Garcia v. Vertical Screen

592 F.Supp.3d 409

William GARCIA, Plaintiff

v.VERTICAL SCREEN, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-3184

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed March 21, 2022

Jeremy M. Cerutti, Allison Aileen Barker, W. Charles Sipio, Ari Risson Karpf, Karpf Karpf & Cerutti P.C., Bensalem, PA, for Plaintiff.

Jacqueline K. Gallagher, Monica L. Simmons, Sara E. Hoffman, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ...––––

II. BACKGROUND ...––––

III. LEGAL STANDARD ...––––

IV. DISCUSSION ...––––

A. Vertical Screen's Motion ...––––

1. Discrimination Claims...––––

2. Retaliation Claims...––––

a. ADA & PHRA Retaliation...––––

b. FMLA Retaliation...––––

c. Title VII Retaliation...––––

3. FMLA Interference...––––

4. Failure to Pay Wages under the WPCL...––––

5. Punitive and Liquidated Damages...––––

B. Vertical Screen's Amended Counterclaims ...––––

1. Breach of Contract...––––

2. Trade Secret Claims under the DTSA and PUTSA...––––

C. Garcia's Motion ...––––

1. Breach of Contract...––––

2. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets...––––

3. Garcia's WPCL Claim...––––

V. CONCLUSION ...––––

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William Garcia brings this action against his former employer, Defendant Vertical Screen Inc. ("Vertical Screen"), claiming that Vertical Screen discriminated and retaliated against him when it terminated his employment. Garcia asserts claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). Garcia also brings a claim for failure to pay wages owed under Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL").

Vertical Screen asserts counterclaims against Garcia for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.

For the reasons set forth below, both motions will be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Vertical Screen's motion will be granted as to Garcia's claims under the ADA, the FMLA, Title VII, the PHRA, and as to Garcia's request for punitive damages. It will be denied as to Garcia's WPCL claim and Vertical Screen's counterclaims. Garcia's motion will be granted as to his WPCL claim and as to Vertical Screen's request for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees pursuant to its trade secret claims and denied as to the remainder of Vertical Screen's counterclaims.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Vertical Screen is one of the world's leading employment applicant screening companies² and is headquartered in Warminster, Pennsylvania. Garcia was an employee at Vertical Screen for five years until he was terminated on October 2, 2018.³ Garcia started as a Public Records Researcher and was later promoted to Public Records Team Leader. As part of his promotion, Garcia's supervisors promised him a $.50/hour raise, which he never received. During the final year of his employment with Vertical Screen, Garcia's supervisors were Katherine Denis, Michael Hanna, Alison Graham, Samuel Twardowski, and Yahne Johnson.

Garcia alleges that he suffered from disabilities during his time at Vertical Screen, including rheumatoid arthritis (originally misdiagnosed as Lupus ) and anxiety. As a result of these disabilities, Garcia took periodic time off from work. He further claims that in response to his taking periodic time off, Johnson told him on several occasions that he "shouldn't be calling out," or that Johnson would "take [his] position away from [him]." Pl's Stmt. of Facts ¶ 43, ECF No. 76.

Garcia asserts that he informed Hanna, Graham, and Twardowski of his disabilities. He claims further that after he informed his supervisors of his disabilities, Hanna disclosed that Garcia was disabled to other co-workers. Hanna denies ever disclosing Garcia's medical conditions to anyone other than Marcine Schiehser, Vice President of Human Resources at Vertical Screen, or Twardowski, who was Hanna's direct supervisor.

Garcia also claims that a co-worker falsely told other employees that she and Garcia had a sexual relationship. He felt this was sexual harassment and complained verbally to Twardowski and asked him to communicate the complaint to the company's human resources department.

On September 17, 2018, Garcia requested necessary materials to request FMLA leave from Vertical Screen's human resources department. He did not fill out the paperwork or otherwise submit his FMLA request to Vertical Screen.

On October 2, 2018, Vertical Screen terminated Garcia's employment. Vertical Screen claims that he was terminated because he violated the company's confidentiality policy when he allegedly sent a series of emails, one of which contained a document titled "Courts Tier Training Spreadsheet" (the "Spreadsheet"), from his work email to his personal email account. According to Vertical Screen, the Spreadsheet included information that was not only confidential, but amounted to protectable trade secrets. Several Vertical Screen employees testified that the decision to terminate Garcia was made solely by Tim Gaudreau, the company's chief operating officer. See Gaudreau Dep. at 14:18-20, ECF No. 69-2; Schiehser Dep. at 46:14-17, ECF No. 69-12, Hanna Dep. 33:3-34:22, ECF No. 69-10.

Garcia denies ever sending himself any of the emails in question. According to Vertical Screen's IT Security Analyst Neelay Patel, the company's email security system triggered an alert that Garcia had sent the Spreadsheet, which was at least partially encrypted, to his personal email. See Patel Decl., ECF No. 69-18. A subsequent investigation into the event led Patel to conclude that the Spreadsheet had left the company's servers and had reached Garcia's personal email account. See id. However, Vertical Screen later performed a forensic analysis of Garcia's personal devices and email account and found no trace of the Spreadsheet.

Garcia's Amended Complaint contains five counts: (I) disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA; (II) interference and retaliation in violation of the FMLA; (III) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (IV) failure to pay wages owed under the WPCL; and (V) discrimination and retaliation in violation of the PHRA.

Vertical Screen asserts three counterclaims against Garcia: (I) breach of contract; (II) violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq. (the "DTSA"); and (III) violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301, et. seq. (the "PUTSA").

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact." Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 581. "After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997) ). While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the nonmoving party who must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963)).

When confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment, "[t]he court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." Schlegel v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 269 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Vertical Screen's Motion

Vertical Screen moves for summary judgment on all Garcia's claims. Because Garcia fails to meet his burden for each of his discrimination and retaliation claims as required by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the motion will be granted as to Garcia's claims under the ADA, PHRA, FMLA, and Title VII. The motion will also be granted as to Garcia's request for punitive damages, as he has not produced evidence to support any claim under which punitive damages are available. The motion will be denied as it applies to Garcia's WPCL claim.

1. Discrimination Claims Under the ADA & PHRA

In considering claims of employment discrimination where no direct evidence of discrimination exists, courts are informed by the well-rehearsed burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas. The first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires a court to ask whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Then, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination. Id. And finally, if the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, the plaintiff must then "establish ...