Ga. Gov't Transparency & Campaign Fin. Comm'n v. New Ga. Project Action Fund

359 Ga.App. 32

856 S.E.2d 733

GEORGIA GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE COMMISSION

v.NEW GEORGIA PROJECT ACTION FUND et al.

A20A1818

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 16, 2021

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Bryan K. Webb, Deputy Attorney General, Russell D. Willard, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christian A. Fuller, Miles C. Skedsvold, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

Bryan L. Sells ; Krevolin Horst, Joyce G. Lewis, Adam M. Sparks ; Kastorf Law, Kurt G. Kastorf, for appellees.

Pipkin, Judge.

Appellant Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission ("the Commission") moved the Superior Court of Fulton County for an order compelling New Georgia Project Action Fund/New Georgia Project, Fair Count f/k/a/ Third Sector Development, and AFG Group, Inc. d/b/a Stacey Abrams for Governor ("Appellees") to comply with the Commission's administrative subpoenas. The superior court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and denied the motion. This Court granted the Commission's application for discretionary appeal, and we now reverse the superior court and remand for further proceedings.

1. In August 2018, the Commission received a complaint alleging that the Stacey Abrams for Governor campaign had, without the requisite disclosures, engaged in coordination with a number of third-party nonprofit organizations that materially benefitted the campaign. The Commission initiated a preliminary investigation and issued administrative subpoenas to Appellees to obtain "relevant communication information to determine if coordination existed between the Abrams [c]ampaign and other third[-]party groups[.]" According to the Commission, Appellees have only responded in part, if at all, and the Commission moved the Superior Court of Fulton County to compel Appellees to produce the records and communications. In a one-paragraph order, citing to Oxendine v. Govt. Transparency and Campaign Finance Comm. , 341 Ga. App. 901, 802 S.E.2d 310 (2017), the superior court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter and denied the motion. On appeal, the Commission contends that it may seek judicial enforcement of its administrative subpoenas in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act and that Oxendine is inapplicable. We agree.

2. Before we delve into our statutory analysis, we recognize that "we must afford the statutory text its ‘plain and ordinary meaning,’ we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." (Citations omitted.) Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). This Court "look[s] to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it." Scott v. State , 299 Ga. 568, 571 (2), 788 S.E.2d 468 (2016). See also OCGA § 1-3-1 (a), (b). Where the statutory text is "clear and unambiguous," we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning generally ends. See Deal , 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337. The issue before us is purely legal and, thus, is reviewed de novo. See Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus , 285 Ga. 684, 689 (4), 681 S.E.2d 122 (2009).

Broadly speaking, the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, see OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., "is meant to provide a procedure for administrative determination and regulation where expressly authorized by law or otherwise required by the Constitution or a statute of this state."¹ OCGA § 50-13-1. Among other things, the Act describes "the procedures an agency must follow in order to adopt new rules and regulations," Walker v. Dept. of Transp. , 279 Ga. App. 287, 293-294 (2) (c), 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006), details the procedural rules and remedies relevant to agency proceedings, see DeKalb County School Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Ed. , 294 Ga. 349, 370 (4) (a), 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013), and provides for judicial review of both intermediate and final agency decisions, see Federated Dept. Stores v. Ga. Pub. Svc. Comm. , 278 Ga. App. 239, 241 (1), 628 S.E.2d 658 (2006).

The Commission argues that it may seek judicial enforcement of its administrative subpoenas under OCGA § 50-13-13 (b).²

This provision states as follows:

In proceedings before the agency, the hearing officer, or any representative of the agency authorized to hold a hearing, if any party or an agent or employee of a party ... neglects to produce, after having been ordered to do so, any pertinent book, paper, or document ... the agency, hearing officer, or other representative shall have the same rights and powers given the court under Chapter 11 of Title 9, the "Georgia Civil Practice Act." If any person ... refuses as specified in this subsection, the agency, hearing officer, or other representative may certify the facts to the superior court of the county where the offense is committed for appropriate action, including a finding of contempt. ...

Id. In order to address the Commission's arguments, we must determine both whether the phrase "proceedings before the agency" encompasses the Commission's preliminary investigation and whether the Commission's administrative subpoena "ordered" Appellees to produce the requested materials. We address each in turn.

(a) The Georgia Administrative Procedure Act does not expressly define the phrase "proceedings before the agency,"³ but we can use other portions of the Act to help glean the meaning of the phrase. See GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden , 306 Ga. 829, 834 (3), 834 S.E.2d 27 (2019). A substantial portion of the Act concerns the "contested case," which refers to "a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 50-13-2 (2). Appellee AFG Group d/b/a Stacey Abrams for Governor ("Appellee AFG") contends that the phrase "proceedings before the agency" is a reference to a "contested case" and urges us to conclude that OCGA § 50-13-13 (b) applies only to these more formal adjudicative proceedings. However, had the General Assembly intended that OCGA § 50-13-13 (b) apply only to contested cases, it could have expressly used that term as it did in countless other instances throughout the Act; instead, the General Assembly used the phrase "proceedings before the agency," and we must give meaning to this choice of words. See Pandora Franchising v. Kingdom Retail Group , 299 Ga. 723, 728 (1) (b), 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016) (recognizing that "[w]here the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the Court assumes different meanings were intended" because we presume "that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless language") (citations and punctuation omitted).

Our conclusion that the use of the phrase "proceedings before the agency" is not merely a substitute for the term "contested case" is bolstered when OCGA § 50-13-13 is viewed as a whole.⁴ OCGA § 50-13-13 includes three sections; the General Assembly utilized the phrase "contested case" in both subsections (a) and (c), but not in subsection (b). Additionally, while OCGA § 50-13-13 (b) initially uses the term "party" – which can be understood as a participant in a contested case, see OCGA § 50-13-2 (2) and (4) – subsection (b) later provides that it is applicable to "any person," not just a party.⁵ More significantly, subsection (c) provides, in part, that "[s]ubsection (a) of this Code section and the other provisions of this chapter concerning contested cases shall not apply to any case arising in the administration of the revenue laws[.]"⁶ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 50-13-13 (c). While the instant matter does not involve the administration of the revenue laws, subsection (c) is no less relevant here; the language of subsection (c) indicates that it is only subsection (a) of OCGA § 50-13-13 – along with other unidentified provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act – that specifically "concern[s] contested cases."

Having established that the Act does not plainly or immediately provide a meaning to the phrase "proceedings before the agency," we must now turn to the language itself for a solution. The word "proceedings" is defined as "the carrying on of an action or course of action," see New World Dictionary of American English College Edition 1072 (2nd ed. 1988), as "a series of activities or events; happenings," and as a "legal step or measure," see Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1542 (2nd ed. 1997). However, the word "proceedings" is not used in isolation here; instead, it refers to what is occurring "before the agency," that is, an administrative agency. The phrase "administrative proceeding" is defined as "[a] hearing, inquiry, investigation , or trial before an administrative agency, usu. adjudicatory in nature but sometimes quasi-legislative." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Thus, while "proceedings before the agency" can be understood to reference a more formal process – including a contested case – we agree with the Commission that the phrase can also be understood to encompass an agency's investigations.⁷

(b) Now we must delve into the second relevant portion of OCGA § 50-13-13 (b). Returning to the text of the statute, subsection (b) permits an agency to seek relief in the superior court where "any person" fails "to produce, after having been ordered to do so , any pertinent book, paper, or document[.]" (Emphasis supplied.) Id. Here, the Commission issued administrative subpoenas to Appellees in accordance with its subpoena power under OCGA § 21-5-6 (a) (5), and we must now decide whether, for the purposes of OCGA § 50-13-13 (b), these subpoenas sufficiently "ordered" Appellees to produce the requested documents.⁸

When used as a...