Garcia v. Yuba Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

559 F.Supp.3d 1122

Carmel GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.YUBA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-02621-KJM-DB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed October 22, 2021

Filed October 25, 2021

Fulvio Francisco Cajina, The Law Office of Fulvio F. Cajina, Oakland, CA, Stanley Goff, Law Office of Stanley Goff, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Richard W. Osman, Henry B. Bernstein, Sheila Dana'e Crawford, Bertrand Fox Elliot Osman & Wenzel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant City of Vacaville.

ORDER

Kimberly Mueller, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE The City of Vacaville moves to dismiss the claims against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). This is a rare case in which the alleged need for adequate policies and training is so obvious that a single constitutional violation suffices to state a claim under § 1983. See City of Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 389–90 & n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). The motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In the winter of 2017, Samuel Levi Yasko was working on a construction site with his brother and a friend. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 28. He seemed despondent, and he told his brother he was depressed and thinking about hurting himself. Id. ¶ 14. He also asked coworkers if they thought he was "crazy." Id. Then he fell from a third-story balcony at the job site, possibly hitting his head. Id. His behavior was erratic after the fall. Id. ¶ 15. His brother and friend tried to convince him to go to the hospital, but he refused. Id.

After several hours, the three left together. Id. Yasko's erratic behavior continued on the way home. Id. ¶ 16. He tried to strangle himself with a seatbelt, forcing his brother and friend to stop and restrain him, but he soon worked himself free and again tried to strangle himself. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. They stopped at a gas station, and Yasko's friend called the police for help. Id. ¶ 17. He warned the dispatcher that Yasko was having a mental health crisis and was trying to commit suicide, and he explained he and Yasko's brother were trying to hold him down. Id.

When the first officer arrived, the two men told her Yasko was suicidal and unarmed. Id. ¶ 18. The officer told them to hold Yasko against the ground with pressure on his back. Id. A second officer arrived and immediately knelt on Yasko's back. Id. ¶ 19. Then a third officer, a sergeant, arrived and joined the other on Yasko's back. Id. ¶ 20. They decided to use a "WRAP" to restrain him. Id. A WRAP restraint is a total body restraint in the style of a cocoon. See Cooke v. City of Stockton , No. 14-00908, 2017 WL 6447999, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2017). It includes "an ankle strap, upper body harness, [and] a leg restraint." Johnson v. Cortes , No. 09-3946, 2011 WL 445921, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011). When a WRAP restraint is properly applied, it forces a person into "a seated position" with the "legs straight in front" and hands restrained behind the back. Id.

The sergeant went to his car to retrieve the WRAP restraint, and while he was gone, the other officers kicked or stomped on Yasko and shocked him with a Taser. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 20. When the sergeant returned with the restraint, three officers were pressing down on Yasko's back, with Yasko remaining prone on the ground. Id. ¶ 21. Yasko was a large man, more than 250 pounds and six feet tall, but the officers did not take precautions to avoid the dangers of asphyxia when placing their bodyweight on the back of an overweight person restrained in a WRAP device. See id. ¶¶ 19, 29–31. As the officers applied the WRAP restraint, Yasko stopped breathing. Id. Officers could find no pulse. Id. They called the paramedics, who took Yasko to the hospital. Id. ¶ 22. He fell into a coma and later passed away. Id.

Yasko's mother and children filed a lawsuit against the City of Vacaville, several of the individual officers who responded to the call, and others. See Compl., ECF No. 1. After the complaint was amended, the defendants moved to dismiss, and the court granted the motion. See Prev. Order, ECF No. 27. The court dismissed the claims against the City because the complaint did not include factual allegations that, if true, permitted the court to infer, as the plaintiffs alleged, that Yasko's death was the result of (1) the City's failure to train its officers "how to deal with persons suffering from psychiatric or physical distress" or (2) the City's "longstanding custom and practice of not providing assistance to individuals suffering from psychiatric, psychological or physical distress." Id. at 10–12 (quoting Opp'n at 5, ECF No. 18). The court however granted leave to amend. The plaintiffs have now amended their complaint, and the City moves again to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See generally Second Am. Compl.; Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 29. The motion is fully briefed and the court submitted it without oral argument. See Opp'n, ECF No. 31; Reply, ECF No. 33; Minute Order, ECF No. 34.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. , 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) ). The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes "them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco , 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington , 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) ). If the complaint's allegations do not "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief," the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint need contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not "detailed factual allegations," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). But this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; "sufficient factual matter" must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on "judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

These same standards apply to claims against municipal governments under § 1983. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare , 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff's allegations "may not simply recite the elements" of a claim under Monell . See id. (quoting Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) ). The complaint must "contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice" of the plaintiff's claims and allow the municipal government "to defend itself effectively." Id. (quoting Starr , 652 F.3d at 1216 ). The plaintiff's allegations "must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Id. (quoting Starr , 652 F.3d at 1216 ).

III. ANALYSIS

Now, as before, Vacaville argues the complaint lacks factual allegations that, if true, could show it is liable under § 1983. To establish a municipality's liability under § 1983 and Monell , the plaintiff must ultimately prove a "policy or custom" deprived a person of a constitutional right. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles , 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The plaintiff must also show this policy or custom "reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights" of the municipality's inhabitants. Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ). The policy, in other words, must reflect "a deliberate or conscious choice" among alternatives. Canton , 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (quotation marks omitted).

Four types of policies or customs can support a claim against a municipal government under § 1983. First is an express policy: "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated." Monell , 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The plaintiffs do not tie the policies or customs referenced in their complaint to any express statements or rules of this type.

Second, the Supreme Court has held that local governments can be liable under § 1983 for injuries caused by an official's decisions, even if not written or officially promulgated, but only if that official had "final policymaking authority" over "the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue." McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala. , 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ). The plaintiffs do not allege that any official with final policymaking authority made a decision about the policies or customs listed in their complaint.

Third, relatedly, if "authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final." City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik , 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). The complaint also does not include allegations of this type.

This leaves the fourth category: custom and practice. The Supreme Court has held that "a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and...