Fuentes v. Cranshaw

541 P.3d 573

Samuel FUENTES, Petitioner/Appellant,

v. Hon. Jay CRANSHAW, City Magistrate and Tucson City Court, Respondent Judge/Appellees,andThe State of Arizona, Tucson City Attorney's Office, Criminal Division, Real Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-CV 2023-0022

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.

Filed December 13, 2023

Robert S. Wolkin, Tucson, Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Tucson City Attorney's Office, Criminal Division, Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney, Alan L. Merritt, Deputy City Attorney, By Mari L. Worman, Principal Assistant Prosecuting City Attorney, Tucson, Counsel for Real Party in Interest

Judge Sklar authored the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.

OPINION

SKLAR, Judge:

¶1 When a parent is convicted of domestic violence, that conviction can lead to consequences beyond the criminal sentence. Applicable here, if the parent is later involved in a divorce or paternity case, the parent may be required to rebut a statutory presumption against sole or joint legal decision-making. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). Likewise, the parent may be required to carry an evidentiary burden before being awarded parenting time. § 25-403.03(F).

¶2 This case concerns whether these and related statutory consequences apply uniformly at the time of conviction, such that they would entitle defendants to jury trials in misdemeanor domestic-violence cases. We conclude that they do not. We therefore affirm the rulings of both the superior court and the Tucson City Court that Samuel Fuentes is not entitled to a jury trial on his misdemeanor domestic-violence charges.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Fuentes is accused of initiating an argument in July 2021 with his wife while intoxicated, then slamming his fists on a car and pushing his wife. This alleged conduct occurred in the presence of the couple's three children.

¶4 Later that month, Fuentes was charged in Tucson City Court with six misdemeanor offenses. Three of them carry a domestic-violence designation under A.R.S. § 13-3601(H) : (1) assault with no injury; (2) disorderly conduct through noise; and (3) defacing or damaging property valued less than $250. In addition, Fuentes was charged with three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. That crime is not eligible for a domestic-violence determination, though the complaint improperly listed one count as involving domestic violence. See § 13-3601(A) (not including contributing to delinquency of minor in list of domestic-violence eligible offenses).

¶5 In December 2021, Fuentes filed a demand for a jury trial. He argued that in a potential divorce proceeding, a conviction on the domestic-violence charges would affect his rights concerning legal decision-making and parenting time. This consequence, he argued, triggered a jury-trial right under Derendal v. Griffith , 209 Ariz. 416, 104 P.3d 147 (2005). The respondent judge disagreed and denied Fuentes's demand in April 2022.

¶6 Fuentes then sought relief via special-action complaint in the superior court. On December 1, 2022, the superior court ruled against Fuentes, in effect affirming the denial of the jury trial. This timely appeal followed.

JURY-TRIAL ELIGIBILITY

¶7 We generally review a superior court's decision in a special action for an abuse of discretion. Bazzanella v. Tucson City Court , 195 Ariz. 372, ¶ 3, 988 P.2d 157. However, because jury-trial eligibility is a question of law, we independently determine the merits of such a request de novo. Ottaway v. Smith , 210 Ariz. 490, ¶ 5, 113 P.3d 1247 (App. 2005).

I. Scope of jury-trial right

¶8 Under the Arizona Constitution, "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23. This provision preserves common-law jury-trial rights that existed when Arizona became a state. Crowell v. Jejna , 215 Ariz. 534, ¶ 7, 161 P.3d 577 (App. 2007). It therefore entitles a defendant to a jury trial only if the "statutory offense has a common law antecedent that guaranteed a right to trial by jury at the time of Arizona statehood." Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416, ¶ 36, 104 P.3d 147. Fuentes does not argue that the offenses at issue have common-law antecedents that would entitle him to a jury trial. We need not address the issue, and we express no opinion on it.

¶9 The Arizona Constitution also entitles criminal defendants to "a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24. We construe this provision consistently with the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment. Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416, ¶ 13, 104 P.3d 147. Under the Sixth Amendment, jury trials are available only for serious, not petty, crimes. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas , 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) ("It has long been settled that there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision.") (citations and internal quotations omitted).

¶10 The United States Supreme Court has held that where an offense's maximum term of imprisonment is six months, the offense is presumptively petty. Id. at 543-44, 109 S.Ct. 1289. In Arizona, the maximum term of imprisonment for class-one misdemeanors is six months. A.R.S. § 13-707(A). Thus, our case law generally holds that defendants accused of class-one misdemeanors are presumptively not entitled to jury trials. E.g. , Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416, ¶ 40, 104 P.3d 147 ; Benitez v. Dunevant , 198 Ariz. 90, ¶ 13, 7 P.3d 99 (2000) (collecting cases).

¶11 However, that presumption is rebuttable. Where the maximum incarceration term does not exceed six months, the offense can still warrant a jury trial if it subjects the defendant to additional consequences reflecting a legislative determination that the offense is serious. See Derendal , 209 Ariz. 416, ¶¶ 21, 25, 37, 104 P.3d 147. To rebut the presumption, a defendant must show: (1) the consequences arise directly from Arizona statutory law; (2) the consequences approximate the severity of the loss of liberty implicated in a prison term; and (3) the consequences apply "uniformly to all persons convicted of a particular offense." Id. ¶¶ 22-25. Applying this test, our supreme court has held that a requirement to register as a sex offender rebuts the presumption and entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Fushek v. State , 218 Ariz. 285, ¶ 30, 183 P.3d 536 (2008).

¶12 In this case, Fuentes's misdemeanor domestic-violence charges are presumptively not jury eligible. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(B) (assault committed intentionally or knowingly is class-one misdemeanor); 13-2904(A)(2), (B) (disorderly conduct through noise is class-one misdemeanor); 13-1602(B)(6) (criminal damage is class-two misdemeanor where amount is less than $250). We must address whether a domestic-violence designation overcomes that presumption, in light of the consequences in divorce and paternity cases.

II. Background on domestic-relations consequences of domestic-violence offenses

¶13 The domestic-violence designation applies to enumerated offenses where the defendant and victim have a qualifying relationship. Section 13-3601(A) lists both the offenses and relationships. See also § 13-3601(H) (requiring indictment and other charging documents to contain domestic-violence designation where offense qualifies as domestic violence). Fuentes's charges for assault, disorderly conduct, and damaging or defacing property are enumerated offenses. See § 13-3601(A). To the extent Fuentes's wife and children are considered victims, his relationship with them would qualify. See § 13-3601(A)(1), (2), (4). A domestic-violence designation does not change the substantive charge. State ex rel. McDougall v. Strohson , 190 Ariz. 120, 123-24, 945 P.2d 1251, 1254-55 (1997). However, a conviction of an offense with a domestic-violence designation can have collateral consequences, such as a federal prohibition on possessing firearms. Id. at 124, 945 P.2d at 1255 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) ).

¶14 A domestic-violence conviction can also lead to consequences where the offender seeks legal decision-making and parenting time in a divorce or paternity case. As to legal decision-making, Section 25-403.03(D) imposes a "rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint legal decision-making to the parent who committed the act of domestic violence is contrary to the child's best interests." This presumption applies only where a court determines that the parent has committed an act that meets a definition of "domestic violence" in Section 25-403.03(D). As we will explain, not all acts giving rise to domestic-violence convictions will do so.

¶15 With respect to parenting time, Section 25-403.03(F) requires a parent who has committed domestic violence—which is not defined for purposes of subsection (F)—to carry the burden of proving "to the court's satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the child's emotional development." If the parent meets that burden, "the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the child and the other parent from further harm." § 25-403.03(F).

¶16 In addition, courts determining legal decision-making and parenting time must consider "all factors that are relevant to the child's physical and emotional well-being." A.R.S. § 25-403(A). This includes "[w]hether there has been domestic violence or child abuse pursuant to § 25-403.03." § 25-403(A)(8). The issue we confront is whether these domestic-relations consequences satisfy Derendal ’s three-prong test.

III. Application of Derendal —the undisputed prongs

¶17 The first Derendal prong is whether the consequences arise directly from Arizona statutory law. 209 Ariz. 416, ¶ 23, 104 P.3d 147. Because they flow from Sections 25-403 and 25-403.03, this prong is satisfied.

¶18 Derendal ’s second prong requires the consequences...