Gastelum v. Kohl's Inc.

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FERNANDO GASTELUM, Plaintiff, v. KOHL'S INC., Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-1740 JLT BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California

March 19, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (DOC. 23)

Fernando Gastelum asserts Kohl's Inc. violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and California law by not having accessible features in stores its located in Bakersfield and El Centro California. (Doc. 20.) Defendant^[1] seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing Gastelum lacks standing to pursue his claims and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 23) Gastelum opposes the motion, arguing the allegations are sufficient. (Doc. 25.)

The Court finds the matter is suitable for decision without oral arguments, and no hearing will be set pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

I. Background and Procedural History

Gastelum resides in Casa Grande, Arizona. (See Doc. 20 at 1.) He reports he is “missing a leg” and “uses a wheelchair for mobility when locations are wheelchair accessible and a prosthetic leg and a cane when the location is not wheelchair accessible.” (Id. at 1 ¶ 1.) Gastelum alleges he visited the Kohl's store in located at 9400 Rosedale Highway in Bakersfield, California, on July 2, 2021; and he visited the store located at 808 E. Danenberg Drive in El Centro, California, on February 24, 2022. (Id. at 2, ¶¶ 5, 10.)

According to Gastelum, when he visited the Bakersfield and El Centro stores, he “discovered that [each] Store is not compliant with the disability access laws in conformance with the ADA Standards as it relates to wheelchair users like the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 20 at 3, ¶¶ 11, 12.) Specifically, Gastelum asserts he identified the following barriers at the Bakersfield store:

a. The operable part of the restroom door requires the twisting of the wrist to operate. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to open the door. This condition violates accessibility standards at 309.4

b. Fitting room door requires twisting of the wrist. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to open the door. This condition violates accessibility standards at 309.4

c. Clear width of accessible routes was less than 36” between displays of merchandise. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to move between displays of merchandise. This condition violates accessibility standards at 403.5.1

d. There are numerous protruding objects that reduce clear width of accessible routes between rows of merchandising displays. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to move between the rows of merchandise. This condition violates accessibility standards at 307.5

e. The benches near the entrance are completely inaccessible to a wheelchair which makes it impossible for Plaintiff to use them.

(Id. at 3, ¶ 11.) In addition, Gastelum alleges he identified the following barriers at the El Centro store:

a. Clear width of accessible routes was less than 36” between displays of merchandise. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to move between displays of merchandise. This condition violates accessibility standards at 403.5.1.

b. The operable part of the fitting room door requires the twisting of the wrist to operate. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to open the door. This condition violates accessibility standards at 390. 4 c. The bathroom door requires the push-pull force greater than 5 lbs. This condition makes it more difficult for Plaintiff to open the door. This condition violates accessibility standards at 309.4.2.

(Id. at 3-4, ¶ 12.) Gastelum asserts he “personally encountered these barriers,” and they “relate to and impact [his] disability.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 13.) He alleges that “[b]y failing to provide accessible facilities, the defendants denied the plaintiff full and equal access.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 15.)

Gastelum alleges he “is often in the area where the Stores are located.” (Doc. 20 at 4, ¶ 19.) He contends that he “will return to the Stores to avail himself of its goods and services and to determine compliance with the disability access laws once it is represented to him that the Stores are accessible.” (Id., ¶ 20.) According to Gastelum, he “is currently deterred ... because of his knowledge of the existing barriers and his uncertainty about the existence of yet other barriers at the Stores.” (Id.)

Gastelum filed his First Amended Complaint on April 13, 2022, seeking to hold Defendant liable for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. (See Doc. 20.) Kohl's filed answers to the FAC on April 28, 2022, and May 9, 2022. (Docs. 21, 22.) On June 14, 2022, Defendant filed the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 23.) Gastelum filed his response to the motion on July 8, 2022 (Doc. 25), to which Defendant filed a reply on July 13, 2022 (Doc. 26). Both parties filed supplemental authorities in support of their positions while this matter has remained pending.^[2] (See Docs. 27, 28, 34.)

II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough to not delay trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Ninth Circuit explained that “pleadings are closed for the purposes of Rule 12(c) once a complaint and answer have been filed, assuming . that no counterclaim or cross-claim is made.” Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Because Kohl's filed answers, and no counterclaims or cross-claims were made, the pleadings are closed in this action.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings “challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings and operates in much the same manner as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Morgan v. Cnty. of Yolo, 436 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1154-55 (E.D. Cal. 2006), aff'd 277 Fed.Appx. 734 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explained a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is “functionally identical” to a motion under Rule 12(b). Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[t]he principal difference between motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) is the time of filing”). Consequently, “the same standard of review” applies to a Rule 12(c) motion. Chandavong v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Assoc., 599 F.Supp.3d 1017, 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (citing Gregg v. Dep't of Public Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017)).

In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the pleading standard under Iqbal applies to Rule 12(c) motions, because Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) motions are functionally equivalent). Thus, the court “must accept all factual allegations in the [pleadings] as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court is “not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint, or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013).

To prevail on a Rule 12(c) motion, the moving party bears the burden to demonstrate that (1) “no material issue of fact remains to be resolved” and (2) “he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the Court retains the discretion to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to grant dismissal rather than enter judgment. See Pacific W. Grp. v. Real Time Solutions, 321 Fed.Appx. 566, 569 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Chandavong, 599 F.Supp.3d at 1020 (“[a]lthough Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts may grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend”); Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F.Supp.2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“courts have discretion both to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend ... and to simply grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment”).

III. Jurisdictional Challenges

The district court is a court of limited jurisdiction and is empowered only to hear disputes “authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Federal courts are “presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case, unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” A-Z Int'l. v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, a plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936)); Vacek v. United States Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006).

Notably although a challenge to subject matter is normally made under Rule 12(b)(1), “it may also be raised on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c).” J & J Sports Prods. v. Alvarez, 2013 WL 6070412, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) (citing Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822 (2nd Cir. 1985) [affirming dismissal of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(c) motion]); see also Strudley v....