Gaskill-Clayborn v. Mighty Oaks Child Dev. Ctr.

BEONICA V. GASKILL-CLAYBORN v. MIGHTY OAKS CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, LLC and UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF APPEAL, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania PLAINTIFF DEFENDANTS

No. 1:20-CV-128-DMB-RP

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division

September 22, 2021

ORDER

DEBRA M. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Following a default judgment on liability against Mighty Oaks Child Development Center, LLC, Beonica V. Gaskill-Clayborn's Title VII claims against Mighty Oaks are before the Court for a determination of damages.

I Procedural History

On June 18, 2020, Beonica V. Gaskill-Clayborn filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Mighty Oaks Child Development Center LLC, and the Unemployment Compensation Board of Appeal of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Doc. #1. The complaint alleged that Mighty Oaks violated Title VII by failing to accommodate Gaskill-Clayborn's religion and by terminating her due to her religion. Id. at PageID 6-7. The complaint also sought review of the Unemployment Compensation Board's decision that Gaskill-Clayborn was not entitled to unemployment benefits. Id. at PageID 7. As relief Gaskill-Clayborn sought (1) “[a]n award of back pay and any lost unemployment benefits;” (2) “front pay and/or reinstatement as appropriate;” (3) “an injunction curing the violations alleged ... and prohibiting any future similar violations;” (4) “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate;” (5) “compensatory damages for emotional distress and any other non-pecuniary harms flowing from the actions alleged;” (6) “consequential damages and any other pecuniary harms flowing from the unlawful acts complained of;” (7) “punitive damages commensurate with the misconduct and necessary to deter violations of the law;” (8) “notice given to all employees regarding the violations ... and notifying such employees of the order entered proscribing any future similar violations;” (9) pre- and post-judgment interest; (10) attorney fees; (11) costs; and (12) “any other relief available under any applicable principle in law or equity.” Id. at Page ID 78.

Gaskill-Clayborn moved for entry of a default against Mighty Oaks on October 22, 2020. Doc. #10. The Clerk of Court entered a default against Mighty Oaks on October 27, 2020. Doc. #11. Two days later, Gaskill-Clayborn moved for a default judgment against Mighty Oaks. Doc. #12. On November 23, 2020, the Court denied the motion without prejudice because the motion was not accompanied by a memorandum brief in violation of the Court's local rules, and because the motion did not “mention the claims in the complaint or explain why a default judgment is procedurally justified.” Doc. #14 at 2. One week later, Gaskill-Clayborn filed a second motion for default judgment against Mighty Oaks. Doc. #16.

On December 15, 2020, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, Gaskill-Clayborn voluntarily dismissed her claims against the Unemployment Compensation Board. Doc. #19. On January 13, 2021, the Court granted Gaskill-Clayborn's motion for default judgment against Mighty Oaks and advised that “[a] hearing on damages will be set by separate notice.” Doc. #20 at 6-7.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on damages on February 26 2021. Doc. #26. Both Gaskill-Clayborn and her husband Marcus Clayborn testified. Doc. #27. Gaskill-Clayborn also introduced four exhibits: (1) pay stubs from Mighty Oaks; (2) employment search records; (3) a handwritten estimate of back pay; and (4) medical records. Doc. #28. After the hearing, in response to the Court's directive that she file “a post-hearing brief which details the type and amount of damages to which she claims entitlement, and includes authority supporting each request, ” Doc. #29 Gaskill-Clayborn timely filed a post-hearing brief. Doc. #34.^[1]

II Damages Standard

Following a default judgment, “[a] plaintiff bears the burden of proving his damages.” Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1355 (10th Cir. 2014); see Flynn v. People's Choice Home Loans, Inc., 440 Fed.Appx. 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2011) (after default judgment, “the burden of establishing damages rest[s] squarely and solely” on plaintiff). Regarding damages, “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c). Therefore, “the relief prayed for in a complaint defines the scope of relief available on default judgment.” United States v. Giles, 538 F.Supp.2d 990, 994 (W.D. Tex. 2008); see Silge v. Merz, 510 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (Rule 54(c) “permits neither increases in kind or in amount from the figure specified in the demand for judgment”) (cleaned up). If the requested relief does not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings, the Court must then determine “if the requested relief is appropriate based on governing law.” Fagan v. Lawrence Nathan Assocs., Inc., 957 F.Supp.2d 784, 801 (E.D. La. 2013).

III Analysis

In her complaint, Gaskill-Clayborn sought back and front pay injunctive relief; compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages; pre- and post-judgment interest; attorney fees, and costs. Doc. #1 at PagelD 7-8. In her post-hearing brief, Gaskill-Clayborn argues she is entitled to (1) $32, 660 in back pay; (2) $41, 600 in front pay; (3) $50, 000 in compensatory damages; and (4) $14, 273 in costs, including attorney fees. Doc. #35 at 1.

A. Back Pay

Gaskill-Clayborn argues that she is entitled to $32, 660 in back pay based upon “a rate of four hundred and sixty ($460) per week for seventy-one weeks.”^[2] Doc. #35 at 3-4.

For claims brought under Title VII, after a court finds that a defendant “intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, ” the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, ” including back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). “[B]ack pay under Title VII is an equitable, or ‘make whole,' remedy. As such, its purpose is to place the plaintiff in the position that she would have been in but for the defendant's illegal conduct.” Overman v. City of East Baton Rouge, 656 Fed.Appx. 664, 671 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975)).

Gaskill-Clayborn submitted four pay stubs reflecting that she worked 96.04 hours from August 16, 2019, to August 29, 2019; 84.76 hours from September 14, 2019, to September 27, 2019; 80.44 hours from September 28, 2019, to October 11, 2019; and 91.30 hours from October 16, 2019, to October 29, 2019. Doc. #30. All four pay stubs reflect a rate of $10 per hour. Id. Gaskill-Clayborn's hearing testimony confirmed her pay rate and that the pay stubs are a fair representation of what she was paid at Mighty Oaks.

On average, based on the pay stubs, Gaskill-Clayborn was paid for 44 hours each week at a rate of $10 per week, yielding a weekly total of $440. For 71 weeks, that amounts to a total of $31, 240.^[3] Thus, the Court determines that Gaskill-Clayborn is entitled to $31, 240 in back pay.

B. Front Pay

Rather than seeking reinstatement, Gaskill-Clayborn “asks that this Court award her two years of front pay” in the amount of $41, 600.^[4] Doc. #35 at 5.

The United Supreme Court held in Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. that Title VII authorized front pay, which “is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.” 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). “Calculations of front pay cannot be totally accurate because they are prospective and necessarily speculative in nature.” Jackson v. Host Int'l, Inc., 426 Fed.Appx. 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reneau v. Wayne Griffin & Sons, Inc., 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991)). Because of this “speculative character, ” district courts have “wide latitude” in determining a front pay award. Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2007). However, “such awards must be carefully crafted to avoid a windfall to the plaintiff.” Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499 F.3d 474, 491 (5th Cir. 2007).

There are several factors a court should consider in determining the amount of a front pay award, including “(1) the length of prior employment, (2) the permanency of the position held, (3) the nature of the work, (4) the age and physical condition of the employee, (5) possible consolidation of jobs, and (6) the myriad other non-discriminatory factors which could validly affect the employer/employee relationship.” Downey, 510 F.3d at 544.

Gaskill-Clayborn testified that she worked for Mighty Oaks from August 2, 2019, until November 4, 2019; after her termination she has been unable to find similar work; and, as an alternative teacher originally from Pennsylvania, she would have to return to school to obtain the same credentials she held in Pennsylvania. Additionally, Gaskill-Clayborn stated that she would not feel comfortable returning to work at Mighty Oaks. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that an award of front pay is appropriate. Spangler v. Colonial Ophthalmology, 235 F.Supp.2d 507, 509 (E.D. Va. 2002) (awarding one year of front pay in lieu of reinstatement following default judgment). However, during the hearing, Gaskill-Clayborn testified that her family originally planned to stay in Mississippi “for a year” and afterwards were “due to go back” to Pennsylvania. Given that Gaskill-Clayborn's intent to return to Pennsylvania after a year implies that she did not intend to work at Mighty Oaks for more than one year, the Court finds that an award for two years of front pay would result in a windfall to her. Rather, the Court will award Gaskill-Clayborn front pay for one year in the amount of $20, 800.

C. Compensatory...