Garcia v. Fujitec Am., Inc.

621 F.Supp.3d 577

Walter GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. FUJITEC AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

Case No.: PWG 19-cv-1460

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division

Signed August 12, 2022

Robert Porter, The Spiggle Law Firm, Arlington, VA, Francisco Mundaca, The Spiggle Law Firm, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

Walter Garcia, Herndon, VA, Pro Se.

Alexander Ivan Castelli, Darryl G. McCallum, Shawe Rosenthal LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Paul W. Grimm, United States District Judge

On March 22, 2019, Plaintiff Walter Garcia, represented by counsel,¹ filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, alleging a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 3-501 et seq.; breach of contract for failure to pay commissions that had been earned; and wrongful discharge. Compl., ECF No. 4. Defendant, Fujitec America, Inc., removed the case to this Court on May 17, 2019. Not. Removal, ECF No. 1.² Pending before me is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 32. I have reviewed the filings³ and find a hearing unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2016, Mr. Garcia applied for a job as a sales representative for Fujitec, an elevator repair company. Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 3, Resp. Ex. A, ECF No. 36-1. The job application included a certification at the end, which Mr. Garcia signed. Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 4; Applicant's Cert., Resp. Ex. B, ECF No. 36-2. The job applicant's agreement and certification included the following language in bold type:

I agree that any claim or lawsuit relating to my service with Fujitec America, Inc. must be filed no more than twelve (12) months after the date of the action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit. I waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.

I have read and understand the contents of this employment application and am fully able and competent to complete it.

Applicant's Cert. 2. Mr. Garcia then interviewed for the job and was offered the position on August 5, 2016. Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 5; Offer Letter, Resp. Ex. C, ECF No. 36-3.

As a sales representative, Mr. Garcia's primary duties were to "[a]cquire new business and to sell repairs," and his offer letter included minimum sales requirements. Hunter Dep. 14:1, Mot. Ex. 3, ECF No. 32-6; Offer Letter 2-3. His compensation included a fixed salary, and he had the potential to earn commissions. Hunter Dep. 14:16-20; see also Horan Dep. 9-11, Mot. Ex. 4, ECF No. 32-7 (describing the sales incentive programs); Offer Letter 2-3 (stating annual salary). In 2017, Mr. Garcia was placed on a 60-day performance improvement plan ("PIP") to address deficiencies in meeting sales performance goals and failures to submit reports. Horan Decl. ¶ 4, Mot. Ex. 5, ECF No. 32-8; Hunter Dep. 44:16-45:20. Pl.'s Dep. 116:21-118:10, Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 32-5; PIP, Resp. Ex. I, ECF No. 36-9. On February 27, 2018, Mr. Garcia received a formal write-up from his manager for failure to follow the PIP, which included a warning that "future failures to perform your duties will be grounds for more severe disciplinary action, up to and including your dismissal." Warning Letter, Resp. Ex. L, ECF No. 36-11. Fujitec terminated Mr. Garcia's employment on March 16, 2018. Term. Letter, Resp. Ex. Q, ECF No. 36-15.

Mr. Garcia alleges that he was not paid all the commissions due to him and that he was terminated because he complained about Fujitec's violation of state wage laws. His complaint, filed on October 22, 2019, asserts four causes of action:

• Count I - Violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL")

• Count II - Breach of Contract • Count III - Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

• Count IV - Declaratory Judgment

Fujitec moves for summary judgment, contending that Mr. Garcia's claims are untimely, and also that they fail as a matter of law because he was an "at will" employee, and the commissions at issue are not wages under the MWPCL.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides for the judgment in favor of the movant "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In reviewing the evidence related to a motion for summary judgment, the Court considers undisputed facts, as well as the disputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009); George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2009); Dean v. Martinez, 336 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (D. Md. 2004). Only factual disputes that "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Additionally, the factual dispute must be genuine to defeat a motion for summary judgment, in that "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record . . . a court should not adopt that version."). It is the nonmoving party's burden to confront a motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence to show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A plaintiff nonmovant, "to survive the defendant's motion, need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Id.

DISCUSSION

Fujitec moves for summary judgment based on the following grounds: (1) Mr. Garcia's claims are untimely; (2) the MWPCL claims fail as a matter of law because commissions do not constitute wages under the MWPCL; (3) the MWPCL claim also fails because Mr. Garcia was paid all commissions due; (4) the breach of contract claim fails because Mr. Garcia was an "at will" employee, so there was no enforceable contract; and (5) the wrongful discharge claim fails because Mr. Garcia cannot establish a violation of public policy related to his termination. I shall first address whether Mr. Garcia's claims were timely filed.

I. Timely Filing

A. Contractual Limitations Period

The job application that Mr. Garcia signed included a provision that shortened the statute of limitations for any action arising from his employment to 12 months from the date the action accrues. Applicant's Cert. 2. Fujitec argues that this provision is enforceable and bars Mr. Garcia's claims. Mot. Mem. 8-10. Mr. Garcia argues that the limitations-shortening provision in his certification lacked consideration and is not valid because it is unconscionable and unreasonable. Resp. 11-14. He also argues that regardless, his claim did not accrue until March 23, 2018, when he received his final paycheck after termination, and his case was filed within a year, on March 22, 2019. Id. at 14-15.

Maryland⁴ recognizes a "strong public policy in favor of freedom to contract" and the "ability of parties to agree to a shorter period of limitations." Coll. of Notre Dame v. Morabito Consultants, Inc., 132 Md.App. 158, 752 A.2d 265, 275 (2000). And the Fourth Circuit has long adhered to the general principle that parties may contract for shorter limitations periods, noting that "it is well settled that such a provision, if reasonable in extent, is within the power of the parties and is binding upon them, even if the stipulated period is shorter than set up in the statutes of limitation[s] otherwise applicable." Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Pope, 119 F.2d 39, 44 (4th Cir. 1941). The Morabito court provided guidance for reviewing such provisions: "parties may agree to a provision that modifies the limitations result that would otherwise pertain provided (1) there is no controlling statute to the contrary, (2) it is reasonable, and (3) it is not subject to other defenses such as fraud, duress, or misrepresentation." 752 A.2d at 273.

Also, courts have construed employment applications as contracts between employer and employee in the context of arbitration clauses that were contained in employment applications. See generally Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001); Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1998); Holloman v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 391 Md. 580, 894 A.2d 547 (2006). The Sixth Circuit has held that an abbreviated limitations period within an application for employment is binding if reasonable. See Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing cases and specifically noting that a six-month statute of limitations may be found reasonable). The Fourth Circuit cited Thurman with approval in an antitrust case where it concluded that a one-year contractual limitations period was reasonable. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir. 2007).

"Among the factors to be considered in assessing reasonableness are the subject matter of the contract, the duration of the shortened limitations period compared to the period that would otherwise govern, the relative bargaining power of the parties to the contract, and whether the shortened limitations period is a one-sided provision that applies to one party but not the other." Ceccone v. Carroll Home Servs., LLC, 454 Md. 680, 165 A.3d 475, 483 (2017). I note that unilateral provisions in a contract are permissible under Maryland law when "supported by a 'valid justification.' " See Storto Enters., Inc. v. Exxonmobil, Oil Corp., No. WDQ-10-1630, 2011 WL 231877, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2011) (quoting Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 872 A.2d 735 (2005) (finding that a unilateral arbitration clause was enforceable)); see also Ceccone, 165 A.3d at 482 ("[T]he validity of...