Fukita v. Gist

Tomoko Fukita, Plaintiff, v. Joshua Gist and Deborah Starr, Defendants.

Case No. 20-CV-1869 (SRN/LIB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

January 28, 2021

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Gregory McLawsen, Immigration Support Advocates, 113 Cherry St. ECM # 45921, Seattle, WA 98104-2205, and Nicholas Ratkowski, Contreras & Metelska, P.A., 200 University Ave. W., Ste. 200, St. Paul, MN 55103, for Plaintiff.

Joshua Gist and Deborah Starr, Pro Se Defendants.

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. No. 22] filed by Tomoko Fukita. A hearing on this motion was held on January 15, 2021 via video conference. Gregory McLawsen and Nicholas Ratkowski appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, and Defendants Joshua Gist and Deborah Starr appeared on their own behalf. Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion.

I. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), a United States citizen or resident initiating the immigration process on behalf of a non-citizen immigration petitioner must execute a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-864 Affidavit of Support. It is uncontested that Defendants Joshua Gist and Deborah Starr executed such Affidavits of Support on behalf of Plaintiff Tomoko Fukita. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants seeking to enforce her rights to support under those documents.

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Greiner v. De Capri, 403 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1218 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (holding that Court possessed federal question jurisdiction over claim to enforce the Affidavit of Support); Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The suit thus arises under federal law . . . .").

2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Joshua Gist and Deborah Starr. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) (noting that "under Rule 12(h) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, '[a] defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person ... is waived' if not timely raised in the answer or a responsive pleading."). Here, neither Gist nor Starr have answered or filed any responsive pleading contesting personal jurisdiction. Consequently, any defense on such a ground is waived.

3. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Neither Mr. Gist nor Ms. Starr have answered or filed any responsive pleading contesting venue, and therefore any defense on such a ground is waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).

A. The Defendants are in Default

4. "Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, the Court may enter a default judgment against a defendant against whom a default has been entered for failing to plead or otherwise defend." Iota Phi Lambda Sorority, Inc. v. Contenta Glob. CapitalGrp., LLC, No. 19-CV-532 (SRN/DTS), 2019 WL 4687115, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2019). "[W]hen a defendant is in default, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint except those relating to damages." Id. (citing Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2010)); Adventure Creative Grp. v. CVSL, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1069 (D. Minn. 2019).

5. There is a two-step process for the entry of a default judgment. Iota Phi Lambda Sorority, 2019 WL 4687115, at *4 (citing Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1988)). First, the moving party must seek a default from the Clerk of Court, and the Clerk must enter default based on proof that the opposing party has failed to plead or defend against the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the moving party must seek entry of default judgment from the Court based on either Rule 55(b)(1) (where damages are sum certain) or Rule 55(b)(2) (in all other cases). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)-(2). Entry of default by the Clerk of Court must precede entry of default judgment. Johnson, 140 F.3d at 783.

6. Having been served with the summons and complaint in this action and having failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the Defendants are in default. The Clerk of Court has entered a default against Defendants [Doc. No. 21], and Plaintiff has moved for a default judgment.

7. The Court must determine if Plaintiff's factual allegations "constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law." Marshall v. Baggett, 616 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2010); Murray, 595 F.3d at 871. If the taken-as-true allegations of the complaint constitute a legitimate cause of action, then theamount of the default judgment must be ascertained. Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000).

8. A plaintiff with Ms. Fukita's standing may enforce her rights under the Affidavit of Support. Cf. Greg McLawsen, Suing on the I-864, Affidavit of Support; September 2020 Update, 22 Bender's Immigr. Bull. 1581 (Oct. 15, 2020) (collecting and analyzing cases).

9. Accordingly, the Court will enter default judgment against the Defendants as provided below.

B. The Defendants are Liable to Plaintiff Fukita for Damages Under the Affidavits of Support

10. As noted above, the factual allegations in the Complaint—other than those relating to the amount of damages—are accepted as true.

11. To be entitled to relief, Ms. Fukita must establish three things. First, Ms. Fukita must show that the Defendants have "executed" Affidavits of Support for her benefit.

12. "An affidavit of support is executed when a sponsor signs and submits the appropriate forms in accordance with the form instructions to USCIS or the Department of State, as appropriate." 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(a)(ii).

13. Once "executed," the Affidavit becomes a binding contract between the sponsor and the U.S. Government. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d).

14. The Complaint alleges that Mr. Gist signed his Affidavit of Support on July 30, 2012 and filed the same in support of Ms. Fukita's residency application. (Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 64-65]; Gist Aff. of Supp., Compl., Ex. 1 [Doc No. 3-1].)

15. The Complaint alleges that on July 26, 2012, Ms. Starr signed her Affidavit of Support, which she filed in support of Ms. Fukita's residency application. (Compl. ¶¶ 67-68; Starr Aff. of Supp., Compl., Ex. 2 [Doc No. 3-2].)

16. Each Defendant's Affidavit of Support was therefore duly executed and therefore is an enforceable contract. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d).

17. Second, Ms. Fukita must show that she subsequently acquired U.S. residency status. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) ("The sponsored immigrant . . . after the sponsored immigrant acquires permanent resident status, may seek enforcement of the sponsor's obligations through an appropriate civil action") (emphasis added).

18. The Complaint alleges that Ms. Fukita was granted residency status on November 9, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 72; Fukita Res. Card, Compl., Ex. 7 [Doc No. 3-7].)

19. The Defendant's support obligations under their Affidavits of Support commenced when Ms. Fukita gained resident status on November 9, 2012. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(1).

20. Ms. Fukita is a third-party beneficiary of the Affidavits of Support executed by the Defendants and therefore has standing to maintain the action at bar. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d).

21. Third, Ms. Fukita must show that her income has fallen below 125% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A). She alleges the same. (Compl.¶¶ 82-83.) Because the calculation of damages in this matter is equal to the difference between 125% of the Poverty Guideline and Ms. Fukita's income, her income is discussed in detail below.

22. Finally, Ms. Fukita must show that none of the five terminating events have occurred which would end the Defendant's legal duties under the Affidavits.

23. The Defendants' support obligations under their Affidavits of Support terminate only upon the occurrence of one of the following Terminating Events, that Ms. Fukita: (1) naturalizes; (2) can be credited with 40 quarters of work under the Social Security Act; (3) loses residency status and departs the United States; (4) readjusts status to residency in removal proceedings; or (5) dies. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i).

24. The first terminating event has not occurred because Ms. Fukita is not a U.S. citizen. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i)(A); (Compl. ¶ 85).

25. The second terminating event has not occurred because Ms. Fukita cannot be credited with 40 quarters of work under the Social Security Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i)(B); (Compl. ¶ 86).

26. The third terminating event has not occurred because Ms. Fukita has not both lost residency status and departed the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i)(C); (Compl. ¶¶ 73-76) (Ms. Fukita has successfully removed the conditional status of her residency and is now an unconditional permanent resident).

27. The fourth terminating event has not occurred because Ms. Fukita has not acquired residency status during removal (i.e., deportation) proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i)(D); (Compl. ¶ 88).

28. The fifth terminating event has not occurred because Ms. Fukita is alive. 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i)(E); (Compl. ¶ 89).

29. Ms. Fukita has demonstrated that she is entitled damages under the Affidavits of Support, as authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e)(1). The valuation of her damages is set forth in Section D below.

30. By signing Affidavits of Support, each Defendant agreed to provide Ms. Fukita with any support necessary to maintain her at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for her household size. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A).

31. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable with respect to their financial support obligations under the Affidavits of Support. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.1.

32. In the present case, Plaint...