Garrett v. Cape Fox Facilities Servs.

LISA GARRETT Plaintiff, v. CAPE FOX FACILITIES SERVS., et al.,Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-579

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

January 17, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss by Defendant Cape Fox Facilities Services ("CFFS") and the individual defendants Chelsey Brown,¹ Faye Wells, and Harold Mitchell (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"). Defendants seek to dismiss for failure to state a claim pro se Plaintiff Lisa Garrett's complaint, which alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants' motion and the matter is thus ripe for disposition. The parties waived oral argument, and, in any event, oral argument is dispensed with as the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in the existing record.

Plaintiff now concedes that her claims against the Individual Defendants must be dismissed. Although Defendants argue that plaintiff signed a Severance and Release Agreement ("Release"), that argument is not reached here because whether plaintiffexecuted the release is an affirmative defense not properly considered on a threshold motion to dismiss. The complaint must be dismissed in its entirety, however, because plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII or the ADA. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss must be granted in part and denied in part. The motion is denied insofar as defendants sought to dismiss on the basis of the Release and insofar as defendants sought dismissal with prejudice on the claims against CFFS; the motion is granted in all other respects with leave to amend the claims against CFFS.

I.

As settled precedent requires, the following facts are derived from the allegations in the complaint and the attached documents, which are taken as true solely for the purpose of resolving the motion to dismiss. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986).²

• Plaintiff is a white, female, military veteran who was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") in 2017.

• On February 20, 2018, plaintiff was employed by CFFS as an Employee Relations Specialist on staffing assignment with CFFS' client, USAID.³

• Plaintiff's job was to investigate, analyze, and review proposals and grievances apparently by USAID employees.

• On or about March or April 2018, plaintiff communicated to Brown, a CFFS program manager, concerns that toxins in the air in the building where she was assigned to work were adversely affecting her.

• To accommodate plaintiff, CFFS then assigned plaintiff to a different workspace in the same building and permitted her to work from home one day a week.

• Plaintiff then requested to move herself and her team to an entirely different building.

• CFFS denied her request.

• Plaintiff experienced difficulties with USAID employee Silas York who refused to communicate with plaintiff regarding plaintiff's work or to provide plaintiff with necessary information to perform her job.

• Plaintiff discussed these issues with her co-worker, Carene Reid, who agreed with plaintiff that York refused to communicate with plaintiff and Reid because they are women. The complaint alleges that Reid later denied having these conversations.

• The complaint alleges that York told plaintiff that she was a "little bird" that needed to be trained and told others that he and plaintiff had a "thing."

• On April 25, 2018, plaintiff complained to USAID Director Vanessa Prout about York and informed Prout about her PTSD.

• Prout then began holding plaintiff's case drafts and would not clear them to be submitted to the Office of General Counsel.

• In mid-May 2018, Prout made edits to plaintiff's case drafts.

• Plaintiff complained to Brown about York, including a story York told plaintiff involving a chicken being eaten by a wolf that plaintiff viewed as a threat to her.

• Plaintiff felt that she was placed at the furthest end of the building and isolated from her team.

• Plaintiff complained to Brown that she felt she was being discriminated against based on her race.⁴

• A new USAID Director, Maria Price-Detherage, replaced Prout, but also held plaintiff's cases back from being submitted to the Office of General Counsel, refused to review them, and placed plaintiff on "Peer Review."⁵ Plaintiff's work was the only work that was peer reviewed.

• Before complaining to Prout regarding York, plaintiff did not experience difficulty having her work submitted to the Office of General Counsel and between 4-6 cases had been cleared to that Office.

• Reid, who also knew that plaintiff suffered from PTSD, began "gas lighting"⁶ plaintiff by informing plaintiff that Reid was included in high-level meetings and calling plaintiff a liar about being physically ill.

• On May 24, 2018, plaintiff complained to USAID's General Counsel, Jane Ellen Paschall, who referred plaintiff to USAID's Office of Civil Rights and Diversity ("OCRD").

• On May 29, 2018, plaintiff contacted OCRD and submitted a complaint of race and sex discrimination and retaliation.

• At the same time, because plaintiff suffered several PTSD triggers at her work and because she experienced a lot of stress at work, plaintiff decided to resign.

• On June 1, 2018, sometime after plaintiff complained about edits Prout made to her grievance cases, Brown provided plaintiff with a "performance intervention" email, which plaintiff perceived as a written warning and an effort to begin the termination process.

• On June 20, 2018, plaintiff submitted her two-weeks' notice to Brown, which CFFS accepted.

• CFFS offered plaintiff two weeks' severance pay in exchange for a general release.

• Plaintiff signed the release but alleges that she was sick at the time and was not paying attention to the document that she signed.

• On November 23, 2018, plaintiff filed her EEOC charge of discrimination.

• On March 29, 2019, the EEOC issued plaintiff a right to sue letter.

II.

The well-settled motion to dismiss standard does not require extensive elaboration. Ajs the Supreme Court has made clear, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).Importantly, in making this determination, a district court must "accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]." United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 632 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). But a district court is not bound to "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that, "as a general rule[,] extrinsic evidence should not be considered at the 12(b)(6) stage." Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004).

III.

Although the complaint asserts claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, plaintiff now correctly agrees to the dismissal of this aspect of the complaint. This is correct because Title VII and the ADA do not afford plaintiff such relief. See Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App'x 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) ("these statutes do not provide for causes of action against defendants in their individual capacities"); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VII and the ADA do not provide for actions against individual defendants). In her opposition brief, plaintiff states that she withdraws her complaint against the Individual Defendants. See Opp'n Br. at 3. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss with respect to the Individual Defendants must be granted and the claims against the Individual Defendants must be dismissed with prejudice.

IV.

Next, CFFS seeks dismissal of the entire complaint on the basis of the allegation in the complaint, that plaintiff signed a Release. Although plaintiff concedes that in exchange for two-weeks severance pay she signed a release of claims, it is premature to consider the release on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss must be denied in this regard.

Documents referenced in the complaint and attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered when evaluating a motion to dismiss if they are "integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint," Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004). Ordinarily, however, an affirmative defense such as the execution of a release is not appropriately considered on a motion to dismiss. See Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). The Fourth Circuit has held that, only "in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion t0 dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. Importantly, the Fourth Circuit has limited this exception to instances where all facts necessary to the affirmative defense "clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)(emphasis added).

Here, the terms of the Release are not clear from the face of the complaint, because no specific terms are recited in the complaint and the complaint does not attach the Release. Moreover, as defendants acknowledge, a release may be invalid due to mutual mistake, fraud, misrepresentation or duress and that releases are enforced only ifthey are knowing and voluntary. Mot. at 9 (citing Va. Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 265 (4th Cir. 1971); Davis v. Old Dominion Tobacco Co., 755 F. Supp. 2d 682, 692 (E.D. Va. 2010)). The Fourth Circuit has held that, to fall within the limited exception of addressing an affirmative defense on a motion to...