G.W. v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ.

G.W. and Mk.W. o/b/o M.W., Plaintiffs, v. RINGWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-13734

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

December 21, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiffs G.W. and Mk.W. (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Parents”) bring this suit against Defendant Ringwood Board of Education (the “Board”) seeking reversal of an Administrative Law Judge's order approving the parties' settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) and remand back to the Office of Administrative Law for a due process hearing. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that the Settlement Agreement is void in its entirety, or in the alternative, that the Settlement Agreement's waiver of attorneys' fees is void. Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment, D.E. 35, and Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, D.E. 44. The Court reviewed the parties' submissions^[1] and decided the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) and L Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

M.W. is a child with a disability who is a resident of Ringwood, New Jersey. D.E. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 11. M.W. is eligible for special education and related services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Id. G.W. and Mk.W. are M.W.'s parents. Id. at ¶ 12. Federal law requires that “local education authorities” (“LEA”) that receive federal funds, such as the Board here, provide eligible children with disabilities a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) in the least restrictive environment. Id. ¶ 19; 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(1)(A). Where a dispute arises between an LEA and parents of a child with disabilities regarding the child's education and services, the parents have a right to a “due process hearing.” Compl. ¶ 23; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).

The Parents filed a due process petition with the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) seeking a hearing, and it was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 27. G.W. attended on that day, with counsel, but Mk.W. did not because she was not scheduled to testify and “did not want to miss additional days of work.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Administrative Law Judge Ellen S. Bass (“ALJ Bass”) was to preside over the hearing. Id. ¶ 31. Before the hearing began, ALJ Bass “conferenced the case with counsel” and began facilitating settlement discussions. Id. ¶ 31. Defendant alleges that “[i]t was Plaintiffs, not the Board or Judge Bass, who requested that the parties engage in settlement discussions prior to the start of the hearing.” D.E. 41 (“Answer”) ¶ 29. Plaintiffs allege that G.W. agreed to ALJ Bass participating in settlement discussions because G.W. believed “he had no real alternative.” Compl. ¶¶ 33-34. According to Plaintiffs, “Judge Bass became an active advocate for settlement, driving the discussion of what it would take to settle the case, opining on the legality and practicability of Petitioners' requests, and pressuring Petitioners to settle their matter to avoid a trial.” Id. ¶ 35. Defendant denies these assertions. Answer ¶ 35.

Plaintiffs further allege that “G.W. had not come to the hearing . . . prepared to discuss specific terms of settlement.” Compl. ¶ 40. At one point, “G.W. respectfully requested that the parties simply go to trial,” but ALJ Bass “again stepped in to advocate for a settlement, suggesting that G.W. not get angry and return to the bargaining table.” Id. ¶¶ 42-43. Defendant denies this allegation. Answer ¶¶ 42-43.

Plaintiffs also allege that ALJ Bass “remembered Mk.W.'s role, and stated that if Mk.W. was a ‘decision-maker,' then she must appear the next day.” Compl. ¶ 46. ALJ Bass then “asked G.W. to call Mk.W. and get her input.” Id. ¶ 48. At that point, Plaintiffs allege that Mk.W. “advised [G.W.] that her position was a firm ‘no' to settlement.” Id. ¶ 49. As a result, “G.W. again attempted to end the settlement discussions,” but ALJ Bass continued. Id. ¶ 50. The Board denies these facts, except for the allegation that “Judge Bass spoke with Mk.W. directly on at least two occasions during settlement discussions by phone.” Answer ¶¶ 46-50.

“When Judge Bass spoke directly with Mk.W. on the phone,” Plaintiffs allege that “Mk.W. discussed her objections to the proposed settlement, to the extent that it had been explained to her and/or to the extent that she understood it.” Compl. ¶ 53. Plaintiffs further claim that Mk.W.'s communications with G.W. and ALJ Bass “were conducted while Mk.W. was at work, struggling with poor cell phone reception, and without her ever having had the opportunity to review the proposed settlement document itself.” Id. ¶ 54.

Later that same day, a draft settlement agreement was created. Id. ¶ 60. While Plaintiffs' former attorney “attempted to send the proposed written agreement to Mk.W. for review,” Plaintiffs allege that “Mk.W. never received the agreement because of poor service on her cell phone.” Id. ¶ 61. G.W. also attempted to call Mk.W. but did not reach her. Id. ¶ 62. “Judge Bass asked G.W. if Mk.W. agreed to the settlement agreement, and G.W. replied that she had not seen it and asked if he could take a picture and send it via text.” Id. ¶ 66. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he District's counsel replied, ‘no.'” Id. ¶ 67. Defendant alleges, to the contrary, that “Plaintiffs' counsel emailed Mk.W. the Agreement” and that “Mk.W. subsequently confirmed she had reviewed, understood, and accepted it.” Answer ¶ 61.

The parties agree that the following statements then occurred, on the record

THE COURT: . . . [G.W.], before I get into my regular questions I do want to note for the record that [Mk.W.] was not able to join us today but we did communicate with her several times. I think I spoke to her twice by phone and you spoke to her more times by phone and perhaps by text message as well.

I also want to note that the settlement agreement was emailed to her at some point during our conversations and that you did confer with her, and so I do want to ask you if I am correct in my understanding that you are authorized today to sign this settlement agreement on both your behalfs.

[G.W.]: I am.

THE COURT: Okay. And you understand that your signature then binds both you and your wife to the terms of the settlement, correct?

[G.W.]: I do.

Compl. ¶ 69; D.E. 8 Ex C (“Admin. Rec.”) at 12:14-13:6. According to Plaintiffs, G.W.'s responses were “based on G.W.'s mistaken belief that Mk.W. had expressed her agreement to the settlement to Judge Bass.” Compl. ¶ 70. But Plaintiffs allege that “Mk.W. had expressed to Judge Bass that Mk.W. did not agree to the terms of settlement” and that “[b]ased upon her phone calls with Mk.W., Judge Bass knew or should have known that Mk.W. would not have agreed to the terms of the settlement.” Id. ¶¶ 72-73 (emphasis in original). Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that “Mk.W. had not even seen the Putative Settlement Agreement because she was not able to access it on her cell phone.” Id. ¶ 74.

Defendant denies that Mk.W. never saw the Agreement, denies that Mk.W. told ALJ Bass that she did not assent to the Agreement, and denies that ALJ Bass knew or should have known that Mk.W. did not assent to the Agreement. Answer ¶¶ 70-74. Defendant points to another section of the administrative record where Plaintiffs' former counsel, Mr. Holland, questioned G.W.:

MR. HOLLAND: [G.W.], so you read through the entire agreement; is that correct?

[G.W.]: I did.

MR. HOLLAND: Okay. Are you confident that your wife advised you that she also did the same, that she read through the entire agreement?

[G.W.]: I am.

MR. HOLLAND: Do you feel confident that you understand all of the terms and conditions of that agreement?

[G.W.]: I do.

MR. HOLLAND: Are you confident that she told you - are you -can you represent that she told you that she read and understands those terms as well?

[G.W.]: She did.

Id. ¶ 70; Admin. Rec. at 14:15-15:4.

On May 7, 2019, the Settlement Agreement was signed by a representative of the school district and G.W. D.E. 8 Ex. A at 4. The Settlement Agreement states that it “shall be deemed fully executed and effective when all parties have executed at least one of the counterparts, even though no single counterpart bears all such signatures.” Id. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement states that it “is subject to the approval of the Ringwood Regional Board of Education.” Id. ALJ Bass entered a “Decision Approving Settlement” on May 7, 2019, even though the Board of Education had not yet approved the Settlement Agreement. Compl. ¶ 79; D.E. 8 Ex. B. On May 10, 2019 “the Parents filed a motion with Judge Bass to set aside the settlement and served a copy on Ringwood.”^[3] Compl. ¶ 82. That same day, the Parents sent letters to the Ringwood Superintendent, the Board President, and each Board Member repudiating the agreement. Id. ¶¶ 83-84. Defendant alleges that these letters were sent “three days after [the Settlement Agreement] had been fully executed and became effective and binding[.]” Answer ¶¶ 83-84.

A meeting of the Ringwood Board of Education took place on May 13, 2019. Compl. ¶ 85. Plaintiffs allege that “[d]uring the public comment, [G.W.] expressly repudiated the Putative Settlement Agreement.” Id. ¶ 85. Defendant alleges that G.W. only “asked the Board to release Plaintiffs from the Agreement.” Answer ¶ 85. Nevertheless, the Board approved the Settlement Agreement on May 13, 2019. Compl. ¶ 86; D.E. 8 Ex. A at 4.

Plaintiffs then brought this action appealing ALJ Bass' Decision Approving Settlement. Plaintiffs allege that the Settlement...