Garland v. Knorr

KENDALL GARLAND, Plaintiff, v. PROBATION OFFICER AGENT DAVID KNORR,PROBATION SUPERVISOR MICHAEL HERNANDEZ,and the CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-2996

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 5, 2020

OPINION

Defendant City of Philadelphia's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 17 — GRANTED

Defendants David Knorr and Michael Hernandez's motion to dismiss, ECF Nos. 28 — GRANTED

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights action in which pro se Plaintiff Kendall Garland alleges multiple constitutional violations arising from his arrest in 2017 for violating the terms of his probation and his subsequent incarceration. Defendant the City of Philadelphia ("the City") has moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the grounds that Garland fails to adequately plead facts plausibly supporting either a constitutional violation in the first instance, or a claim of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individual Defendants, Probation Officer David Knorr and Probation Supervisor Michael Hernandez (collectively, "Individual Defendants"), have also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. They argue, among other things, that Garland's claims in this case are precluded by an adverse judgment in a previously-filed state court lawsuit in which Garland raised essentially the same claims.

Upon consideration of the Defendants' motions to dismiss, and for the reasons set forth below, both motions are granted, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts alleged in the Amended Complaint¹

At some point in January 2017, Garland was alleged to have violated Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA").² Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Based upon these allegations Garland was arrested and incarcerated until June 2017.³ Id. Around that time, the SORNA charges were "resolved" in Garland's favor, he was released from prison, and Agent Knorr was assigned to be his probation officer. Id.

According to the Amended Complaint, "[a]t some point prior [to June 2017], [Garland] was informed that [he] would no longer be permitted to own his personal laptop." Am. Compl. ¶6. The Amended Complaint avers that "[t]his condition, even by itself, should have been known to be illegal and a violation of [Garland's] constitutional rights under due process and an undue infringement upon [his] liberty interests." Id. ¶ 7. This is especially so, according to Garland, in light of his background and training as a software and web developer and given that his 2005 conviction for aggravated indecent assault — the source of his SORNA obligations —"had nothing to do with technology at all." Id. Nevertheless, Garland sold his laptop at a pawn shop and backed up its files to two portable hard drives. Id. ¶ 8.

The Amended Complaint next states that at some point after his assignment to Garland's case — exactly when is not clear —"Defendant Knorr stated to [Garland] that he fully expected [Garland] to be in prison because, as Agent Knorr stated quite emphatically, 'I know you broke the law and should be in prison, but instead here you sit in front of me.'"⁴ Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Similarly, Garland alleges Knorr was "quite hostile and belligerent towards" him. Id. ¶ 11.

On August 8, 2017, Knorr conducted a visit to Garland's residence, and "without [Garland's] permission or consent, and without probable cause," conducted a search of Garland's person. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. Garland avers that in conducting this search, Knorr was "essentially looking for a reason to arrest" him, as indicated by Knorr's statements that he believed Garland should be in prison. Id. ¶ 15. During his August 8, 2017 visit, Knorr noticed the devices Garland had used to back up the contents of his laptop. Id. ¶ 17. Upon noticing these devices, Knorr informed Garland that he was subject to a complete and total ban of all computer and internet access, and that the portable hard drives appeared to be utilized forcomputer and/or internet access. See id. ¶¶ 18-20. Knorr then seized the hard drives "without [Garland's] permission or consent." Id. ¶ 20. Knorr also "repeatedly asked [Garland] if these devices had wi-fi capability," which, the Amended Complaint contemplates, was likely because he did not realize what the devices were. Id. ¶ 21.

As a result of his possession of the external hard drives, Knorr handcuffed and arrested Garland and initiated revocation proceedings on the basis that Garland had "accessed a computer and/or the internet." Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Garland alleges this conduct was "without cause." Id. Prior to being transported to jail, Garland observed that Knorr "appeared to contact his supervisor for permission to continue to detain [Garland]." Id. ¶ 24. Garland moreover states that he noticed this procedure — a probation officer's contacting of his or her supervisor — previous times when he had been arrested on allegations of probation violations. Id.

According to the Amended Complaint, Knorr's supervisor was Michael Hernandez, whose signature appears on the "request for probation revocation that charges [Garland] with accessing a computer." Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Garland avers that, like Knorr, Hernandez "should have known in August, 2017 that a complete and total ban on all computer and / or internet access would be violation of [Garland's] constitutional rights." Id. ¶ 28. This information should have been known to Hernandez and Knorr, Garland claims, based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Packingham v. North Carolina . . . which specifically invalidated state regulations from prohibiting certain convicted persons from prohibiting certain convicted persons from using any social medial platform as being too broad." Id. ¶ 31. The Amended Complaint avers that by failing to bar or prevent Garland's arrest based upon his possession of the external hard drives, and rather approving the arrest, Hernandez was "deliberately indifferent" to Garland's constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 29.

Upon his arrest, Garland was transported "to the Philadelphia Prison System" and was incarcerated in "the House of Corrections." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. The Amended Complaint avers that a "warrant for detention was issued in order to have [Garland] detained in the Philadelphia prison." Id. ¶ 39. According to Garland, the warrant should have given the City of Philadelphia reason "to examine the situation" and prevent Garland's unlawful detention; however, the City "did nothing and acquiesced." Id. ¶ 40.

According to the Amended Complaint, the House of Corrections was, at the time of Garland's detention, "overcrowded" with many probation violation detainees, some having "serious open cases involving guns or violence." Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Similarly, Garland contends that "[t]he Philadelphia prison system is often understaffed to handle the sheer capacity and constant flow of inmates being admitted into the prison system." Id. ¶ 42. Moreover, because the "House of Corrections is an older prison," Garland claims it "should not be allowed to house as many inmates as there seemed to be housed there." Id. ¶ 43. According to Garland, inmates in this facility "are often forced to endure horrible and extra harsh conditions of incarceration . . . . Supplies, soap and basic necessities are often deprived prisoners." Id. ¶ 44. He additionally claims that prison staff are "often not properly trained" and "not the most highly compensated city employees," which "creates a highly volatile environment where city employees are often less than caring," and which in turn leads to inmates having to "fend for themselves and attempt to protect themselves." Id. ¶ 45. As evidence of this, Garland states that "while incarcerated," he "was attacked an [sic] injured" and "has incurred continued right shoulder pain, which has required therapy to heal."⁵ Id. ¶¶ 56-57.

Garland attributes all of his grievances as to the conditions of the "Philadelphia Prison System" to the City's "policies and procedures of permitting overcrowded prisons, with understaffed workers, workers who many [sic] are not properly trained, and also policies of providing insufficient materials to adequately cover basic needs like soap for showers." Am. Compl. ¶ 46.

In addition to his grievances regarding the conditions of his confinement, Garland states that he had a "Gagnon I" hearing while incarcerated, at which time City officials "could and should have examined the situation and released [Garland] or perhaps even at the very least, recommended release of [Garland] pending the eventual Gagnon II hearing."⁶ Am. Compl. ¶ 49. In support of this, Garland states that he has "previously been released from the city of Philadelphia prison system by City of Philadelphia employees prior to a Gagnon II hearing when incarcerated under an alleged probation violation when the allegations of a violation of probation have been found to not be serious." Id. ¶ 50.

Garland states that his ordeal ended on December 8, 2017. On that date a "probation hearing" was held, at which "the Court stated that the condition of probation imposed . . . a complete ban on all computer and internet access[,] was an unreasonable condition of probation." Am. Compl. ¶ 53. As a result, "[t]he Court lifted [Garland's] probation detainer thathad been lodged against [him]," and the proceedings consequently terminated in his favor. Id. ¶¶ 54-55.

Based upon the above factual averments, Garland asserts claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest and imprisonment, and unlawful search and seizure "under both the Fourth Amendment and applicable state law, and also retaliation and harassment⁷ for the exercise of Constitutionally protected conduct." Am. Compl. ¶ 59.

B. Relevant procedural background

Garland filed his initial Complaint in this action on July 10, 2019. See ECF No. 2. Service of the Complaint was effected on the City shortly thereafter, however service on Defendant Knorr — the...