Funderburk v. Snyder

1

BRIAN A. FUNDERBURK, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM SNYDER, in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Martin County Sheriff's Office, and STEVEN O'LEARY, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-14290-Cann/McCabe

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

March 27, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DE 47

RYON M. MCCABE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (DE 47) filed by William D. Snyder in his official capacity as Sheriff of Martin County (“Sheriff”), which was referred to the undersigned by United States District Judge Aileen M. Cannon (DE 63). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a civil rights case alleging, inter alia, excessive force and false arrest. The record shows the following undisputed facts. At or around 8:45 P.M. on August 20, 2018, Martin County Deputy Sheriff Steven O'Leary responded to a residence to investigate an anonymous report of a domestic disturbance (DE 58-3 at 45:7-11, 56:9-10). O'Leary encountered Plaintiff at the residence and, after a series of events not relevant to this Motion, placed him under arrest for violating Fla. Stat. § 843.02, which makes it unlawful to resist an officer without violence (DE 589).

Thereafter the State Attorney for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit charged Plaintiff with several counts, including resisting an officer with violence in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.01 (DE 53-8 at 12). On April 18, 2019, Plaintiff entered into a plea agreement, whereby he agreed to plead no-contest to this offense (DE 58-12 at 4). A state court judge thereafter accepted the plea, adjudicated Plaintiff guilty of violating Fla. Stat. § 843.01 and sentenced him to sixteen months in prison (DE 53-9 at 1, 3, 8).

At some later point in time, Plaintiff decided to bring suit against the Sheriff arising from his arrest and incarceration. To that end, on or about January 15, 2021, Plaintiff sent a “Notification of Intention to File Claim” to the following addresses:

Martin County Attorney's Office

Sarah Woods

County Attorney

2401 SE Monterey Rd.

Stuart, FL 34996-3322

Martin County Administrator

Taryn Kryzda

2401 SE Monterey Rd.

Stuart, FL 34996

Florida Department of Financial Services

Division of Risk Management

200 E. Gaines Street

Tallahassee, FL 32399

(DE 58-13 at 5-7). Plaintiff sent these notifications by certified mail with return receipts requested (DE 58-13 at 1-3). Plaintiff submitted signed receipts into the record showing actual receipt by all three addressees (DE 58-13 at 1-3).

Plaintiff's administrative assistant also sent a fourth notification to the Sheriff, which she attested was “identical” to the versions sent to the Martin County Attorney and the Martin County Administrator, apart from the addressees (DE 68-1 at 1-2). Plaintiff has not, however, submitted a copy of this fourth notification into the record, nor has he submitted a return receipt to show actual receipt by the Sheriff. The Sheriff's General Counsel, meanwhile, has submitted an affidavit stating that the Sheriff never received any such notification (DE 53-10 ¶ 4).

On or about July 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case, alleging the following counts against Sheriff:

Count I Excessive Force Cognizable Against Sheriff Under Florida Law;

Count III False Arrest Against Sheriff Cognizable Under Florida Law; and

Count V Violation of Privacy-Intrusion Upon Seclusion Cognizable Under Florida Law.

(DE 1 at 5, 7, 10). This Motion followed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the movant must show the court that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Id. at 325.

After the movant has met its burden under Rule 56(a), the burden of production shifts, and the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As Rule 56 explains, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact ... the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3). Therefore, the non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings” but instead must present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). Courts also must resolve ambiguities and draw justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Ultimately, “the trial court may ... deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Sheriff seeks summary judgment on several grounds, each of which the Court will address in turn.

A. Failure to Comply with Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a)

Sheriff first argues summary judgment should be entered on all counts because Plaintiff failed to comply with Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a). Under that statute, the State of Florida and its political subdivisions agree to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, but only upon compliance with certain conditions, including timely presentation of the claim to the appropriate agency:

An action may not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality, county, or the Florida Space Authority, presents such claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing; ....

Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a).

A plaintiff must comply with this provision as a condition precedent to suing a state agency or political subdivision under Florida law. See Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979) (“Compliance with [§ 768.28(6)(a)] is clearly a condition precedent to maintaining a suit.”). Since § 768.28(6)(a) functions as part of a waiver of sovereign immunity, the statute “must be strictly construed.” Levine v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 442 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla. 1983); see also Menendez v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 537 So.2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1988) (“[T]he language in the state's notice provision is clear and must be strictly construed.”).

Moreover, the word “presents,” as used in the statute, means not only that a plaintiff must send the claim to the appropriate agency, but that the agency must actually receive the claim. Simmons v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 338 So.3d 1057, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). This means the appropriate agency must receive the claim “in hand” by the appropriate deadline. Id. Because the statute must be construed strictly, this “leaves little room for substantial compliance.” Id. (quoting Hamide v. Dep't of Corrs., 584 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)).

Here, the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff presented the claim in writing to the Martin County Attorney and the Martin County Administrator by the appropriate deadline (DE 58-13 at 5-6). The Court finds these two notifications did not qualify as “presenting the claim” to the Sheriff under § 768.28(6)(a). As to the County Attorney, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in Pirez v. Brescher, 584 So.2d 993, 994 (Fla. 1991), where it answered the following question of great public importance:

DOES NOTICE GIVEN ONLY TO THE BROWARD COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE PURSUANT TO SECTION 768.28(6)(a) SUFFICE TO SUPPORT AN ACTION ON A CLAIM AGAINST THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE OF BROWARD COUNTY?

The Pirez court answered in the negative, following the reasoning of Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal:

Sheriffs in most counties are elected constitutional officers operating their own bandwagons, even taking out their own insurance out of their own budgets to safeguard them against claims such as the one before us now. We do not agree that notice to the county attorney's office, when it does not represent the sheriff and when the county is not even named as a defendant, satisfies the intent of the legislature.

Id. at 995 (quoting Pirez v. Brescher, 566 So.2d 577, 578-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)). As a result, the Florida Supreme Court found that “Pirez failed to give proper notice of his claim and thus failed to comply with a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id.

As to the Martin County Administrator, the Court likewise finds the notice provided did not suffice. In 2011, another court in this district answered...