed this denial to the Oakland County Circuit Court of Michigan. However, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of this matter with prejudice on October 30, 2012.

This lawsuit was filed on June 6, 2012. Approximately one month later, Bloomfield Hills filed a motion for summary judgment. At a hearing on December 18, 2012, the Court requested supplemental briefing on the defenses of res judicata and statute of limitations that had been raised by the City . Those issues are now fully briefed.

II.

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings may be treated in the same manner as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 1999). Such a request for relief should be granted only "when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]ll well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." Id. at 581 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, as with a 12(b)(6) motion, this assumption of truth does not extend to "legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Id. at 581-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

When considering a 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, "documents attached to the pleadings becomepart of the pleading and may be considered." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (c)). "In determining whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court [should primarily consider] the allegations in the complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken into account." Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted)); see also Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying Amini, 259 F.3d at 502, in the context of a Rule 12 (c) motion (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, "documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the [Plaintiffs'] complaint and are central to [their] claim." Weiner, D.P.M. v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Supplemental documents attached to the motion to dismiss do not convert the pleading into one for summary judgment where the documents do not "rebut, challenge, or contradict anything in the plaintiff's complaint." Song v. City of Elyria, 985 F.2d 840, 842 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Watters v. Pelican Int'l, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1452, 1457 n.1 (D. Colo. 1989)).

The purpose of the summary judgment rule, as reflected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The entry of a summary judgment is proper only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is 'material' for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties." Aqua Grp., LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 620F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citing Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)). In order for a dispute to be genuine, it must contain evidence upon which a trier of the facts could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2004). When assessing a request for the entry of a summary judgment, a court "must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987). The entry of a summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to present evidence which is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, and on which it will bear the burden of...