Frost v. Cnty. of Monmouth

GARY FROST, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, et. al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-4395-BRM-DEA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 26, 2018

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is: (1) Defendant John Clemente's ("Clemente") Motion to Dismiss all counts against him (Counts Four and Five) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 3);¹ and (2) Defendants Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, Monmouth County Prosecutor Joseph M. Competello ("Competello"), and Monmouth County Assistant Prosecutor Christopher J. Gramiccioni's ("Gramiccioni") Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for a Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (ECF No. 15).² Plaintiff Gary Frost ("Frost") opposes both motions. (ECF Nos. 11 and 19.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court did not hear oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Clemente's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in its entirety and the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, Competello, and Gramiccioni's Motion is GRANTED in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of the Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the Court also considers any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original).

This matter arises out of a dispute that occurred on September 19, 2013, between Frost and his former contractor Clemente. (ECF No. 1.) As a result, on September 19, 2013, Clemente filed a private citizens' criminal complaint against Frost for violations of N.J.S.A. § 2C:17-3A(1), criminal mischief; N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(a), simple assault; and N.J.S.A. § 2C:33-4(a), harassment. (Id.) Frost alleges the criminal complaint "was without any basis in law or fact." (Id. ¶ 12.) On December 11, 2013, Frost was indicted by a Grand Jury for N.J.S.A. § 2C:17-3A(1), criminal mischief, a third degree crime. (Id. ¶ 14.) The remaining charges were no billed. (Id.) On April 14, 2014, Frost filed a motion to dismiss the indictment "due to lack of sufficient evidence in the grand jury proceeding," which was granted, and the indictment was dismissed without prejudice. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Therefore, Competello, "acting under the authority and direction of . . . Gramiccioni, [] County of Monmouth and Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, advised [] Frost, through counsel, that he would be notified as to whether an indictment would be re-presented to the grand jury, or downgraded to the Township of Marlboro municipal court." (Id. ¶ 17.)

On January 14, 2015, Frost was re-indicted by a Grand Jury for N.J.S.A. § 2C:17-3A(1), criminal mischief in the third degree. (Id. ¶ 18.) "The remaining allegations in [] Clemente's complaint were again no billed." (Id.) On June 30, 2016, a criminal trial commenced before theHonorable Richard W. English, J.S.C. (Id. ¶ 21.) At the beginning of trial, Judge English found the amount in controversy for the criminal mischief charge to be less than $500 and that the State had no jurisdiction to proceed under N.J.S.A. § 2C:17-3A(1). (Id. ¶ 22.) Therefore, he downgraded the charge to a disorderly persons offense and tried the case without a jury. (Id.) At the conclusion of the State's case, Frost moved for a judgment of acquittal. (Id. ¶ 24.) Judge English granted Frost's motion and dismissed the complaint against him, finding "there was absolutely no evidence for the State to even proceed to trial on . . . Clemente's private citizens' complaint against [] Frost." (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) He further held "this case was really about . . . Clemente's retribution and revenge from . . . Frost because [Frost] received a judgment against [Clemente] in civil court for poor workmanship." (Id. ¶ 31.) Judge English also determined Clemente fabricated his story as to the criminal allegations in the complaint for the sole purpose of getting retribution and revenge against Frost. (Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff contends defendants Gramiccioni, Competello, County of Monmouth, and Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office "knew that the amount in controversy was less than $500[] which would constitute a disorderly persons offense" but "nevertheless proceeded with the indictment . . . in violation of [Frost's] civil rights and to maliciously prosecute [Frost]." (Id. ¶ 23.) He further maintains those same defendants "knew, or should have known, that there was no evidence against [him] but said defendants prosecuted anyway." (Id. ¶ 36.) Lastly, Frost alleges defendants "intentionally and/or negligently withheld exculpatory evidence from [him] . . . despite [his] repeated requests for full discovery." (Id. ¶ 37.)

On June 15, 2017, Frost filed a Complaint against the County of Monmouth, the Monmouth Prosecutor's Office, Gramiccioni, Competello, and Clemente alleging: (1) violations of his rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA") against County of Monmouth and MonmouthCounty Prosecutor's Office; (2) violations of his constitutional rights against County of Monmouth and Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office; (3) § 1983 supervisory liability against County of Monmouth and Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office; (4) malicious prosecution against all Defendants; and (5) defamation against Clemente. (ECF No. 1.) On August 7, 2017, Clemente filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint against him. (ECF No. 3.) On August 11, 2017, County of Monmouth, Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, Gramiccioni, and Competello filed an Answer. (ECF No. 5.) Subsequently, on November 8, 2017, County of Monmouth, Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, Gramiccioni, and Competello filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 15.) Frost opposes all motions. (ECF Nos. 10 and 19.) On December 28, 2017, County of Monmouth was dismissed with prejudice from the case by stipulation. (ECF No. 22.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) mandates the dismissal of a case for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). An assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a challenge to a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)). Typically, when jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). However, because "Eleventh Amendment immunity can be expressly waived by a party, or forfeited through non-assertion, it does not implicate federal subject matter jurisdiction in the ordinary sense," and therefore, a partyasserting Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden of proving its applicability. Christy v. Pa. Turnpike Comm., 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a court must first determine whether the motion attacks the complaint as deficient on its face, or whether the motion attacks the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from any pleadings. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion consists of a facial attack, the court "must accept the complaint's allegations as true," Turicentro v. Am. Airlines, 303 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002), and "must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d. at 891). However, if the motion involves a factual attack, "the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings." Gould, 220 F.3d at 176 (citing Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1997)). Here, the Motions to Dismiss are a facial attack, because the Monmouth County Police Department, Gramiccioni, and Competello assert they are immune from Frost's claims as pled. Therefore, on this question of immunity, the Court's review is limited to the allegations in the Complaint, which the Court must accept as true and view in the light most favorable to Frost.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. "[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff's "obligation to providethe 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,...