Garcia v. Paylock

CARLOS GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. PAYLOCK and STATE of NEW YORK, Defendants.

13-CV-2868 (KAM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: January 28, 2014

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Carlos Garcia commenced this action on April 16, 2013 in the Supreme Court of Queens County against defendants Paylock and the State of New York pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(2), as well as the New York State Constitution and State and City human rights laws. (See generally 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 18.) The action was removed to this court on May 14, 2013.¹ (ECF No. 1.) Paylock and New York State have filed motions to dismiss the claims against them. (N.Y.S. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15; Paylock Mot. to Dismiss,ECF No. 19.) In addition, Paylock has moved for a stay of discovery and for sanctions to be imposed against plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in their entirety, and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Paylock's motion to stay discovery is moot. Finally, defendant Paylock's motion for sanctions is denied.

Background

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("2d Am. Compl.") alleges the following facts, which the court, for the purposes of this motion, assumes to be true. From July 2012 to February 12, 2013, plaintiff was an employee of defendant Paylock, a New Jersey business that contracts with the City of New York to scan license plates in order to determine whether the license plate holder has unpaid parking tickets. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 7.) In this role, plaintiff operated a vehicle able to scan license plates. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) On January 24, 2013, after his designated work hours, plaintiff identified a town car associated with unpaid parking tickets. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) He informed the driver of the outstanding tickets and gave her information on how to pay the fines online in order to avoid having her car towed. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff states that, at some point during this exchange, the driver offered him "$100 without provocation, insisting that Plaintifftake it and get coffee." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) The driver eventually threw the money into plaintiff's vehicle when plaintiff refused to take it. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiff was unaware of the amount of money he had been given until he returned to his home. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 26.)

After the town car was towed on January 25, 2013, the driver made a complaint to the office of the City Marshal, alleging that she gave plaintiff money to resolve the outstanding tickets, allegations plaintiff denies. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22.) The complaint was forwarded to New York City's Department of Investigations (DOI). (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) On February 7, 2013, DOI informed Paylock about the complaint, and plaintiff was suspended. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) On February 12, 2013, plaintiff was notified by a detective via telephone that he should surrender to the New York City Police Department. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.) On February 12, 2013, Paylock was similarly notified of this fact, and Paylock's agents called plaintiff and terminated plaintiff's employment, referring to plaintiff's "taking money in the field." (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36, 40.) Plaintiff was subsequently charged with petit larceny and receipt of a commercial bribe in the second degree, in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 155.25 and 180.05, respectively. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) The case against plaintiff was adjourned incontemplation of dismissal and restitution was ordered.² (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 39).

Plaintiff now seeks monetary damages related to his termination, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Both defendants have moved to dismiss all claims in the Second Amended Complaint. Each defendant's motion will be addressed in turn.

Discussion

I. State of New York's Motion to Dismiss

The State of New York moves to dismiss the claims asserted against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).³ Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissedfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See also Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) ("A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it."). In evaluating, as here, a facial challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the complaint, a court "must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff."⁴ Doyle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 11-CV-5571, 2012 WL 5210596, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012), aff'd 722 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)). Where the State seeks to dismiss a complaint based on sovereign immunity, it has the burden of demonstrating its entitlement to immunity. Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2006).

In essence, plaintiff alleges that a provision of the state human rights law, New York Executive Law § 296(15),⁵ violates his right to equal protection under the law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the New York Constitution. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 47.) Section 296(15) prohibits the denial of employment based solely on a person's prior criminal convictions. Plaintiff asserts that, under Section 296, persons who have been accused of a crime receive fewer protections than those who have been convicted of the same crime and thus that the law is discriminatory. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 47.) Based on his contentions regarding the constitutionality of N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, plaintiff alleges the State violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(2), as well as the State Constitution. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 47.)

Plaintiff's claims against the State fail in their entirety because the State is immune from plaintiff's claims. "As a general matter, states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, even if the claim arises under federal law."KM Enters., Inc. v. McDonald, 518 Fed. Appx. 12, 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XI; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727-28 (1999)). A state and its agencies may be sued in federal court only if Congress abrogates the state's immunity or the state waives its immunity.⁶ In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d 760, 765 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).

The State has not waived its immunity, nor has its immunity been abrogated, for the causes of action plaintiff has asserted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.⁷ On the contrary, "[i]t is well-established that New York has not consented to § 1983 suits in federal court, and that § 1983 was not intended to override a state's sovereign immunity." Mamot v. Bd of Regents, 367 Fed. Appx. 191, 192 (2dCir. 2010); see also, e.g., Pietri v. N.Y.S. Office of Court Admin., 936 F. Supp. 2d 120, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("The state [of New York] has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims brought under § 1983"); Positano v. New York, No. 12-CV-2288, 2013 WL 880329, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) ("Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the State are barred by the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, for 'a state is not a "person" amenable to suit under § 1983'" (quoting Caroselli v. Curci, 317 Fed. Appx. 199, 202 (2d Cir. 2010))); Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("A State's sovereign immunity is not abrogated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (citation omitted)). Plaintiff's equal protection claims also may not be brought directly under the Fourteenth Amendment because the State has not waived its immunity or had that immunity abrogated pursuant to that constitutional amendment. See Santiago v. N.Y.S. Dept. of Corr. Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 28-32 (2d Cir. 1991) (analyzing this question at length and holding that suits for retroactive damages against state agencies under the Fourteenth Amendment are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

Section 1985 claims similarly may not be asserted against the State. See, e.g., Davis v. New York, 106 Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding the district court's dismissal of § 1985 and other claims against the State of New York based on its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); Scaglione v.Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 Fed. Appx. 17, 18 (2d Cir. 2002) (similarly dismissing § 1985 claims as to a state agency). But cf. Emmons, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (dismissing a § 1985 claims against a state entity, reasoning that "[a]lthough it is not settled law whether § 1985 abrogates New York's immunity, it is well-settled that a State and its instrumentalities are not 'persons' subject to suit under § 1983 . . . and there is no reason to suspect the Congress intended the term 'persons' to take on a different meaning in § 1985." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Finally, to the extent plaintiff alleges that defendant has violated his rights under the Article 1, § 11 of the New York State Constitution, the State's sovereign immunity also bars plaintiff's claims against the State. See Herschman v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 08-CV-11126, 2011 WL 1210200, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2011) (citing Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 237 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); Washpon v. Parr, No. 06-CV-2400, 2007 WL 541964, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2007) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff argues in response that the language of the Eleventh Amendment does not bar litigants from bringing suit against their home state. (Pl. Mem. 12, ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff cites to language from...