G.E. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

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G.E., the student; and S.B., the student's parent and legal guardian, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 3:21-cv-00702

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

June 6, 2024

To The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ALISTAIR E. NEWBERN United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiffs G.E. and his parent S.B. brought this action against Defendant Williamson County Board of Education, doing business as Williamson County Schools (WCS), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C §§ 1400-1482, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act or § 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Title II), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. (Doc. Nos. 1, 44.) The Court has referred this action to the Magistrate Judge to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Doc. No. 30.)

The Court previously remanded this action to the state administrative law judge (ALJ) for reconsideration of the ALJ's order denying G.E. and S.B.'s claims for relief. (Doc. No. 38.) On remand, the ALJ found that: (1) WCS did not violate the IDEA's and § 504's child-find provisions by failing to identify and evaluate G.E. as a student who might have a disability during his fifth, sixth, and seventh-grade years; (2) G.E. is not eligible for special education services under the IDEA or § 504; (3) WCS did not deny G.E. access to services in violation of § 504 or Title II; and (4) G.E and S.B. are not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition, compensatory education, or other requested relief. (Doc. No. 48-1.)

G.E. and S.B. filed an amended complaint challenging most of the ALJ's reconsidered findings and arguing that, in fifth and sixth grade, WCS failed to reasonably accommodate G.E. in violation of Title II and § 504 and violated § 504's and the IDEA's child-find provisions and that, in seventh grade, WCS further violated the IDEA by finding G.E. ineligible for special education services. (Doc. No. 44.)

G.E. and S.B. have moved for judgment on the administrative record. (Doc. No. 51.) WCS has responded in opposition (Doc. No. 52), and G.E. and S.B. have filed a reply (Doc. No. 53). Considering the parties' arguments and the administrative record as a whole, and for the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court deny G.E. and S.B.'s motion.

I. Background

A. Legal Background

1. The IDEA

Congress enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [(FAPE)] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).^[1] The IDEA defines a FAPE as:

special education and related services that- (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.

Id. § 1401(9)(A)-(D). To be considered a “child with a disability” under the IDEA, a child must have (1) “intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and” (2) must, “by reason thereof, need[ ] special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A).

“To meet [the IDEA's] goal, Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme outlining the responsibilities of government agencies and the procedural and substantive guarantees provided to students with disabilities and their families.” Ja. B. ex rel. M.B. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 61 F.4th 494, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2023). The IDEA requires states that accept federal funding to identify, locate, and evaluate “[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State . . . who are in need of special education and related services[.]” Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). This “child-find mandate” creates an affirmative obligation of every local educational agency (LEA) to identify and evaluate students who are reasonably suspected of having disabilities and needing special education services. Ja. B., 61 F.4th at 500; see also Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty. v. L.M. ex rel. T.D., 478 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007). The obligation is not limited to children enrolled in the public school system; it extends to “any student residing in the state and all ‘[c]hildren who are suspected of being a child with a disability under [the IDEA] and in need of special education, even though they are advancing from grade to grade[.]'” Ja. B., 61 F.4th at 501 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412.

Before a child may receive special education services, an LEA “shall conduct a full and individual initial evaluation” “to determine whether [the] child is a child with a disability” as defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401 and “to determine the educational needs of such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A), (C)(i)(I)-(n). If a student is found to be a child with a disability in need of special education or related services, the LEA is “required to establish an [individualized education program (IEP)]” for the child. Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 853 (6th Cir. 2004). “[T]he IEP must contain a specific statement of the child's current performance levels, the child's short-term and long-term goals, the educational and other services to be provided, and criteria for evaluating the child's progress.” Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2001); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (defining requirements for IEPs).

A parent with concerns about “any matter relating to” the child's identification, evaluation, and educational placement may file a complaint with the school district and is entitled to an administrative due process hearing on the complaint. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f), (g). Any party aggrieved by the state educational agency's final decision may file a civil action in federal district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

The IDEA provides that a court reviewing an administrative determination “(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)-(iii). “The Supreme Court has construed this provision to mean that an initial reviewing court should make an independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence, but also should give ‘due weight' to the determinations made during the state administrative process.” McLaughlin ex rel. McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). The amount of weight due to a state agency's findings “will vary, depending on whether the court is reviewing procedural or substantive matters and whether educational expertise is essential to the administrative findings.” Burilovich ex rel. Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Schs., 208 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2000). When reviewing procedural issues, “a court should ‘strictly review'” whether the school complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements. Id. (quoting Dong ex rel. Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Cmty. Schs., 197 F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Deal, 392 F.3d at 854 (same). With respect to substantive issues, courts “must keep in mind that the state and local educational agencies are deemed to possess expertise in education policy and practice.” Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 567; see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 (“The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the [IDEA] to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.”). “As a result, less weight is due to an agency's determinations on matters for which educational expertise is not relevant, so that a federal court would be just as well suited to evaluate the situation[,]” while “[m]ore weight is due to an agency's determinations on matters for which educational expertise would be relevant.” Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 567.

2. Rehabilitation Act § 504

“While the IDEA guarantees individually tailored special education services to students with disabilities, Section 504 and the ADA prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities more broadly.” Knox Cnty. v. M.Q. ex rel. N.Q., 62 F.4th 978, 999 (6th Cir. 2023); see also Fry ex rel. E.F. v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 170-71 (2017) (“[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.”).

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

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