Garrison v. Tregre

1

DARLINTA COOK GARRISON v. MICHAEL TREGRE

Civil Action No. 19-13008

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

December 21, 2021

SECTION “R” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is defendant Sheriff Michael Tregre's motion for summary judgment.^[1] Plaintiff Darlinta Cook Garrison opposes the motion.^[2]For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves claims of employment discrimination. Plaintiff Darlinta Cook Garrison began working for the St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff's Office in November 2009.^[3] At the time of her termination, she was working as a D.A.R.E. instructor and grant writer.^[4] Plaintiff alleges that, on April 2, 2018 she requested leave, to begin the same day, and to run through April 6, 2018.^[5] Despite her same-day request, plaintiff represents that she had planned on taking this leave “[a] few days before” because the school where she teaches D.A.R.E. was closed that week, and she “needed rest.”^[6] On the morning of April 2, plaintiff's supervisor approved her request.^[7]However, that evening, plaintiff received a call from the Sheriff Office's Human Resources Director, Troy Cassioppi, informing plaintiff that her leave had been revoked by defendant Sheriff Tregre, and that she was “to report to work to backfill for the switchboard.”^[8] Defendant testified that he revoked plaintiff's leave because multiple people had submitted advanced vacation requests for that week, which created a staff shortage, and that he “needed[] people to attend [to] other day-to-day operations at the sheriff's office.”^[9] He also noted that plaintiff had not complied with the office's 30-day advance-notice policy for employees seeking non-emergency leave, although he conceded that there are circumstances where employees would give fewer than 30 days' notice and still have their requests approved.^[10] Despite the revocation of her leave, plaintiff did not report to work on April 3. That day, plaintiff's supervisor sent her an email stating that, if she had another unauthorized absence that week, it would result in “additional disciplinary actions for failure to obey direct instructions.”^[11] Despite this warning, plaintiff did not report to work on April 4 or 5.^[12]

On April 5, 2018, plaintiff was discharged for “insubordination, refusal to work [the] switchboard, and failure to report for duty.”^[13] After her termination, plaintiff filed a charge of race and sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.^[14] Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter on September 11, 2019.^[15]

On October 7, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging that defendant unlawfully terminated her on the basis of her sex and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.^[16] In her complaint, plaintiff contends that the reason given for her termination was a pretext for discrimination, and that defendant “habitually subjects black female employees under his command to worse treatment in comparison to their black male, white male, and white female counterparts.”^[17] Defendant now moves for summary judgment.^[18] The Court considers the parties' arguments below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law' are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F.Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, ” or by “showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The plaintiff in a Title VII action bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, “an employee must demonstrate that she ‘(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.'” Morris v. Town of Independent, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 319-20 (5th Cir. 2014)).

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the “burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination.” Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). If an employer produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must produce “substantial evidence that the proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Id. Even if pretext is shown, it may be insufficient to establish discrimination “when the record conclusively reveals some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, ” or “when the plaintiff creates only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue, and there was abundant and uncontroverted evidence that no discrimination occurred.” Id.

Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate ultimately turns on “the strength of the plaintiff's prima face case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 579 (citing Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for sex or race discrimination, and that, even if Garrison has established a prima facie case, she cannot establish that defendant's stated reason for her termination was pretextual.^[19] In response, plaintiff asserts that she has established a prima facie case of discrimination because (1) as a black female, she is a member of a protected group; (2) there is no dispute that she was qualified for the position; (3) she was discharged; and (4) she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside of her protected group who were not ordered to work at the switchboard.^[20]

Defendant does not challenge that Garrison has met her burden as to the first two elements of the prima facie case. However, defendant contends that Garrison has not satisfied the third and fourth elements because she cannot show that she (1) suffered an “adverse employment decision, ” or (2) that she was treated “less favorably than a similarly situated individual.”^[21]

The Court...