Fuller v. State

481 P.3d 1131

Dillon Wayne FULLER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-20-0080

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

February 24, 2021

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Westling.

Representing Appellee: Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Jones.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] Law enforcement officers entered Dillon Wayne Fuller's apartment without a warrant to arrest him after he failed to stop for a traffic violation. Mr. Fuller filed a motion to suppress, arguing the warrantless entry was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court decided the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances—the "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect—and denied Mr. Fuller's motion. Mr. Fuller appeals from that denial. We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

[¶2] Did the district court err in concluding law enforcement's warrantless entry into Mr. Fuller's apartment to arrest him was constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement?

FACTS

[¶3] At around 3:30 A.M. on March 20, 2019, Campbell County Sheriff's Deputy Ryan Kellison observed a sport-utility vehicle (SUV) with no visible registration traveling through downtown Gillette. He activated his vehicle's emergency lights and attempted to stop the SUV. The SUV did not stop, but rather sped up slightly from 35 mph to 40 mph. After traveling about four blocks, the SUV pulled into a single-story apartment complex. The driver jumped out of the vehicle, looked at Deputy Kellison, and ran into an apartment. Before the driver entered the apartment, Deputy Kellison twice told him to stop.

[¶4] Deputy Kellison called for back-up. While waiting for back-up to arrive, Deputy Kellison approached the SUV, where he found a female passenger. The passenger identified herself but claimed not to know the driver's name. Deputy Kellison ran the passenger's name through dispatch; she did not have any outstanding warrants. Deputy Kellison waited near the front door of the apartment for back-up.

[¶5] Back-up officers arrived "a couple of minutes" after Deputy Kellison requested their assistance. Deputy Kellison walked around the apartment building and discovered the only other potential exit from the apartment was a back window, which was closed. Officers positioned themselves around the building while Deputy Kellison and other officers "stacked up" to enter the apartment. After knocking and announcing their presence three times, the officers kicked in the door, which had been blocked by a table. Once inside the apartment, officers found Mr. Fuller and arrested him. Mr. Fuller "had slurred speech ... [and] could not walk or stand without swaying or being helped by [the officers]." Deputy Kellison smelled "a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from [Mr. Fuller's] facial area" and the odor of burnt marijuana coming from his person. Another officer found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in plain view. Deputy Kellison subsequently obtained a search warrant for the apartment. The search revealed a vape pen cartridge with suspected THC oil.

[¶6] Mr. Fuller was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance (Count 1); felony driving while under the influence (Count 2); misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (Count 3); and misdemeanor interference with a police officer (Count 4). Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-5-204(a), 31-5-225, 31-5-233(b)(iii)(C), 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2019). He filed a motion to suppress all evidence found in his apartment, arguing the officers’ warrantless entry without his consent violated the Fourth Amendment.¹ The district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which the State stipulated the apartment was Mr. Fuller's home. The district court denied the motion to suppress. It concluded the officers’ warrantless entry into Mr. Fuller's home was reasonable because (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Fuller for driving without a visible registration and eluding and interfering with a police officer; and (2) exigent circumstances existed—Deputy Kellison was in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect.

[¶7] Mr. Fuller entered conditional guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 2, reserving the right to appeal from the district court's denial of his suppression motion. The district court sentenced him to prison for 2-4 years on Count 1 and 3-5 years on Count 2 and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Mr. Fuller timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision and accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Baker v. State , 2010 WY 6, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 542, 547 (Wyo. 2010). "The underlying question of law—whether the search was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional—is reviewed de novo ." Robinson v. State , 2019 WY 125, ¶ 20, 454 P.3d 149, 156 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Jennings v. State , 2016 WY 69, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 788, 790 (Wyo. 2016) ).

DISCUSSION

[¶9] The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). See also, United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div. , 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."). However, warrantless entries into the home to effectuate an arrest are valid under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. Payton , 445 U.S. at 587-89, 100 S.Ct. at 1381. See also, Welsh v. Wisconsin , 466 U.S. 740, 741, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2093, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) ("[A]bsent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment."); Pena v. State , 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004) ("[W]arrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they are justified by probable cause and established exceptions.") (citing Morris v. State , 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 1995) ). Mr. Fuller does not dispute Deputy Kellison had probable cause to arrest him for driving without visible registration and eluding a police officer. He disputes only the existence of exigent circumstances.

[¶10] Exigent circumstances exist "when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." Michigan v. Tyler , 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (citations omitted). Such circumstances include the need to (1) provide emergency assistance to a home's occupant; (2) engage in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect; (3) prevent harm to the police or to other persons; (4) avert the imminent destruction of evidence; (5) prevent the suspect's escape; and (6) enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause. Birchfield v. North Dakota , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2189, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (citing Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 149, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ); Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). See also, Baker , ¶ 10, 223 P.3d at 547 (recognizing "a search conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect" is an exception to the warrant requirement) (quoting Andrews v. State , 2002 WY 28, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 708, 712 (Wyo. 2002) ). We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. McNeely , 569 U.S. at 149, 133 S.Ct. at 1559. See also, Pena , ¶ 29, 98 P.3d at 870 ("The existence of exigent circumstances is dependent upon all of the facts or circumstances viewed in their entirety."). The State bears the burden of showing the existence of exigent circumstances. Pena , ¶ 29, 98 P.2d at 870.

[¶11] The district court concluded the officers’ warrantless entry into Mr. Fuller's apartment was justified by exigent circumstances—the "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect (hereinafter referred to as the "hot pursuit" exception). It explained:

[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, [Deputy] Kellison's entry into [Mr. Fuller]’s home to effectuate an arrest was reasonable. Not only were the offenses at issue [(no visible registration and eluding the police)] jailable offenses, [Mr. Fuller] repeatedly and quickly escalated his criminal behavior. In a matter of minutes, [Mr. Fuller] went from not having a properly displayed vehicle registration to trying to elude the police in a vehicle to running away from a deputy sheriff as he attempted to make an arrest. Under these facts, the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine applies and prohibits rewarding [Mr. Fuller] for escalating his criminal behavior and avoids penalizing law enforcement for apprehending a suspect who by his own actions drew law enforcement into his home.

[ ] Moreover, [Deputy] Kellison knew almost nothing about the suspect in this case except that he was willing to continue to escalate his criminal behavior at 3:30 a.m. [Deputy] Kellison testified that he did not recognize [Mr. Fuller] from any earlier contacts. Moreover, [Deputy] Kellison was unable to run the registration on the [SUV] to determine who the owner might be. Finally, the female occupant of the [SUV] refused to tell [Deputy] Kellison who had been driving the vehicle. Under these

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