Gallardo v. IEH Corp.

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CARINA GALLARDO, Plaintiff, v. IEH CORPORATION, KARI GRAHAM, and WILLIAM CRAIG, Defendant.

No. 21-cv-3257 (LDH)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

September 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASHANN DEARCY HALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Carina Gallardo (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against IEH Corporation (“IEH”), Kari Graham, and William Craig (together with IEH and Graham “Defendants”), alleging (i) violations of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), (ii) discrimination and retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), (iii) and violations of the notice requirements under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), the New York Insurance Law (“NYIL”), and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff is separated from her husband and effectively a single mother who cares for a minor child. (Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff was hired as an accounting clerk at IEH on or about June 5, 2017. (Id. ¶ 10.) In this position, Plaintiff was responsible for handling, among other things, “items involving the incoming cash for” IEH. (Id. ¶ 11.)

On or about October 16, 2020, Plaintiff met with Craig, the Chief Financial Officer of IEH, to discuss the status of an account on which she worked. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 12.) During that meeting, Craig discussed the history of the account. (Id. ¶ 13.) In August 2020, Craig asked Plaintiff to stop pulling funds from the account, not send the client any of the normal paperwork, and put the account on hold. (Id. ¶ 14.) An executive for that client mentioned that IEH owed the client $4 million and asked Craig about the outstanding balance. (Id. ¶ 15.) In response, Craig asked the client “to give him a break because another [ ] employee of IEH, also a single mother, was diagnosed with COVID-19 and because he worked with ‘single mothers.'” (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff reported the comment to the human resources department (HR) on October 20, 2020, because the “single mothers” comment made her feel uncomfortable. (Id. ¶ 18.) According to Plaintiff, the comment revealed that Mr. Craig viewed single mothers “as inadequate employees.” (Id.) Plaintiff's HR complaint went ignored. (Id. ¶ 22.)

On or about December 9, 2020, Plaintiff spoke with Graham, the then new “controller” of IEH. (Id. ¶ 23.) Graham instructed Plaintiff not to process any incoming payments until Graham could come into the office physically to input them into the system. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff attempted to explain to Graham how to input the incoming payment remotely. (Id. ¶ 26.) Graham ignored Plaintiff's concerns that work would pile up and stood on her request for Plaintiff to wait until Graham was physically in the office to enter the payments. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Graham also instructed Plaintiff to report directly to her, and she would then report to Craig. (Id. ¶ 29.) Graham allegedly threatened Plaintiff at the end of the call, saying Plaintiff “would ‘not be around much longer' if she did not understand how ‘things work.'” (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff followed up with Graham by email on the same day, asking her to confirm that Plaintiff was not to process any incoming payments until Graham was in the office, that no one had informed Plaintiff that she was not to report to Craig anymore, expressing concern with Graham's tone and perceived threat, and requesting a follow-up meeting. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff also sent an email to HR expressing concern about Graham's “unprofessional” and “inappropriate . . .threat.” (Id. ¶ 34.)

On December 9, 2020, Plaintiff spoke with Craig about Graham's conduct. (Id. ¶ 35.) Craig responded that Plaintiff would have to “put her big boy pants on if she wanted to work at IEH.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Craig then told Plaintiff that he runs IEH and “if she did not like how someone spoke to her, then she should go to school, get her CPA license, and be her own boss.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Craig also stated that Plaintiff and another employee, also a single mother, had a “good situation going at IEH” and “this would not be happening if you weren't taking your PTOs.” (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) Plaintiff understood these comments to be a threat that required her to either “quietly endure abuse or risk being an unemployed single mother during the pandemic.” (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) Plaintiff sent another complaint to HR following her December 9, 2020 meeting with Craig. (Id. ¶ 49.)

Following the March 2020 closure of schools due to COVID-19, Plaintiff requested and was approved to work remotely. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) Craig told her that “someone of [Plaintiff's] title should not be working remotely and should be in the office.” (Id. ¶ 52.) Ultimately, Plaintiff felt it was necessary to take leave because of Craig's constant negative comments about working remotely. (Id. ¶ 53.) On or about December 23, 2020, Plaintiff requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for her child who was not attending school due to the pandemic. (Id. ¶ 54.) On or about December 27, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter stating that (1) her FMLA leave was denied because the unavailability of childcare is not covered under the FMLA, (2) she was covered under the FFCRA, (3) she would be required to return to work on March 17, 2021, because her leave commenced on December 23, 2020, (4) but, in the company's discretion, she would actually be scheduled to return on April 1, 2021, and (5) failure to return on April 1, 2021, would be deemed a voluntary resignation. (Id. ¶ 55.) On March 17, 2021, Plaintiff emailed HR to confirm she was scheduled to return on April 1, 2021, and to ask whether she would be expected to physically return to the office. (Id. ¶ 57.) Plaintiff also inquired about her complaints of harassment, intimidation, and hostility. (Id.)

On March 29, 2021, Plaintiff received a letter from IEH stating that her position had been eliminated because her role could be performed on an automated basis and otherwise internally within IEH. (Id. ¶ 58.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility” of a defendant's liability, id., “[i]t is not the Court's function to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss. Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F.Supp.2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the Court must merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient, and, in doing so, it is well settled that the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. FFCRA

On March 18, 2020, Congress passed FFCRA in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Pub. L. No. 116-127 (Mar. 18, 2020) (“FFCRA”). Of particular relevance here, the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (“EFMLEA”) temporarily amended the FMLA to expand its applicability to certain employees for up to 12 weeks of paid leave per year “because of a qualifying need related to a public emergency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(F). The term “qualifying need related to a public emergency” refers to when “the employee is unable to work (or telework) due to a need for leave to care for the son or daughter under 18 years of age of such employee if the school or place of care has been closed, . . . due to a public emergency.” 29 U.S.C. § 2620(a)(2)(A). In making a request for such leave under the EFMLEA, an employee must provide the following documentation to her employer:

(1) the name of the son or daughter being cared for; (2) the name of the school, place of care, or child care provider that has closed or become unavailable; and (3) a representation that no other suitable person will be caring for the son or daughter during the period for which the employee takes paid sick leave or expanded family and medical leave.

Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 FR 19326-01.

A. Pleading Requirement

Defendants argue the FFCRA claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege that she provided Defendants the information necessary to approve her leave request. (Defs.' Mem. at 10, ECF No. 20.) Defendant misapprehends a documentation requirement under the statute with a pleading standard to state a claim for relief.

Plaintiff alleges that she originally sought FMLA leave to care for her child who could not attend school due to COVID-19. (Compl. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff further alleges that she needed to take leave under the FFCRA because childcare was not available through her child's school or childcare provider. (Id. ¶ 79). In response, Defendants informed her she was covered by the FFCRA and approved her leave under the FFCRA. (Id. ¶ 55.) At this stage, Plaintiff has at least plausibly alleged that she was entitled to leave under the FFCRA.^[2] Whatever dispute Defendant has with respect to the documentation Plaintiff provided when requesting leave is an issue that will certainly be tested through the course of discovery and perhaps even through a motion for summary judgment-not on a motion to dismiss.^[3] Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied on this ground.

B. Job Restoration

Defendants argue that claims under FFCRA should be dismissed...