Garner v. City of Many

ELLIOT GARNER, ET AL. v. CITY OF MANY, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 21-0228

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division

September 9, 2021

MAGISTRATE Judge HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

S MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUDGE

Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss challenging the sufficiency of Elliot and Rose Garner's (collectively “Plaintiffs” or “the Garners”) civil rights allegations brought individually and on behalf of their minor child, P.G. See Record Documents 5, 15 & 21. Each motion is opposed. See Record Documents 13, 27 & 29.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, ^[1] and are considered in the light most favorable to the Garners. See Record Document 26. On January 28, 2020, Plaintiffs' child was held down and sodomized in the Many High School locker room by nine fellow students with a mechanical pencil and their fingers. See id. at ¶31. Although an athletic coach walked in on the attack, local law enforcement was not contacted, nor were the Garners immediately informed of what had taken place. See Id. at ¶¶31-32. Rose Garner became aware of the incident on Friday, January 31, 2020, when an individual showed her a video of the attack, which had been posted on the internet. See id. at ¶¶16-19.

After viewing the video, Rose Garner made a recording and returned home to confirm what had happened with P.G. See id. at ¶¶19-20. She then took P.G. to the Sabine Parish Sheriff's Office to file a report but was not permitted to make a statement or leave a copy of the video, instead being redirected to the City of Many Police Department. See id. at ¶¶21-23. Once there, she was advised the individual she needed to speak with was not present and instructed to return on Monday, February 3. See id. at ¶24. She returned an hour later and forced an officer to watch the video, make a recording of it and take down her information. See id. at ¶¶25-26. Nevertheless, the officer advised her that nothing could be done until after the weekend. See id. at ¶27.

Upset and frustrated, she telephoned the Louisiana State Police, who launched an investigation into the sexual assault. See id. at ¶28. Later in the evening on January 31, Many High School's assistant principal finally called Elliot Garner, but did not discuss the nature or extent of the incident, only stating that “something happened with P.G., but it will be taken care of by Monday.” See id. at ¶30. Ultimately, the Louisiana State Police drafted and filed arrest warrants against six suspects. See id. at ¶34.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint spans fifty pages and over two hundred paragraphs. See id. It names nearly a dozen Defendants. See id. at ¶8. The Amended Complaint explicitly labels claims for (1) Equal Protection and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Due Process and § 1983; (3) civil conspiracy, § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (4) Fourth Amendment violations; (5) policies, procedures, or lack thereof; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) abuse of process; and (8) direct action recovery.

The Amended Complaint struggles to attach specific allegations to particular Defendants, opting instead to generalize the vast majority of its assertions. Accordingly, the Court is left to decipher which claims and which allegations within them pertain to each Defendant based solely on the nature of the contentions. With this task set forth, the Court is prepared to analyze the pending motions to dismiss in this matter filed by the Sabine Parish District Attorney's Office and District Attorney Don Burkett (Record Document 5), the Sabine Parish School Board (Record Document 15), and the Sabine Parish Sheriff's Department (Record Document 21).

I. Legal Standard

In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations but does require more than mere labels and conclusory statements. See id. at 555. Importantly, a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. When evaluating a pleading, courts must accept all factual allegations as true, but need not accept legal conclusions as facts. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]… a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Facial plausibility is present when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

II. Sabine Parish District Attorney's Office and District Attorney Don Burkett's Motion to Dismiss (Record Document 5)

Plaintiffs have sued the Sabine Parish District Attorney's Office (“DA's Office”) and District Attorney Don Burkett (“Burkett”) in his official and personal capacities. See Record Document 26 at ¶8. The official capacity claims against Burkett and the claims against the DA's Office as a whole are duplicative, and the Court will proceed to analyze them together as claims against the DA's Office. The personal capacity claims against Burkett appear to be made against him in his role as prosecuting attorney. See id. This distinction is important because Plaintiffs' allegations state that in addition to serving as the elected District Attorney, Burkett also represents the Sabine Parish School Board (“School Board”). See id. at ¶110. This dual representation is statutorily mandated, pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 42:261.

A singular motion to dismiss has been filed on behalf of the DA's Office and Burkett. See Record Document 5. It argues immunity from some claims and insufficient pleading for others. See Record Document 5-1. Plaintiffs counter with attempted explanations of their precise claims to avoid immunity, and with arguments in support of the strength of their allegations. See Record Document 13.

A. Prosecutorial Immunity and Standing

Underscoring any suit against a prosecutor or his office are the related concepts of absolute and qualified immunity. While prosecutorial acts more often than not qualify for absolute immunity, “the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Rather, the prosecutor seeking absolute protection bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function he performs. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). For state prosecutors, absolute immunity is available for conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

Courts distinguish between (1) actions taken “in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of [the prosecutor's] role as an advocate for the State, ” and (2) “administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.” Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 956 F.3d 773, 779-80 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). The former will be subject to absolute immunity, while the latter, so-called investigatory functions, may be eligible for only qualified immunity. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 496 (holding that a prosecutor's participation in a probable cause hearing qualified for absolute immunity, whereas legal advice he gave to police earned only qualified immunity).

Whether an act is entitled to qualified immunity depends on if the official's conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Courts must determine whether the government official's actions were objectively reasonable in light of law which was clearly established at the time of the disputed action. See Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir. 2004). Qualified immunity supports all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 480.

Tied to the concept of prosecutorial immunity is the widely recognized rule that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Recently, the Fifth Circuit discussed the breadth of Linda R.S., stating that “every court to our knowledge to have addressed this question prior to this case agrees that a crime victim may not challenge a prosecutor's failure to investigate or prosecute his perpetrator.” Lefebure v. D'Aquilla, 987 F.3d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 2021). With this framework in place, the Court is prepared to analyze the instant motion to dismiss.

B. Equal Protection

The DA's Office and Burkett argue Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claims are rooted in failures to prosecute and investigate the alleged sexual assault of P.G., as well as for advising police on how to handle the matter. See Record Document 5 at 2-5. Consequently, they argue for dismissal under absolute and qualified immunity, as well as for a lack of standing. See id. Plaintiffs clarify that the alleged failures and advice to police are not the foundation of the claims themselves, but rather examples of differential treatment towards black and white victims of crime that comprise their overarching Equal Protection claims. See Record Document 13 at 4-6. Plaintiffs state repeatedly throughout their opposition...