Fuhrman v. Mawyer

1

MICHAEL E. FUHRMAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. BRIAN A. MAWYER, et al., Defendants

No. 1:21-cv-02024

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

September 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM

YVETTE KANE, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court is the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (Doc. No. 25) filed by Plaintiffs Michael E. Fuhrman and Linda M. Angel, Co-Executors of the Estate of their father Eugene V. Fuhrman (“Plaintiffs”). Four motions to dismiss the TAC have been filed by Defendants Lindsay Goldberg, LLC and Goldberg, Lindsay & Co., LLC (“LG Defendants”), Defendant H.I.G. Capitol, LLC (“Defendant H.I.G.”), Defendants Pixelle Specialty Solutions, LLC (“Defendant Pixelle Specialty”) and Pixelle Specialty Solutions Holding LLC (“Defendant Pixelle Holding,” and with Defendant Pixelle Specialty, “Pixelle Defendants”), and Defendant Shenandoah Valley Farms LLC (“Defendant SVF”) (collectively “Moving Defendants”). (Doc. Nos. 60, 63, 65, 66.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the pending motions to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual background is drawn from the TAC. (Doc. No. 25.) Because the TAC spans 297 pages and contains hundreds of paragraphs and subparagraphs-many of which contain identical allegations-only the relevant facts are summarized below.

Plaintiffs allege that, on February 23, 2021, Defendant Brian A. Mawyer (“Defendant Mawyer”) was driving a tractor owned by Defendant Charles R. Richards d/b/a B&C Enterprise (“Defendant Richards”) and hauling a trailer loaded with timber from property owned by Defendants Tapscott Brothers Trucking, Inc. (“Defendant Tapscott Trucking”) and Tapscott Brothers Logging, Inc. (“Defendant Tapscott Logging,” and with Defendant Tapscott Trucking, “Defendant Tapscott Brothers”), to property owned by the alleged Pixelle Defendant, which is purportedly comprised of the LG Defendants, Pixelle Defendants, and Defendant H.I.G. (the “Alleged Pixelle Defendant”).^[1](Id. ¶¶ 13, 30, 41-42, 44, 48.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Tapscott Brothers “contracted” with Defendant SVF to transport the timber with the full knowledge and consent of the Alleged Pixelle Defendant (i.e., the LG Defendants, Pixelle Defendants, and Defendant H.I.G.). (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs also aver that Defendant Tapscott Brothers “knowingly loaded [the trailer with] . . . timber at a capacity that it knew would cause the tractor trailer unit . . . to be overweight” and failed “to properly secure the timber in the trailing unit.” (Id. ¶¶ 44-46).

At approximately 10:29 a.m., Decedent Eugene V. Fuhrman (“Decedent”)'s vehicle, which “had [a] green light and [was] lawfully proceeding] through the intersection” on East Middle Street in Hanover Borough, Pennsylvania, was struck by Defendant Mawyer's tractor, which purportedly ran a red light while he was transporting the timber load. (Id. ¶¶ 48-52.) As a result of the collision, which was allegedly caused by Defendant Mawyer's “negligent, careless, and reckless” operation of his vehicle, Decedent suffered traumatic injuries that “caused him great pain and suffering,” ultimately resulting in his death. (Id. ¶ 52-54.)

Plaintiffs aver that, at all relevant times, “Defendant Mawyer was the agent, servant, workman, contractor and/or employee of Defendant Richards and/or Defendant Tapscott Brothers and/or Defendant Shenandoah Valley Farms, LLC, and/or [the Alleged Pixelle Defendant] and was acting within the course and scope of his agency and/or employment.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the Alleged Pixelle Defendant “had the contractual right to and/or exercised such control over the transportation of the load in question, . . . that Defendants Mawyer, Richards, Tapscott Brothers, and [SVF]” should be considered the Alleged Pixelle Defendant's agents. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs assert that “[a]s a direct and proximate result” of the allegedly “negligen[t], careless, gross, wanton, and reckless conduct of Defendants,” Defendants “either alone or combined . . . directly and proximately caused the Crash” that resulted in the death of Decedent, their father. (Id. ¶¶ 54-56.)

On December 2, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated the above-captioned action on behalf of Decedent by filing a complaint in this Court against Defendants Mawyer, Richards, and Tapscott Trucking (collectively, “Original Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs' initial complaint asserted the same three claims against each of the Original Defendants: survival; wrongful death, and punitive damages.^[2] On January 31, 2022, the Original Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for a more definite statement. (Doc. No. 7.) On June 28, 2022, the Court denied the motion to dismiss, but granted, in part, the motion for a more definite statement and provided Plaintiffs twenty-one (21) days to file an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 11.) Consistent with the Court's Order, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on July 15, 2022. (Doc. No. 12.)

On February 21, 2023, the parties stipulated to the filing of a second amended complaint (Doc. No. 21), which added Defendant SVF as a party and asserted survival, wrongful death, and punitive damages counts against it (Doc. No. 22). On February 22, 2023, the parties stipulated to the filing of a third amended complaint (Doc. No. 24), which added Defendant Tapscott Logging and the remaining Moving Defendants as parties and asserted survival, wrongful death, and punitive damages counts against each Defendant (Doc. No. 25).

The Original Defendants filed an answer to the TAC with affirmative defenses on March 31, 2023 (Doc. Nos. 36), and Defendant Tapscott Logging filed an answer with affirmative defenses on April 28, 2023 (Doc. No. 54). On May 19, 2023, Defendant SVF filed the first of the four pending motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 60.) Defendant SVF's motion to dismiss requests an order: striking the TAC under Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(f) for failing to provide a short and plain pleading; dismissing the TAC for failing to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6); or in the alternative, directing Plaintiffs to file more a definite statement under Rule 12(e). (Id.) The LG Defendants filed the second pending motion, which offers two grounds for dismissal: failure to comply with Rule 8, and lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). (Doc. No. 63.) Defendant H.I.G. filed the third pending motion, which seeks dismissal based on Rules 8, 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 65.) Finally, the Pixelle Defendants filed the fourth pending motion, which seeks to strike the TAC under Rule 8 and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 66.) The Moving Defendants have each filed a brief in support of their motions (Doc. Nos. 64, 67, 68, 73), and Plaintiffs have filed briefs in opposition (Doc. Nos. 74, 75, 76, 77). The Pixelle Defendants, LG Defendants, and Defendant H.I.G. have also filed reply briefs in further support of their respective motions. (Doc. Nos. 78, 79, 80.) Having been fully briefed, the pending motions are ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

As indicated above, the pending motions implicate several Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, for the reasons discussed, infra, the Court finds Rules 12(b)(2) and 8 sufficient to resolve the pending motions.

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Once “the defendant raises the question of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.” See Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992). If the defendant supports its motion with “competent evidence refuting jurisdiction,”^[3]see Carbonite Filter Corp. v. C. Overaa & Co., 353 F.Supp.3d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2018), the plaintiff must submit its own competent evidence to rebut the defendant's submissions, and cannot carry its burden of establishing personal jurisdiction by relying on an “unverified complaint” or “bare assertions made ‘upon information and belief,'” see Nugeneration Technologies, LLC, v. Shoeb Moiyadi, Ecolink, Inc., et al., No. 23-cv-00459, 2023 WL 5020831, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2023) (collecting cases); see also Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir.1984) (explaining “at no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction” (citing International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1982)).

“A federal court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of the state.” Carteret Sav. Bank, 954 F.2d at 144-45 (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987)). Pennsylvania's long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.” See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5322(b). Therefore, in its exercise of personal jurisdiction, this Court is constrained only by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires that a defendant have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Requiring “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state gives “fair warning” to a defendant ...