Gardella v. San Joaquin Cnty. Pub. Conservator

1

DEVLIN GARDELLA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY PUBLIC CONSERVATOR, as Trustee, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents

C097745

California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin

February 5, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super Ct. No. STKPRTR20190000220

MAURO ACTING P. J.

Devlin Gardella^[1] filed a probate petition challenging amendments to a trust created by his mother Cynthia. Devlin claimed Cynthia lacked capacity to execute the amendments and that other family members unduly influenced her. The probate court denied Devlin's petition.

Devlin now contends the probate court erred in (1) evaluating Cynthia's mental capacity under Probate Code section 6100.5^[2] rather than sections 810 to 812, and (2) failing to consider the entirety of the circumstances in deciding whether there was undue influence. Finding no error we will affirm the probate court's order.

BACKGROUND

Cynthia executed the Cynthia J. Gardella Trust (the trust) in 2007. She was the trustee and beneficiary of the trust. The beneficiaries to the remainder of the trust estate included her children Stephen, Devlin, Stephenie, Shelby, and Mark and her grandson Evan. Cynthia amended the trust on October 24, 2013, and amended it again on August 18, 2016. The second trust amendment eliminated any distribution to Devlin. Cynthia's long-time attorney Bradford Dozier prepared the trust and trust amendments. Dozier died in October 2018.

On September 29, 2016, after the second amendment, two doctors determined that Cynthia was medically incapacitated and that she required a health care proxy to make health care decisions. Stephen and Stephenie became co-trustees of the trust.

On February 21, 2019, Shelby filed a petition in probate to remove Stephen and/or Stephenie as co-trustees. Stephen and Stephenie resigned as co-trustees effective October 3, 2019 and designated the San Joaquin County Public Conservator (Public Conservator) as successor trustee of the trust. The Public Conservator was also appointed as conservator of the person and estate of Cynthia. Stephen died in November 2019.

On July 7, 2020, the Public Conservator filed a probate petition to surcharge Stephenie about $1.24 million, alleging that Stephen and Stephenie breached their duties as co-trustees of the trust. Stephenie and the Public Conservator settled the matter.

Devlin filed a probate petition challenging the validity of the first and second trust amendments, asserting that Cynthia was not competent to execute the amendments and that Stephen and Stephenie unduly influenced her to amend the trust. Shelby filed objections to the petition, and the Public Conservator filed a response.

Cynthia passed away on May 30, 2022. The parties agreed to submit the matter by filing written briefs. The probate court ultimately issued a written order denying Devlin's petition.

DISCUSSION

I

Devlin contends the trial court erred in evaluating Cynthia's capacity to execute the trust amendments under section 6100.5 rather than under sections 810 to 812.

The determination of a person's mental capacity to do an act is fact specific. (Algo-Heyres v. Oxnard Manor LP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1071 (Algo-Heyres); In re Marriage of Greenway (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628, 639.) Courts have held that mental capacity is measured on a sliding scale. (In re Marriage of Greenway, at p. 639.) Capacity to make a decision or do a particular act depends on the complexity of the decision or act; more mental capacity is required to enter a contract than to make a will. (Id. at pp. 639, 641-642.)

The standard for determining capacity to make a will, set forth in section 6100.5, applies to trusts and trust amendments that, in content and complexity, closely resemble a will. (Eyford v. Nord (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 112, 122, fn 6; Andersen v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722, 731 (Andersen).) But when the trust or trust amendment is more complex than a will or codicil, we evaluate mental capacity under sections 810 through 812. (Gomez v Smith (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1038 (Gomez); Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352-1353 (Lintz).)

Devlin asserts that the probate court should have applied the standard for determining contractual capacity, set forth in sections 810 to 812, because the first and second trust amendments are complex. Although the probate court cited section 811, subdivision (d), it applied the standard in section 6100.5, focusing on whether, at the time Cynthia signed the amendments, she understood the nature of those instruments and what she was doing. Even if the probate court applied the wrong standard, for reasons we will explain, the court did not err in ruling that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Cynthia lacked mental capacity to execute the trust amendments. We will not disturb the probate court's ruling if it is correct in law but given for a wrong reason. (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19; Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1451.)

The Due Process in Competence Determinations Act (Act) (§ 810 et seq.) describes the standard for determining whether a person lacks capacity to make a contract. (Gomez, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040; see In re Marriage of Greenway, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 640, 642.) The Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that all persons have the capacity to make decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions. (§ 810, subd. (a).) This presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the person is deficient in at least one of the following mental functions -- (1) alertness and attention, (2) information processing, (3) thought processes, and (4) ability to modulate mood and affect -- and that there is a causal link between the deficit(s) and the act in question. (§§ 810, subd. (c), 811, subd. (a).) The deficit(s) must significantly impair the person's ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of his or her actions with regard to the type of act or decision in question. (§ 811, subd. (b).) In determining whether a person has a deficit in mental function so substantial that the person lacks the capacity to do a certain act, the court may take into consideration the frequency, severity and duration of periods of impairment. (§ 811, subd. (c).)

The Act does not provide a single standard for contractual capacity. (Andersen, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 730; Smalley v. Baker (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 824, 832.) More complicated decisions and transactions require greater mental function; less complicated decisions and transactions require less mental function. (Lintz, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1352-1353; Andersen, at p. 730.)

The party claiming incapacity bears the burden of proving mental incapacity. (Gomez, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.) Whether a person lacked the mental capacity to enter a contract at a given time is a factual question that we review for substantial evidence. (Algo-Heyres, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070; Gomez, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1040-1044; see Dunphy v. Dunphy (1911) 161 Cal. 380, 384.) On review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving all conflicts in favor of the probate court's findings. (Algo-Heyres, at p. 1070; Gomez, at p. 1026.) We do not reweigh the evidence. (Algo-Heyres, at p. 1070.) We must uphold the probate court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the probate court might have reached a different result had it credited other evidence. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) The appellant must show that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged finding. (Walton v. Bank of California, National Assn. (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 527, 540 (Walton).)

Medical records show that although Cynthia had various physical ailments in June to October 2013, the time period relevant to the first trust amendment, she could communicate with her health care providers and make health care decisions. (Algo-Heyres, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1067-1069, 1071-1072 [relying on information in medical records to conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding of lack of capacity to enter a contract].) There is no evidence that she had a deficit in alertness and attention, information processing, thought processes, and/or ability to modulate mood and affect, that impaired her ability to execute the first trust amendment on October 24, 2013. (§§ 810, subd. (c), 811, subds. (a), (b).)

As for the time period relevant to the second trust amendment, there are comments in the medical records that Cynthia had dementia, should be evaluated for senile dementia, or exhibited symptoms of dementia on particular dates in June July and September 2016. But even if she had some level of dementia before or after she executed the second trust amendment, that does not, by itself, establish lack of mental capacity. (§ 811, subd. (d); Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 743; Holman v. Stockton Sav. &Loan Bank (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 500, 508 [the law in this state is clear that dementia does not necessarily render one incapable of executing contracts or transacting business].) A settlor must have capacity at the time he or she executed the challenged instrument. (American Trust Co. v. Dixon (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 426, 432-438; see Walton, supra, 218 Cal.App.2d at pp. 541-542.) The record indicates Cynthia had lucid moments. On June 24, 2016, she was alert, oriented, and able to answer all questions appropriately during an emergency room visit. During a July 21, 2016 visit to the dermatology...