Gallagher v. Gentile

ROBERT GALLAGHER, Plaintiff, v. DAVID GENTILE, JASON BOYER, THREE UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS,and THE VILLAGE OF LEMONT, ILLINOIS, Defendants.

No. 18 C 6413

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

January 13, 2020

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Robert Gallagher brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and illinois law after being issued traffic citations that ultimately led to a trial in state court. Defendant Officers David Gentile and Jason Boyer and the Village of Lemont, Illinois (the latter, "the Village," and all three collectively, "Defendants") moved to dismiss Gallagher's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 36. For the following reasons, that motion is granted in its entirety.

Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the "sufficiency of the complaint." Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with "fair notice" of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "'A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).

Background

This action arises out of traffic citations issued to Gallagher on two occasions in 2017. The facts recounted here are drawn from Gallagher's complaint and the additional documents and CD-ROMs containing police video of the traffic stops that were included with Gallagher's response brief.¹

At about 11:00 p.m. on August 31, 2017, Gallagher, an Indiana resident, was driving his 1977 Lincoln Mark V from the parking lot of a grocery store to his garage in the Village when Officer Gentile pulled him over. Officer Gentile explained to Gallagher that he stopped him because his vehicle bore a 1978 state of Indiana license plate without evidence of registration. Gallagher then told Officer Gentile: (1) that Indiana—the state in which his vehicle was registered—allowed a "model year" plate without evidence of registration; (2) that Illinois grants reciprocity to Indiana's laws regarding historic vehicles and model year plates; and (3) that Illinois's laws regarding model year plates and registration were basically the same. Gallagher showed Officer Gentile a copy of both the Illinois and Indiana laws allowing older vehicles to bear "model year" license plates under certain circumstances. Gallagher had shown Officer Gentile the same laws about a month prior. At that time, Officer Gentile advised Gallagher to display his current license plate going forward, and did not issue a citation. This time, Officer Gentile discussed with his colleagues whether Gallagher's vehicle was in compliance with Illinois statutes, and decided that it violated more than one. But rather than issuing Gallagher a citation for a more serious violation classified as a misdemeanor, Officer Gentile issued Gallagher only a traffic ticket for failure to display a registration sticker as required by 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (the "Illinois registration display statute"). According to Gallagher, the citation was issued in retaliation for Gallagher previously having admonished OfficerGentile for harassing children at a local McDonald's restaurant, and because Officer Gentile did not like "model year" plates.

On October 19, 2017, Gallagher was stopped by Officer Boyer for speeding. In the course of the stop, Officer Boyer asked Gallagher about his 1978 license plate, and for proof of insurance (which Gallagher could not produce). Gallagher again presented a copy of the Illinois and Indiana laws regarding historic vehicles and "model year" license plates and explained how he was in compliance. In the end, Officer Boyer issued Gallagher citations for: (1) speeding; (2) operating an uninsured vehicle; and (3) failure to display a registration sticker.

According to Gallagher, of the four citations issued to him in 2017, one proceeded to a jury trial in which Gallagher prevailed, and the others were resolved in his favor on pretrial motions.

Gallagher then filed this lawsuit. While far from a model of clarity, and despite that the allegations also implicate the Village's mayor, a prosecutor, and a state court judge, Gallagher's complaint names only Officers Gentile and Boyer, three unknown police officers, and the Village as defendants. His complaint purports to state claims for: malicious prosecution (Counts I-III); extortion/intimidation (Counts IV and V); attempted obstruction of justice (Count VI); negligence (Count VII); false arrest and imprisonment (Count VIII); aiding as an accessory in furtherance of a crime (Count IX); and failure to intervene (Count X). R. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim. R. 36.

Analysis

I. Federal Claims

False arrest/imprisonment (Count VIII). Gallagher seeks relief under Section 1983 for false arrest and imprisonment in connection with both traffic stops, claiming the officers detained him without consent or probable cause. See generally R. 1, Count VIII. "The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, but the existence of probable cause renders traffic stops and resulting warrantless arrests permissible." Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016). Indeed, probable cause "is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest[ or] false imprisonment." Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015). Further, "probable cause to believe that a person has committed any crime will preclude a false arrest claim, even if the person was arrested on additional or different charges for which there was no probable cause." Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007). The parties vigorously debate whether there was probable cause for the stops and citations issued here.

Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed an offense." Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Probable cause is not evaluated based upon "the facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them;" instead, the Court considers the facts "asthey would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer." Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 2013)). As such, "[t]he probable cause inquiry is an objective one," Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014), and the officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant. Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012). Further, "[t]he probable-cause standard inherently allows room for reasonable mistakes." Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). When the facts of what happened are not in dispute, the probable cause determination is a question of law. United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2010).

Here, the Illinois registration display statute provides in relevant part:

Registration stickers issued as evidence of renewed annual registration shall be attached to registration plates as required by the Secretary of State, and be clearly visible at all times.

625 ILCS 5/3-413(b). Both traffic stop videos show that the license plate on Gallagher's vehicle lacked evidence of registration, in clear violation of the Illinois registration display statute. Accordingly, the officers had probable cause to stop and cite him.

Gallagher nevertheless argues that probable cause did not exist because the officer defendants were out to get him, both because he had confronted them before and because they did not like "model year" license plates. But an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant, so this argument fails. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops do not depend on the "actual motivations of the individual officers involved").

Next, Gallagher argues that he complied with both the Illinois and Indiana statutes regarding antique or collector vehicles and "model year" plates, and that those statutes effectively "trump" the more general registration display statutes. While the relevant Illinois statute allows a motorist to display a so-called "model year" plate under certain circumstances, the allegations and videos indicate that Gallagher did not satisfy its requirements. The statute states:

Any person who is the registered owner of an antique vehicle may display a historical license plate from or representing the model year of the vehicle, furnished by such person, in lieu of the current and valid Illinois antique vehicle plates issued thereto, provided that valid and current Illinois antique vehicle plates and registration card issued to such antique vehicle are simultaneously

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