Garland v. Bonds

KENDALL GARLAND, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT G. BONDS, BENJAMIN MALLOW,and the CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01874

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 5, 2020

OPINION

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 14, 25—DENIED

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 27, 29—GRANTED

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights action, in which pro se Plaintiff Kendall Garland ("Garland") alleges he was falsely arrested and imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted, after he was taken into custody for alleged violations of Pennsylvania's sex offender registry law. Discovery has concluded, and Garland has moved for summary judgment. Defendant Robert G. Bonds ("Bonds") and the City of Philadelphia ("the City") (collectively, "City Defendants"), have cross moved for summary judgment, as has Defendant Benjamin Mallow ("Mallow"). Upon consideration of the motions for summary judgment, and for the reasons set forth below, Garland's motion for summary judgment is denied, and Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The undisputed material facts as set forth by Defendants¹

During the time period relevant to Garland's claims, Garland was a "Megan's Law" registrant.² See Bonds' and the City's Statement of Undisputed Material Fact (collectively, "City's SOMF") [ECF No. 27-3] ¶ 2. Also during this time period and up until early 2017, Mallow was a State Parole Agent with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("PBPB") assigned to supervise Garland's probation for a previous criminal conviction. See Mallow's Statement of Undisputed Material Fact ("Mallow's SOMF") [ECF No. 29-3] ¶ 2. On December 31, 2016, pursuant to the terms of his probation, Garland updated his address as 1635 West Susquehanna Avenue, Philadelphia, PA. Id. ¶ 3. This address is home to Nu-Stop Recovery and Education Center ("Nu-Stop").³ Id. ¶ 4. Because, in January 2017, Garland was transferring out of the Philadelphia office of PBPB and therefore to the supervision of a new parole officer, Mallow made two unscheduled and unannounced visits to Nu-Stop. Id. ¶ 6. These visits were a known condition of Garland's probation. Id. Garland was absent from Nu-Stop at the time of both of Mallow's visits. Id. ¶ 7. On January 19, 2017, David Miree, the housing manager at Nu-Stop, informed Mallow that Garland had not been at the facility for two weeks.⁴ Id. ¶ 8. Based upon this information, Mallow alerted the Pennsylvania State Police that Garland was in violation of his probation; supervision of Garland's probation was subsequently transferred to another parole agent.⁵ Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

In early 2017, City of Philadelphia Police Department Detectives Keenya Taylor and Thomas Martinka were the assigned investigators handling the investigation of Garland's residency pursuant to Megan's Law requirements at the request of Pennsylvania State Police's Megan's Law Section.⁶ City's SOMF ¶ 2. On January 27, 2016, Detectives Taylor and Martinka were notified by the Pennsylvania State Police via email that a tip had been received stating that Garland had moved out of the address he had reported on December 31, 2016, hadfailed to register a new address, and had recently come up missing.⁷ Id. ¶ 3. The tip had come from Garland's probation office, Benjamin Mallow.⁸ Id. ¶ 4. Mallow's tip also informed the State Police that Garland was a "Tier 3" offender under Megan's Law in an active status, and that the last address reported by Garland was 1635 West Susquehanna Avenue.⁹ Id. ¶¶ 5-6.

Detective Martinka subsequently interviewed the house manager at Nu-Stop, who told him that Garland had moved out of the facility in early January 2017.¹⁰ City's SOMF ¶ 7. The Detectives' investigation moreover revealed that Garland had not notified the State Police of his change of residence.¹¹ Id. ¶ 8. A warrant for Garland's arrest, supported by an affidavit of probable cause sworn out by Detective Taylor, subsequently issued.¹² See id. ¶ 9. Garland wasarrested in New Jersey on March 17, 2017 and arraigned the following day for violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4915(a)(1) and (a)(2).¹³ See id. ¶¶ 10, 14; Mallow's SOMF ¶ 15. The charges against Garland were withdrawn on May 11, 2017. City's SOMF ¶ 18.

B. The undisputed material facts as set forth by Garland¹⁴

An affidavit of probable cause dated February 2, 2017 and filed by Detective Taylor in support of a request for a warrant for Garland's arrest states that "[t]he offender is not due toverify his address again until the ten day period prior to 03-31-17. The offender is a Tier 3 and required to register quarterly."¹⁵ Garland's Statement of Undisputed Material Fact I ("Garland's SOMF I") [ECF No. 14] ¶ 2. Defendant Mallow was aware that Garland had listed the Nu-Stop facility as his residence, and he was also aware that the facility served as a drug and alcohol treatment facility. Id. ¶ 6. The last registered address Garland had listed in January 2017 was 1635 West Susquehanna Avenue.¹⁶ Id. ¶ 8. Garland was charged with violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4915.1(a)(1) and (a)(2). See Garland's Statement of Undisputed Material Fact II ("Garland's SOMF II") [ECF No. 25]. ¶ 4.¹⁷

C. Procedural background

Garland filed the complaint in this action on May 1, 2019. See ECF No. 2. The City Defendants answered the complaint on July 15, 2019, see ECF No. 8, and Defendant Mallow answered on August 30, 2019, see ECF No. 10. On September 10, 2019, the Court set a discovery schedule, see ECF No. 11, prior to the expiration of which, on December 23, 2019, Garland filed his first motion for summary judgment, see ECF No. 14. The Court subsequently extended the discovery deadline and granted Defendants additional time to respond to Garland's motion. See ECF No. 16. On January 17, 2020, Garland filed a motion "to exclude any and all testimony regarding the plaintiffs [sic] records at Nu-Stop under the grounds of psychologist-patient privilege." ECF No. 19. The Court denied this motion as premature. See ECF No. 21.Shortly thereafter, upon learning of Defendants' inability to take Garland's deposition, the Court directed that Garland's deposition take place on February 4, 2020 as a Court-Ordered deposition. See ECF No. 23. Garland filed his second motion for summary judgment on February 3, 2020. See ECF No. 25. Defendants filed their response to Garlands' motions and cross-motions for summary judgment on March 4 and March 9, 2020. See ECF Nos. 27, 29. After being granted an extension of time to do so, Garland filed replies to Defendants' motions on March 20, 2020. See ECF Nos. 38-40.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bacon v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 401, 412-13 (D.N.J. 2018). In determining if the moving party has satisfied this burden, the Court is obliged to construe all facts and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See United States ex rel. Simpson v. Bayer Corp., 376 F. Supp. 3d 392, 401 (D.N.J. 2019); Boyle v. Cty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Bacon, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 413 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).

Where the movant shows a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-movant to point to record evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Davis v. Quaker Valley Sch. Dist., No. 13-1329, 2016 WL 912297, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2016), aff'd, 693 F. App'x 131 (3d Cir. 2017). "[T]he non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the moving party's pleadings; instead he must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact." Gibson-Reid v. Lendmark Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-02859, 2019 WL 4139034, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2019) (quoting Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007)); see Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorp., 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[U]nsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment."). Summary judgment is mandated where a non-moving party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. . . . [T]here can be 'no genuine issue of material fact'" where "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).¹⁸

Additionally, as noted, pro se filings like Garland's motion and related documents "must be liberally construed." Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Hartmann v. Carroll, 492 F.3d 478, 482 n.8 (3d Cir.2007)). At the same time, pro se litigants "[are] not excused from conforming to the standard rules of civil procedure." Peterson v. Weiss, No. CIV.A. 12-5431, 2012 WL 6042795, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2012) (quoting McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)); see Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 F.App'x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that pro se plaintiffs are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

IV. DISC...