Garcia-Jarquin v. State

314 Ga. 555

878 S.E.2d 200

GARCIA-JARQUIN

v.The STATE.

S22A0727

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: September 7, 2022

Debra Kay Jefferson, P.O. Box 1473, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Alex Martin Bernick, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Cliff Head, Assistant District Attorney, Shannon Glover Wallace, District Attorney, Cherokee County District Attorney's Office, 90 North Street Suite 390, Canton, Georgia 30114, for Appellee.

Colvin, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Ylarrio Garcia-Jarquin was convicted of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Edel Mendoza and the aggravated assault of Miguel Canil.¹ Appellant claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the aggravated assault of Canil.² For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 1979 (emphasis omitted). "This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence." Hayes v. State , 292 Ga. 506, 506, 739 S.E.2d 313 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Viewing the evidence in this light, the record shows that, on July 18, 2016, Appellant drank beer at the Taqueria Oaxaqueña for approximately six hours. Surveillance recordings showed that Appellant left the restaurant around 6:30 p.m., and returned approximately 20 minutes later carrying a firearm. Upon his return, Appellant continued to drink.

Mendoza arrived at the restaurant with two men, one of whom was Canil. Soon thereafter, Appellant began taunting Mendoza by pointing his finger like a gun and patting his right hip where his gun was concealed. The men exchanged some words but did not approach one another. Mendoza turned to talk to Canil and eat his food; meanwhile, Appellant approached the cash register and told the waitress that "[Mendoza] thinks he's all that." Appellant walked toward Mendoza's table with his hand resting on his right hip and made more threatening gestures. Appellant lifted his shirt, showing off his gun, and told the men that he "[was] not afraid." Canil testified at trial that this scared him because he thought Appellant could "shoot [his entire group]," so he "just wanted to get out of there."

Appellant walked to the jukebox and played two songs: one describing the violent nature of cartel leader El Chapo and one about a pistol duel. Appellant passed Mendoza's table one more time, once again using his hands to mimic shooting a gun. When Mendoza stood, Appellant pulled a gun and pointed it at his chest. Mendoza grabbed a chair and ran away carrying it as a shield, but Appellant continued tracking him with the gun and pulled the slide back. Other patrons, including Canil, took cover. Appellant shot Mendoza three times; Mendoza fell to the ground and eventually died of his wounds. Canil testified that, though Appellant never pointed the gun at him, he was scared that he "might [also] get shot" and that the incident left him "traumatized."

Appellant fled the restaurant and was later found in a nearby field with a gun in his possession. Ballistics analysis of the shell casings and bullets recovered from the crime scene showed that the gun found on Appellant was the gun used in the shooting. Appellant spoke with police and admitted shooting Mendoza, but he claimed he did so out of self-defense.

Appellant claims that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for the aggravated assault of Canil because the State failed to establish that Appellant pointed a weapon at Canil. We disagree. Aggravated assault occurs when a person "assaults ... [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury." OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). A person commits an assault when he "[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury." OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). Contrary to Appellant's assertion, " OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) [ ] does not require the deadly weapon to have been pointed directly at each victim, but merely that the defendant use the deadly weapon in such manner as to place another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury." Green v. State , 304 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (a), 818 S.E.2d 535 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the evidence presented at trial showed that Appellant harassed and taunted Mendoza throughout the night, that Appellant showed Mendoza and Canil a gun and said "he [was] not afraid," that Canil was scared by Appellant's threats, and that Canil ran for cover as soon as Appellant fired his weapon. This evidence was sufficient to establish that Canil was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. See Howard v. State , 288 Ga. 741, 742 (1), 707 S.E.2d 80 (2011) ("Testimony that the victims ran from the gunfire is sufficient evidence that Appellants placed them in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury."); Roberts v. State , 267 Ga. 669, 671 (1), 482 S.E.2d 245 (1997) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated assault conviction where victim testified that he ran when he saw two men start shooting and other people being shot). Accordingly, the jury was authorized to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the aggravated assault of Canil. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Pinson, J., not participating.

Bethel, Justice, concurring.

I concur fully in the judgment reached in this case and the reasoning we have applied in rejecting the appellant's claim of error. However, I write separately to question the nature of this Court's jurisdiction and to invite a careful consideration of that question.

This Court has long exercised jurisdiction over all cases in which the appellant has been found guilty of murder. From 1945 until 1983, that jurisdiction was based on the provision of the Georgia Constitutions of 1945 and 1976, respectively, which gave this Court jurisdiction over "all cases of conviction of a capital felony." See Georgia Constitution of 1945, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (providing that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court includes "all cases of conviction of a capital felony"); Georgia Constitution of 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (same). See also Collins v. State , 239 Ga. 400, 402 (2), 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977) (determining that "capital felony" means "felonies to which the death penalty is affixed as a punishment under given circumstances," as opposed to felonies "in which under no circumstances would death ever be inflicted as a penalty" (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted)). Our current Constitution changed that provision to confer upon this Court jurisdiction over "[a]ll cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed." Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (8).

Because, at all relevant times, murder has been a capital felony in Georgia, it is clear to me that under the 1945 and 1976 Georgia Constitutions, this Court had jurisdiction over all appeals in murder cases, even those in which the death penalty was not sought or imposed. But despite this Court's longstanding practice, I interpret the plain language of the 1983 Constitution to have limited our jurisdiction over appeals in murder cases to only those cases in which, at the time of the appeal, a sentence of death has been imposed, cases where the State is actively seeking the death penalty, and cases where a possibility remains that the State could seek the death penalty. By changing the jurisdictional definition from the crime (capital felonies) to the punishment (cases in which a sentence of death was or could be imposed), the new constitutional language eliminated a large category of cases from this Court's jurisdiction: direct appeals following a conviction in cases in which a sentence of death was not imposed. And this change also impacted a smaller category of cases subject to this Court's jurisdiction: interlocutory appeals where the procedural posture of the case definitively excludes the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed. Further, subsequent developments in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the imposition of the death penalty have likewise limited the scope of cases in which a sentence of death could be imposed.³

Like so many appeals in murder cases that this Court has ruled upon since the 1983 Constitution came into effect, at no point in this case did the district attorney seek the death penalty, much less file a notice that the State intended to seek the death penalty against the appellant, see Unified Appeal Procedure, Rule II (C) (1) (requiring the State to provide pre-trial written notice to seek the death penalty); Wagner v. State , 282 Ga. 149, 152-153 (6), 646 S.E.2d 676 (2007) (addressing written notices to seek the death penalty with respect to the Unified Appeal Procedure and the requirements of due process); OCGA § 17-10-36 (a) (requiring the promulgation of the Unified Appeal Procedure), nor did the jury impose a sentence of death.⁴ And, although a sentence of death can be...