Gamez v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

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ARECELY GAMEZ, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-01464-DAD-KJN

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 3, 2024

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ALLEGATIONS IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(DOC. NO. 29)

DALE A. DROZD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on defendant Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc's motion to dismiss certain claims brought against it and to strike the class allegations in plaintiffs' second amended complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 29.)^[1] On April 16, 2024, the pending motion was taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 32.) For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, with leave to amend also being denied. Additionally, defendant's motion to strike will be denied.

BACKGROUND

This is a putative class action arising from defendant's sale of 2021 Toyota RAV4 vehicles (the “Class Vehicles” or “Vehicles”) equipped with allegedly defective panoramic glass sunroofs (the “Roofs”) to plaintiffs Arecely Gamez and Jeffry Takili. (Doc. No. 28 at 2.)

In their SAC, plaintiffs allege the following in relevant part. Defendant designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed sold, and serviced the Class Vehicles. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Each Class Vehicle comes with a panoramic sunroof that is larger than typical sunroofs and covers most of the Class Vehicle's top. (Id. at ¶¶ 2 62.) The Roof shatters under ordinary driving conditions (“the Defect”), due to deficient materials, deficient manufacturing processes, or both, which are described in further detail in the SAC. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 64-70.) Despite knowing of the Defect, defendant has continued to replace shattered Roofs with the same defective Roofs. (Id. at ¶ 95.) Both plaintiffs purchased Class Vehicles and experienced the Defect while driving. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 32, 44, 50.) Both of plaintiffs' Class Vehicles came with defendant's “New Vehicle Limited Warranty” (the “Limited Warranty”), which covers “defects in materials or workmanship.” (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 46-47.) Both plaintiffs still own and continue to use their Class Vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 59.)

In their SAC, plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) breach of implied and express warranties in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq., on an individual basis only; (2) unjust enrichment, asserted by plaintiff Takili on behalf of the putative class members; (3) deceptive business practices in violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq., asserted by plaintiff Takili on behalf of the putative class members; (4) fraudulent, unlawful, and unfair conduct in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., asserted by plaintiff Takili on behalf of the putative class members; (5) breach of implied warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”), California Civil Code §§ 1792, 1791.1, et seq., asserted by both plaintiffs on behalf of the putative class members; (6) breach of express warranty in violation of California Commercial Code § 2313, asserted by both plaintiffs on behalf of the putative class members; and (7) breach of express warranty in violation of Song-Beverly, California Civil Code §§ 1793, 1791.2, et seq., asserted by both plaintiffs on behalf of the putative class members. (Doc. No. 28 at ¶¶ 141-232.)

On July 21, 2023, defendants removed this action from Sacramento County Superior Court to this federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties (Doc. Nos. 8, 9), plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”) on August 25, 2023 (Doc. No. 11). The court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' FAC on January 8, 2024. (Doc. No. 25.) Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC on January 26, 2024. (Doc. No. 28.) Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss and to strike on February 26, 2024. (Doc. No. 29.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the pending motion on March 27, 2024. (Doc. No. 30.) Defendant filed its reply thereto on April 17, 2024. (Doc. No. 33.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. StarInt'lv. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted to consider material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiffs' complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d. 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a district court to strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[S]triking the pleadings is considered ‘an extreme measure,' and Rule 12(f) motions are, therefore, generally ‘viewed with disfavor and infrequently granted.'” Fernandez v. CoreLogic Credco, LLC., 593 F.Supp.3d 974, 994 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2022) (citation omitted). Motions to strike “should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Figueroa v. Kern County, 506 F.Supp.3d 1051, 1056 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (citation omitted). A decision whether to strike certain material is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973. ///// ///// /////

ANALYSIS

A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

1. Unjust Enrichment Claim

Plaintiff Takili asserts his unjust enrichment claim against defendant seeking disgorgement of profits; injunctive relief enjoining defendant's alleged misleading sales practices; and injunctive relief compelling defendant to provide safety repairs, i.e., compelling defendant to repair the Defect, to provide replacement Roofs, and/or to reform the warranty to cover the Defect. (Doc. No. 28 at ¶¶ 156-57.)

First defendant argues that plaintiff Takili failed to sufficiently allege the lack of an adequate legal remedy for his unjust enrichment claim seeking disgorgement of profits. (Doc. No. 28 at 17-18); see also Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law” in order to secure equitable relief); Scheibe v. Fit Foods Distrib., Inc., No. 23-cv-00220-JLS-AHG, 2023 WL 7434964, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2023) (stating that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sonner “unambiguously requires [plaintiffs], for each equitable claim [they] assert[], to plead the basic requisites of the issuance of equitable relief under federal law-including that [they] lack[] an adequate legal remedy-to survive a motion to dismiss”) (citation omitted). Defendant points out that plaintiff Takili merely alleges in his SAC that “[m]oney damages are not an adequate remedy for the above requested non-monetary injunctive relief' (Doc. No. 28 at ¶ 157) (emphasis added), meaning that he has failed to even plead the lack of an adequate legal remedy for his unjust enrichment claim seeking disgorgement of profits. (Doc. No. 29 at 17-18.) Plaintiff Takili does not...