Gardner v. Law

BRYANT GARDNER, Plaintiff, v. RENSCH & RENSCH LAW, and JAMES R. COE, Worker's Compensation Judge; Defendants.

8:18CV71

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

August 10, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Bryant Gardner ("Plaintiff" or "Gardner") filed his Complaint on February 16, 2018. (Filing No. 1.) He has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Gardner brings this action against Rensch & Rensch Law (hereinafter "Rensch"), a law firm in Omaha, Nebraska, and James R. Coe, a judge on the Nebraska Worker's Compensation Court, seeking redress pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1346 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 2-3.) Gardner alleges violations of his due process rights arising out of Rensch's representation of Gardner in an action for workers' compensation benefits in Nebraska state court. Because Gardner's "Statement of Claim" (id. at CM/ECF pp. 6-24) is difficult to decipher, much of the following background is taken from the Nebraska Court of Appeals' opinion in Gardner v. International Paper, Destruction & Recycling, Case No. A-17-184 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018), which Plaintiff attached to his Complaint. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 26-32.)

On April 16, 2009, while employed by International Paper Destruction & Recycling ("International Paper") as a truck driver, Plaintiff was injured in an accident. Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee contract with Rensch whereby Rensch agreed to pursue Plaintiff's claim against International Paper. Through the course of that representation, Plaintiff obtained an award of workers' compensation benefits which was upheld on appeal. See Gardner v. International Paper Destr. & Recycl., 865 N.W.2d 371 (Neb. 2015).

At some point, however, Plaintiff became unhappy with the representation. Gardner filed a motion in the workers' compensation court challenging the fee agreement, and on August 19, 2015, "the workers' compensation court entered an order in favor of Gardner, excluding an additional charge for appellate work and reforming the contract to calculate Rensch's one-third attorney fee after deduction of costs (net method) rather than before deduction of costs (gross method) as provided for in the contract." (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 27.) Gardner also filed a professional malpractice action against Rensch in the Douglas County District Court, alleging

(1) a breach of the attorney fee contract, (2) a claim regarding Rensch's failure to file a lawsuit against a third party on behalf of Gardner, and (3) that Rensch failed to appeal the workers' compensation award." The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Rensch, finding that the workers' compensation court had jurisdiction over the fee contract, the claim relating to Rensch's failure to file a third-party lawsuit was time-barred, and that Rensch did not breach the standard of care in not appealing the workers' compensation award. [The Nebraska Court of Appeals] summarily affirmed that decision on appeal. See Gardner v. Rensch, No. A-16-1140.

(Id. at CM/ECF pp. 27-28.)

Gardner then filed an unsuccessful motion in the workers' compensation court to terminate Rensch as his counsel, claiming that Rensch had appropriated funds inconsistent with the fee agreement. The workers' compensation court denied the motion. On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals found that the workers' compensation court did not err in refusing to find that Rensch acted in bad faith or misappropriated funds and affirmed the order of the workers' compensation court. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 28-32.)

Gardner now seeks relief in this court. He claims Rensch capitalized upon knowledge of Gardner's "handicap of his psychological/cognitive disorder" to construct a bad faith fee agreement and receive attorney fees from Gardner's indemnity payments, though such payments were not obtained through any service Rensch provided since Rensch failed to appeal the worker's compensation award. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 16-22.) Gardner further claims that Rensch conspired to gain wealth from Gardner illegally and that the workers' compensation court failed to supervise Rensch or do anything to stop the violation of Gardner's civil rights. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 22.) Further, Gardner "contend[s] [Rensch] has 'failed to provide' my person with 18 U.S code section 1346 definition of "scheme or artifice to defraud" and asserts claims of "intentional infliction of emotional distress [and] harassment, sometimes called the tort of outrage" due to Rensch subjecting Gardner "to a 'systematic campaign' to deprive." (Id. at CM/ECF p. 23.)

For relief, Gardner seeks to:

(1) Have Rensch remove from all courts ligation, in other words remove for any & everything concerning Gardner. (2) Repay Gardner for cost & expense with court allowed interest, that Rensch don't have billing for. (3) Pay Rensch hourly for the submitting brief to the Supreme Court with tangible evidence to prove his worth. (4) Appoint a Court guardian to proceed with Gardner legal litigation to protect his interest. (5) Remove unlawful lien. (6) Repay out of pocket expense with court allowed interest.

(Id. at CM/ECF p. 24 (capitalization and punctuation as in original).) Gardner also asks "this higher Court [to] over-turn the decision of the district court & Workers' Comp court [f]or its abuse of discretion by allowing this error to continue." (Id.)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").

"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

As an initial matter, the court notes that review of Gardner's Complaint is complicated by the fact that his allegations are rambling and difficult to decipher. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that every complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and that "each allegation . . . be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). A complaint must state enough to "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Here, Gardner's Complaint fails to meet this minimal pleading standard. This defect notwithstanding, the court has liberally construed Gardner's Complaint and concludes the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Here, all of Gardner's complaints deal with Rensch's representation of Gardner and the construction and application of the fee agreement between Gardner and Rensch. However, these are the same issues addressed by the state workers' compensation court and upheld on appeal by the Nebraska Court of Appeals. This court cannot intervene in Gardner's dispute with the state courts.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from exercising appellate review of state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction "over challenges to state-court decisions . . . even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. In short, the "Rooker-Feldman doctrine" bars this court from correcting or altering a state court judgment, and no declaratory or injunctive relief is available in this court to do so. Importantly, Rooker-Feldman bars "straightforward appeals" as well as "more indirect attemptsby federal plaintiffs to undermine state court decisions." Lemonds v. St. Louis Cnty., 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000), implied overruling on other grounds recognized by Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp. v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, where a "federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it," the claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman because it is "inextricably intertwined with specific claims already adjudicated in state court." Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492-93 (internal quotation omitted); see also Gisslen v. City of Crystal, Minn., 345 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues ....