Garcia v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.

188 F.Supp.3d 353

Carmen Garcia, Plaintiff,

v.Yonkers Board of Education, Edwin Quezada, Angela Arias, Rafael Pasian, Antoine Atinkpahoun, and Ramon Martinez, Defendants.

15 Civ. 0767 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed May 27, 2016

Barry David Haberman, Barry D. Haberman, Esq., New City, NY, for Plaintiff.

Joanna Marie Topping, Wilson Elser, Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Carmen Garcia ("Plaintiff") commenced this action by complaint filed February 2, 2015 and amended on June 26, 2015, against defendants Edwin Quezada, Angela Arias, Rafael Pasian, Antoine Atinkpahoun, Ramon Martinez (collectively, "Individual Defendants"), and Yonkers Board of Education ("YBOE") (together with Individual Defendants, "Defendants"). Plaintiff asserts gender discrimination and retaliation claims in violation of her rights under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e–17 ("Title VII"); (2) the New York Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 -97; and (3) Westchester County Human Rights Law ("WHRL") § 700.01. Plaintiff also brings a breach of contract claim against YBOE for a violation of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Yonkers Federation of Teachers ("YFT").

Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

All facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion.¹ Plaintiff has been employed by the City of Yonkers School District (the "District") since 2000 and was assigned to a mathematics teaching position at Lincoln High School ("LHS") in 2001. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11, ¶¶ 27-28, 32.) Plaintiff consistently received satisfactory evaluations from her supervisors and enjoyed success and growth in her classroom. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)

Beginning in the 2006–2007 school year, Plaintiff was sexually harassed by fellow mathematics teacher, Defendant Pasian. (Id. ¶ 38.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Pasian began by repeatedly asking her to go out for drinks, and his behavior escalated to the point where Pasian "told [Plaintiff] that he had a dream about her where he was licking her body, and then pushed [her] into an empty classroom, hovered over her, put his arms around her, and was saying they should be together." (Id. ¶ 40.) On the day following this incident, Plaintiff reported the conduct to the school principal, Defendant Quezada, and his assistant, Defendant Arias. (Id. ¶ 41.) Defendant Arias assured Plaintiff that she would talk to Defendant Pasian regarding his conduct. (Id. ¶ 42.)

When Plaintiff returned for the 2007–2008 school year, Defendant Quezada placed her in the same classroom as Defendant Pasian. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff immediately reported her issues with Defendant Pasian to a school administrator, Jeff Olender, who arranged for a room change.

(Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) Despite the room change, Defendant Pasian continued the sexual harassment, including by making sexual comments and gestures to Plaintiff and sending students to Plaintiff with inappropriate messages. (Id. ¶ 48.) The harassment persisted in the 2008 – 2009 school year, when another mathematics teacher, Defendant Atinkpahoun told Plaintiff that "if she wanted to continue working at [LHS], the Principal, Defendant Quezada, said that everything in [Plaintiff's] teaching career would be better if she has a sexual orgy with Defendants Quezada, Martinez, and Arias." (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants continued to engage in this behavior until 2012, when Plaintiff was transferred out of LHS to the YBOE Central Office. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 55, 62.)

Prior to her transfer, on March 6, 2012, one of Plaintiff's students was misbehaving in her classroom, and Plaintiff called a school safety officer, who temporarily removed the student from the class. (Id. ¶ 57.) The next day, the same student misbehaved, and Plaintiff once again called the safety officer. (Id. ¶ 58.) Instead of the safety officer, a school administrator arrived and removed Plaintiff, rather than the student, from the classroom and asked for her description of the incident. (Id. ) Defendant Quezada required Plaintiff to meet with a YBOE administrator, and Plaintiff was transferred to a position at another school. (Id. ¶ 60; Affirmation of Barry D. Haberman in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, Ex. 5, at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used this incident as a pretext to disguise the true motivation for her transfer: discriminatory retaliation. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 60; Affirmation of Barry D. Haberman in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, Ex. 1, at 4.) Plaintiff continued to report her sexual harassment to YBOE and eventually, in February 2013, to the Yonkers Police Department. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 62-63.)

On June 24, 2013, Defendant YBOE filed disciplinary charges against Plaintiff concerning the March 2012 incident with a student and for failure to report to work. (Id. ¶ 74.) A hearing was held pursuant to New York Education Law § 3020–a (the " § 3020–a Hearing") on October 22, 2013, and Plaintiff provided the hearing officer with a copy of the Yonkers Police Report she filed regarding the harassment. (Id. ¶ 77-78.) Plaintiff alleges that after Defendants presented their case, "[t]he parties conducting the hearing went outside, and when they returned, the hearing was abruptly ended and thus [Plaintiff] was prohibited from presenting her sexual harassment claims and defenses to the charges brought against her." (Id. ¶ 78.) Following the hearing, Plaintiff was terminated on November 29, 2013. (Id. ¶ 79.)

STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must include "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court must thus "take all well-plead factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ]." Leeds v. Meltz , 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1996). However, the presumption of truth does not extend to "legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action." Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" to show he is entitled to relief. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC , 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation omitted). "A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. , 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000) ). In assessing whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, Conyers v. Rossides , 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.2009), but "the court may resolve [any] disputed jurisdictional fact issues by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings." Zappia Middle E. Const. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi , 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir.2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Title VII Discrimination

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claims on the basis that the claims are untimely. Title VII's statute of limitations bars claims based on events occurring more than 300 days prior to filing a charge of discrimination with a state or local employment agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) ; Lange v. Town of Monroe , 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 418 (S.D.N.Y.2002). See also Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous., Pres. & Dev. , 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir.1993) ("In states such as New York that have an agency with the authority to address charges of discriminatory employment practices, the statute of limitations for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is 300 days."). Plaintiff filed her New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") complaint simultaneously with her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") complaint on March 24, 2014. (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Memo"), ECF No. 22, at 14; Amend. Compl. ¶ 21.) Defendants assert that, therefore, any claims stemming from discriminatory conduct occurring before May 29, 2013 (300 days prior to March 24, 2014) are time-barred. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Defs.' Memo"), ECF No. 20, at 13.) In response, Plaintiff contends that the claims are not barred because she was subject to a hostile work environment and the discrimination was a continuing violation. (Pl.'s Memo, at 14-15.) As an initial note, it...