Garcia v. Commercial Acceptance Co.

1

RAFAEL GARCIA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COMMERCIAL ACCEPTANCE COMPANY, Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:19-cv-1058-WJM-AME

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

September 12, 2022

OPINION

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.C.

Plaintiff Rafael Garcia (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against defendant Commercial Acceptance Company (“Defendant”) for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (the “FDCPA”). Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 37 & 38. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

On or about August 2, 2017, Plaintiff suffered an injury and was transported via ambulance to St. Joseph's Hospital in Paterson, New Jersey. (PSOMF ¶¶ 1-3). Immediately following his injury, a third party called the ambulance for Plaintiff, who neither knew the name of the company that provided the ambulance transportation nor signed any paperwork with respect thereto. (PSOMF ¶¶ 3-5).

On January 24, 2018, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Collection Letter”) seeking payment of an outstanding balance of $1,103.00 owed to a creditor (the “Creditor”) identified as “MONOC Ambulance Service C”. (DSOMF ¶ 1; Salvo Decl., Ex. A). The Collection Letter provided, in relevant part:

The creditor listed above has assigned your account to our agency for collection. Your entire balance is to be paid directly to our office at the above address. If your account balance is not satisfied, further collection activity will result. You are hereby notified that your credit rating may be negatively affected if you fail to resolve your obligation.

(Salvo Decl., Ex. A). The Collection Letter also provided information on when and how Plaintiff may dispute the validity of the debt (the “Debt Dispute Language”):

Unless you notify this office within 30 days of receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume the debt valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days of receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, this office will obtain verification of this debt or a copy of the judgment against you and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

Id.

The Creditor's registered corporate name is “Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Services Corporation.” (PSOMF ¶ 23). “MONOC Ambulance Service C” is neither an independent registered business entity nor a registered associated business name for Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Services Corporation in New Jersey. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Not every factual dispute will preclude summary judgment, and those concerning “irrelevant or unnecessary” facts will not factor into the Court's analysis. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Rather, “a fact is ‘material' under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Similarly, a dispute with respect to a material fact is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence. . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Id. at 331. If, however, the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the movant may satisfy its burden by either: (1) “submit[ting] affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim”; or (2) demonstrating “that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58687 (1986)). This requires the nonmoving party to present actual evidence that creates a genuine dispute for trial - reliance on unsupported assertions, speculation, or conclusory allegations is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Solomon v. Soc'y of Auto. Eng'rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324); see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (explaining that a nonmoving party may not successfully oppose summary judgment motion by simply replacing “conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court “may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party's evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Put differently, the Court's sole task in deciding a motion for summary judgment is simply “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The standard for deciding whether to grant a summary judgment motion is the same even where, as here, the parties files cross-motions. See In re Cooper, 542 F.Supp.2d 382, 385-86 (D.N.J. 2008). In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must evaluate the competing motions independently under the applicable standard. See Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Unite Here Local 54, No. 08-0016 (JBS), 2009 WL 540675, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

The FDCPA was enacted to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” and “to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To achieve these purposes, the FDCPA imposes several restrictions and obligations on third-party debt collectors, providing consumers with a private right of action against any such debt collections who violate its provisions. See Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc., 954 F.3d 582, 585 (3d Cir. 2020); Barbato v. Greystone Alliance, LLC, 916 F.3d 260, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2019) (“As remedial legislation, the FDCPA must be broadly construed in order to give full effect to these purposes.” (quoting Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013)).

To that end, in evaluating FDCPA claims, the Court employs a “least sophisticated debtor” standard to ensure the protection of “all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd, the trusting as well as the suspicious, from abusive debt collection practices.” Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). While the “least sophisticated debtor” standard “is lower than the standard of a reasonable debtor, it preserv[es] a quotient of reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care.” Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quotations omitted). The standard is an objective one, and, though forgiving, does not permit a debtor to “disregard responsibilities or adopt ‘bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices.'” Devito v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman, LLC, 908 F.Supp.2d 564, 568-69 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419.

“To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) [he] is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector (3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt' as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014). The parties agree that the first three elements of the Plaintiff's FDCPA claim are satisfied, and, as such, the Court need only resolve questions as to the final element: whether Defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged several such violations in the Collection Letter: (1) it did not properly identify the creditor to whom the debt was owed in violation of § 1692g(a)(2); (2) it provided false, misleading, and confusing information on when and how Plaintiff was required to dispute the validity of the debt in violation of §§ 1692g(a)(3)-(5); and (3) it made false, deceptive, and misleading representations to try and collect the debt by...