Gaddis v. Ala. Inst. for Deaf & Blind

STEPHANIE GADDIS, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA INSTITUTE FOR THE DEAF AND BLIND, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 1:16-cv-01881-SGC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

September 13, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

This matter is before the court on the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants, Alabama Institute for the Deaf and Blind ("AIDB"), John Mascia, and Christy Atkinson. (Docs. 44, 46). These motions are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. (Docs. 45, 47-52, 54F-55). Also pending is Mascia and Atkinson's motion to strike certain evidence on which Plaintiff, Stephanie Gaddis, relies; Plaintiff has not responded to this motion. (Doc. 53). As explained below, the motion to strike is due to be granted in part, and the motions for summary judgement are due to be granted in their entirety.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The operative complaint is the third amended complaint. (Doc. 37). Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendants. Count I alleges disparatetreatment under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 13-15). Count II alleges retaliation and also invokes Title VII and § 1983. (Id. at 15-18). Count III is entitled "Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment." (Id. at 18-21).

All claims are asserted against AIDB, as well as Mascia and Atkinson in their individual and official capacities. Accordingly, one group of attorneys represents AIDB and Mascia in his official capacity. (See Doc. 46). Separate counsel represents Mascia and Atkinson with regard to the remaining claims. (See Doc. 44).² Plaintiff responded separately to each motion for summary judgment (Docs. 48, 49) but also filed amended responses (Docs. 50, 51). The amended responses attach fewer exhibits, but the substance of the briefs appear to be the same, save the amended response to Mascia and Atkinson's motion; Plaintiff's amended response omits the final page of her brief. (Compare Doc. 48 with Doc. 50). In any event, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff intended the amended responses to supplant her original responses, and this opinion analyzes the arguments and evidence presented in Plaintiff's amended responses.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.

III. FACTS

AIDB is the official state agency designated to conduct educational and training programs for deaf, hearing impaired, blind, and visually handicappedAlabamians. ALA. CODE § 21-1-23; see Tuck v. Alabama Inst. for Deaf & Blind, No. 17-0394-ACA, 2019 WL 398702, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2019). AIDB runs the Helen Keller School ("HKS"), which teaches deaf, blind, and multi-handicapped students. (See Doc. 47 at 2). AIDB has employed Plaintiff, an African American female, as a teacher for over thirty years. (Doc. 51 at 2; Doc. 37 at 5). For almost all of that time, Plaintiff taught at HKS, where she continues to teach. (Doc. 51 at 2; Doc. 43-1 at 4).

Mascia has been employed by AIDB since January 2005, and has served as AIDB's President since January 2013. (Doc. 43-3 at 2). Prior to becoming President, Mascia had no supervisory authority over Plaintiff and was not involved in any decisions affecting her employment. (Id.). As President of AIDB, Mascia does not have authority to hire, suspend without pay, or terminate any employee. (Id. at 3). Rather, under Alabama law, Mascia's authority is limited to making recommendations to AIDB's Board of Trustees; the Board of Trustees is not bound by those recommendations. (Id.). Atkinson was employed by AIDB from July 1, 2011, through August 26, 2015; during this time she served as the Principal of HKS. (Doc. 43-4 at 2). As Principal, Atkinson did not have authority to hire, transfer, promote, or suspend any employee. (Id.). Instead, Atkinson's authority was limited to making recommendations on these matters. (Id. at 2-3).

On August 19, 2014, Plaintiff was teaching a class in which K.C. was a student. K.C., a white, visually impaired student who suffers from multiple disabilities, was rude and disruptive, and Plaintiff eventually sent her to stand outside the classroom. (See Doc. 51 at 8-9; Doc. 47 at 3). When K.C. subsequently disobeyed Plaintiff's instruction to return to the classroom, Plaintiff walked to K.C. and began escorting her toward the classroom. (Doc. 51 at 8-9; Doc. 47 at 3). Plaintiff testified that as she and K.C. were walking side-by-side, K.C. fell to the ground and began to throw a temper tantrum. (Doc. 43-1 at 11). Plaintiff had her arm around K.C. before she fell; Plaintiff testified she tried to catch K.C. to help her back to her feet. (Id. at 11-12). When K.C. refused to cooperate, Plaintiff testified she left her alone. (Id. at 12). For purposes of summary judgment, this is how the events with K.C. unfolded.

This interaction was witnessed by at least five other AIDB employees. One teacher, Brenda Lee, stated she saw K.C. fall but did not see Plaintiff pull her across the floor. (Doc. 43-2 at 37). The rest of the witnesses had different impressions. One teacher, Carolyn Stamps, saw Plaintiff escorting K.C. to the classroom and witnessed K.C. fall to the floor; Stamps could not say whether K.C. fell or was pushed to the ground. (Doc. 43-3 at 25). Stamps stated Plaintiff pulled K.C. toward the classroom but did not observe the entire interaction because her view of the area was obstructed. (Id.; Doc. 43-2 at 35). Katie Trotter, a job coach,observed K.C. sit down on the floor as Plaintiff was escorting her. (Doc. 43-3 at 22). Trotter stated Plaintiff pulled K.C. by her arm back to the classroom, with K.C. "sliding on her bottom across the floor." (Id.). Trotter estimated Plaintiff dragged K.C. across the floor for approximately twenty or thirty feet. (Doc. 43-2 at 32-33). Another teacher, Christine Smith, opined K.C. lost her balance and fell; after the fall, Smith saw Plaintiff pull K.C. back to the classroom by the arm, dragging her across the floor for a distance between twelve and twenty feet. (Id. at 28-31; Doc. 43-3 at 24). Holly Hartsfield, a teacher's aide, also stated Plaintiff pulled K.C. across the floor for approximately five to seven feet and into the classroom; Hartsfield heard a loud bang after Plaintiff and K.C. were back in the classroom. (Doc. 43-3 at 23; see Doc. 43-2 at 21).

Later that day, Hartsfield spoke with K.C. and observed a red mark on her arm near the elbow. (Doc. 43-3 at 23). K.C. told Hartsfield that Plaintiff had kicked her in the head during the incident. (See id.; see also Doc. 43-1 at 21; Doc. 43-2 at 17). Hartsfield then took K.C. to the nurse's station and was directed to make a report to the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR"). (Doc. 47 at 4). Multiple agencies responded, and Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave the following day pending an investigation. (Id.; Doc. 51 at 11; see Doc. 43-3 at 10). During the investigation, Plaintiff refused to meet with AIDB personnelwithout her attorney. (Doc. 47 at 5-6; Doc. 51 at 12). Throughout the investigation, Plaintiff denied dragging K.C. across the floor.

AIDB policies prohibit corporal punishment, which is defined as physically punishing a student "by shaking, slapping, grabbing body parts with excessive force, etc." (Doc. 43-1 at 93-94). On October 24, 2014, Mascia wrote Plaintiff a letter memorializing the conclusions of AIDB's investigation. (Doc. 43-3 at 12-13). The letter acknowledged Plaintiff denied pulling K.C. across the floor but concluded her version of events was outweighed by the four witness statements to the contrary. (Id. at 12). As a result, Mascia recommended Plaintiff be suspended without pay for ten days. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff rejected Mascia's proposed discipline and requested an evidentiary hearing with AIDB's Board of Trustees. (Doc. 43-6 at 3; see Doc. 43-1 at 92).

The hearing board was comprised of four members of the Executive Committee of AIDB's Board of Trustees (the "Hearing Board"). The Hearing Board conducted an evidentiary hearing on November 7, 2014. (Doc. 43-2).³ Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, presented evidence, and testified she never pulled K.C. across the floor. (Id.; see Doc. 47 at 7). Plaintiffalso called Brenda Lee, who testified she witnessed K.C. fall but did not see Plaintiff pull her across the floor. (Doc. 43-2 at 37). The Hearing Board also heard the other witnesses—Stamps, Smith, Trotter, and Hartsfield—testify they saw Plaintiff pull K.C. across the floor after she fell. (Id. at 20-36). The Hearing Board...