Gaines v. Smith

379 So.3d 411

Dalen GAINES

v.Nick SMITH, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Walker County, and Christopher Doeur, individually and in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Walker County

1210304

Supreme Court of Alabama.

November 18, 2022

Rehearing Denied January 6, 2023

* Note from the reporter of decisions: Judge Vance, circuit judge, Jefferson County, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the circuit judges in 14th Judicial Circuit.

Charles C. Tatum, Jr., and Seth Diamond, Jasper, for appellant.

Jamie Helen Kidd Frawley and J. Randall McNeill of Webb McNeill Walker, PC, Montgomery, for appellees.

MITCHELL, Justice.

In this appeal, Dalen Gaines seeks monetary and equitable relief against Walker County law-enforcement officers for their role in what Gaines asserts was a delayed bond hearing. The trial court granted the law-enforcement officers’ motion to dismiss, and Gaines asks us to overturn that decision. We decline to do so.

Facts and Procedural History ¹

After Gaines failed to appear in the Walker Circuit Court to answer criminal charges, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Three months later, Walker County Sheriff’s Deputy Christopher Doeur executed the warrant and took Gaines into custody. Afterward, Deputy Doeur filed a certificate of execution, informing the Walker Circuit Court that he had arrested Gaines and placed him in the Walker County jail.

After about a month, Gaines remained incarcerated and had not yet appeared in court. Gaines then filed a complaint against Walker County Sheriff Nick Smith and Deputy Doeur ("the Officers"), in both their official and individual capacities. He claimed -- under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- that they had violated his civil rights, and he also asserted state-law claims for negligence and wantonness. Gaines sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and unspecified monetary damages. The day after Gaines filed his complaint, the Walker Circuit Court set his criminal case for a hearing. Four days later, the trial court issued orders that released him on bond.

[1] Shortly after being released, Gaines was arrested on a separate capital-murder charge in Jefferson County; he is currently being held without bond on that charge. He faces additional charges in Jefferson County, along with a probation-revocation matter in Cullman County.²

About four months after Gaines was arrested for capital murder, the Officers filed a motion to dismiss his suit based on theories of insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(4)-(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. In an unexplained order and without a hearing, the trial court granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. Gaines timely appealed to this Court.

Standard of Review

[2–5] This Court reviews a ruling on a motion to dismiss " ‘without a presumption of correctness.’ " Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 563 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ala. 2003)). In conducting this review, we must determine "whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief." Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). Granting a motion to dismiss is proper "only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id. We may, however, "affirm the circuit court’s judgment for any legal, valid reason, even one not raised in or considered by the circuit court, un- less due-process fairness principles require that the ground have been raised below and it was not." State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 373 So.3d 809, 812 (Ala. 2022).

Analysis

Gaines makes two primary arguments on appeal. First, he says that the trial court erred when it granted the Officers’ motion to dismiss without holding a hearing. Second, he argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the case for failure to state a claim. We reject both arguments.

A. The trial court’s failure to hold a hearing before granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss was harmless error

Gaines first argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on the Officers’ motion to dismiss. Gaines contends that the language of Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P., the accompanying committee comments to that rule, and this Court’s previous interpretation of that rule require the trial court to conduct a hearing before granting a motion to dismiss.

[6] We begin with the text of Rule 78, which provides that "the court may enter an order denying a motion to dismiss without oral hearing." (Emphasis added.) The significance of the word "denying" in that rule is made clear by the negative-implication canon of interpretation, which indicates that " ‘[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.’ " Martin v. Martin, 329 So. 3d 1242, 1245 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 10 at 107 (Thomson/West 2012)). Based on that canon, it follows that because Rule 78 allows a court to deny a motion to dismiss without an oral hearing, it does not allow a court to grant such a motion without a hearing.

[7] The committee comments accompanying Rule 78 as well as our precedent confirm this interpretation. The committee comments provide that if "the court has any inclination toward the granting of the motion to dismiss, a hearing will continue to be required." Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).³ We upheld this view of Rule 78 in Burgoon v. Alabama Department of Human Resources, 835 So. 2d 131 (Ala. 2002), in which we held that "[u]nder the plain language of [Rule 78] and the comments to the rule, a trial court may not grant a motion to dismiss without a hearing, although, in some circumstances, it may deny such a motion." Id. at 133.

[8] Here, the trial court erred by granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss without holding a hearing; but that is not the end of the analysis. Our rules of procedure require us to affirm the decision below if the trial court’s error was harmless. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. (prohibiting reversal of the judgment below unless "the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties"). We have consistently held that " ‘ " ‘[t]he burden of establishing that an erroneous ruling was prejudicial is on the appellant.’ " ’ " Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Daphne Auto., LLC, 155 So. 3d 930, 936 (Ala. 2013) (citations omitted). Therefore, Gaines must demonstrate to this Court that the lack of a hearing prejudiced him in a way that affected his substantial rights. See Rule 45.

Gaines fails to make that showing. In his initial brief to this Court, he focuses his argument on the fact that the trial court did not hold a hearing before granting the Officers’ motion to dismiss. But Gaines does not indicate in that brief how or why that error prejudiced him. Rather, he waits until his reply brief to address the harmless-error argument for the first time.⁴ His argument comes too late. See Douglas v. Roper, 374 So.3d 652, 672 (Ala. 2022) ("Arguments not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed waived."). Consequently, Gaines has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s error was prejudicial.

B. Gaines fails to state a plausible claim against the Officers

Gaines next asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his case with prejudice based on a failure to state a plausible claim for relief.⁵ In his complaint, Gaines seeks monetary and equitable relief against the Officers in both their official and individual capacities. He makes several arguments to our Court in an effort to salvage his claims, but none of them are availing.

1. Gaines cannot assert a claim for damages against the Officers in their official capacities

[9] We begin by examining Gaines’s claims for monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities under both state and federal law.⁶ First, State immunity bars Gaines’s state-law claims. Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.) declares that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity" and acts as a jurisdictional bar that "strips courts of all power to adjudicate claims against the State." Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So.3d 192, 198-99 (Ala. 2022). Our statutes likewise reinforce that any "officer, employee, or agent of the state … acting in his or her official capacity is immune from civil liability in any suit pursuant to Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901." § 36-1-12(b), Ala. Code 1975. Therefore, those claims fail.

[10] Second, Gaines is prohibited from making § 1983 claims that seek monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities. Our precedent plainly states that plaintiffs may not "assert a § 1983 claim for money damages against [State officials] in their official capacities." Ex parte Ruffin, 160 So. 3d 750, 757 (Ala. 2014) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)) (holding that a State official sued in his official capacity for damages is not a "person" under § 1983). We thus affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss this category of Gaines’s § 1983 claims.

2. Gaines’s claims seeking equitable relief against the Officers are moot

[11] In his complaint, Gaines seeks two forms of equitable relief against the Officers in their official and individual capacities -- a declaratory judgment that the Officers’ actions violated his constitutional rights and "[p]rospective injunctive relief requiring defendants to comply with the express language of the writ and bring the plaintiff and those who are similarly situated...