Garcia v. Coast Cmty. Health Ctr.

PETER GARCIA, Petitioner, v. COAST COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER Respondent.

Civ. No. 6:20-cv-2175-MC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

May 19, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

MCSHANE, Judge:

Petitioner Dr. Peter Garcia sues Coast Community Health Center ("CCHC") for age discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation. Dr. Garcia brings the action under the Age Discrimination Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Title VII, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"). He seeks lost wages and benefits, liquidated damages, and punitive damages.

CCHC asks this Court to dismiss all of Petitioner's claims. Because Dr. Garcia has failed to state a claim, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 24, is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Dr. Garcia, brings claims for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, ADA, and retaliation in violation of Title VII, the ADA, and the GINA. All the claims stem from two separate employment applications to CCHC for two positions: Chief Medical Officer ("CMO") and Chief Operations Officer ("COO"). Pet'r's Am. Compl. 4-5, ECF No. 18. Dr. Garcia first applied to the CMO position at CCHC in response to an email advertisement from a recruiter in August 2019. Pet'r's Resp. 2, ECF No. 28. Following an interview with CCHC, the recruiter informed Dr. Garcia that he was no longer in consideration for the position based on a lack of recent Federally Qualified Health Centers ("FQHC") experience. Id. Later, Dr. Garcia filed a discrimination charge under the ADEA with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and resubmitted his application to CCHC for reconsideration for the CMO position. Id. In May 2020, CCHC's Chief Executive Officer, informed Dr. Garcia that he was no longer considered for the CMO position because of a lack of recent critical care experience. Id. at 3.

In April 2020, CCHC opened a different position for COO and Dr. Garcia applied. Id. After receiving no communication about his COO application, Dr. Garcia submitted a discrimination and retaliation complaint to the EEOC against CCHC. Id. In February 2021, CCHC informed Dr. Garcia that the COO opening was being closed to outside applicants because of COVID-19 concerns. Id. at 4.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow a court to infer the defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than "the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 678. When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Burget v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000), but it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A plaintiff does not have to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standard at the pleading stage. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). But a plaintiff must still plead a set of facts consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Although a plaintiff does not need evidence to support a prima facie case at the dismissal stage, there still must be sufficient facts to assert a claim. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008). If a complaint is dismissed, the Court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend unless it "determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). Pro se litigants must be granted leave to amend even more liberally "unless it determines that the pleading could not possible be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Strike

Respondent properly moved to strike much of Petitioner's response under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Def.'s Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 30. Petitioner incorrectly used his response as a quasi-amended complaint. That said, because Petitioner's complaint and response still fails to allege a prima facie case of age discrimination, disability discrimination, or retaliation, this Court will DENY the motion to strike and instead dismiss each of the claims using all the information alleged in Petitioner's complaint and response.

II. Withdrawn Claims

Petitioner voluntarily withdrew several claims in his response. He withdrew his retaliation claim under Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 because he has not yet exhausted the administrative remedies through the EEOC. Pet'r's Resp. 21-22. He also voluntarily withdrew his claims under26 U.S.C. § 6104 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because neither has a private cause of action available to Petitioner. Pet'r's Resp. 25. Thus, all three claims are DISMISSED.

III. Age Discrimination

Petitioner fails to allege facts sufficient for a prima facie case of age discrimination for either the CMO or COO position under the ADEA or Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030. The complaint for both the federal and state claims must allege the same elements: (1) that the plaintiff was at least 40 years old at the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct; (2) the plaintiff applied to the position and was denied; (3) the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for the position; and (4) either a substantially younger applicant with equal or lesser qualifications was hired or plaintiff was denied under circumstances "giving rise to an inference of age discrimination." Bellinger v. Coos Bay Sch. Dist., No. 6:13-cv-01443-AA, 2014 WL 5791575, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 5, 2014); Robillard v. Opal Labs, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 3d 412, 435-36 (D. Or. 2019). Petitioner's claim fails both the third and fourth element of the prima facie case for age discrimination.

Petitioner first fails to allege that he was qualified for either position. Petitioner relies on performance reviews and experience that is well over 20 years old to prove that he was qualified for both CCHC positions. Pet'r's Resp. Ex. C. He relies on his own approximations of the position requirements and conclusions about his own abilities to argue that he is qualified. Pet'r's Resp. 4-8. But CCHC twice explained to Petitioner why he was not qualified, which he acknowledges. See Pet'r's Resp. 2-3. Both explanations from CCHC relate to a lack of recent experience in FQHC or critical care. Id. Petitioner also fails to allege that he has a current Oregon medical license. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 13, ECF No. 24. At no point does Petitioner address these specific shortcomings in his qualifications, so he has not alleged that he is qualified for either position at CCHC.

Petitioner also fails to allege that a younger applicant with equal or lesser qualifications than himself was hired. Dr. Ann Kellogg was hired by CCHC. Petr's Am. Compl. Ex. D. Even if this Court assumes that Dr. Kellogg is younger than Petitioner, which Petitioner never alleges, Petitioner fails to argue that he has similar or more qualifications. Instead, Petitioner falsely equates experience with qualifications and tries to shift the burden to the hospital, pointing out that CCHC never argued that Dr. Kellogg was the "superior" candidate. Pet'r's Resp. 16-17. Petitioner takes this faulty analysis a step further by implying that the hiring of Dr. Kellogg is itself evidence of circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Pet'r's Resp. 17. There are no facts alleged by Petitioner that suggest an inference of age discrimination in this case. Even if Petitioner had properly plead that a younger applicant was hired, he makes no specific factual allegations about qualifications other than loose inferences to his own experience. Petitioner has only successfully alleged that CCHC had a job requirement of recent experience, which is not in itself age discrimination.

Finally, Petitioner claims the multiple explanations he received from different sources as to why he was not hired are evidence giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Pet'r's Resp. 3. However, it seems that both reasons, lack of recent FQHC and critical care experience, are valid given Petitioner's lack of qualifications for the position. Rather than an inference of discrimination, this Court finds that Petitioner had several shortcomings fatal to his job application and cited by various sources during his subsequent inquiry.

IV. Disability Discrimination

Petitioner did not exhaust the administrative remedies for his claim under the ADA. In each of the filings that were submitted to the EEOC, Petitioner complained only of discrimination based on age and retaliation. Pet'r's Resp. 2-3; Maxon Decl. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B, Ex.C., ECF No. 25. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) requires any plaintiff bringing an ADA claim first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Brooks v. Agate Res., Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00983-MK, 2019 WL 2635594, at *7 n.2 (D. Or. March 25, 2019) (citations omitted). Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the ADA claim.

But even if this Court had jurisdiction over the disability discrimination claim, Petitioner has failed to allege a prima facie case. Petitioner must establish three elements for a prima facie case under the ADA: "(1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability." Allen v. Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner has...