Gaston v. Joseph L. Caugherty & Borough of Blairsville

JILL D. GASTON, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH L. CAUGHERTY and BOROUGH OF BLAIRSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14-1436

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 14, 2015

Hon. Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an employment discrimination and civil rights action brought pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wherein Plaintiff Jill Gaston ("Gaston") contends that Defendants Joseph Caugherty ("Caugherty") and the Borough of Blairsville ("Blairsville" or the "Borough") unlawfully removed her from the position of Officer in Charge of the Blairsville Police Department (the "Department") and failed to hire her as the new Chief of Police on the basis of her sex. (Docket Nos. 50, 69-2). Gaston brings claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, violations of her equal protection and procedural due process rights, and violation of the Equal Pay Act, as well as claims for hostile work environment and slander per se, stemming, in large part, from false rumors about her having an extramarital affair, which allegedly were spread by Caugherty. (Docket Nos. 50, 69-2).

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint nunc pro tunc. (Docket No. 69). This Motion followed the Court striking the Third Amended Complaint for failure to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). (See Docket Nos. 67- 69). Defendants now oppose Plaintiff's request for leave to amend a third time, arguing primarily that such an amendment would be futile. (Docket No. 73). Each party submitted briefing, (Docket Nos. 69, 73, 75, 80, 81), and the Court held oral argument on the motion on August 28, 2015, (Docket No. 82), after which each party submitted supplemental briefing. (Docket Nos. 89, 90). The Motion is now ripe for disposition.

After careful consideration of the parties' positions and having evaluated the proposed pleading in light of the appropriate standard, for the following reasons Plaintiff's Motion [69] is granted, in part and denied, in part. Plaintiff's motion is granted with regard to all counts except Count VI, the procedural due process claim, which the Court finds to be futile.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Gaston first filed this lawsuit on August 5, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County, alleging slander per se as the only cause of action and naming Caugherty as the only defendant. (Docket No. 1-2). On October 3, 2014 Gaston amended her Complaint, adding the Borough as a defendant and adding counts for violations of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII employment discrimination and retaliation, and violations of her equal protection rights. (Docket No. 1-7). Because that Amended Complaint included federal claims, Defendants removed the case to this Court. (Docket No. 1). Upon removal, Defendants answered the Amended Complaint, (Docket No. 3), and the case proceeded into discovery, (Docket No. 9). Discovery thus far has proved contentious with the filing of a number of motions to compel and motions for protective orders, (Docket Nos. 24, 44, 45), and the Court being asked to referee several other disputes. (See Docket Nos. 14, 36). After requesting and being granted leave to amend, Gaston filed her Second Amended Complaint on June 8, 2015, which added a count for alleged violation of her procedural due process rights. (Docket No. 50). Shortly thereafter, each Defendant filed amotion to dismiss all counts of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). (Docket Nos. 51, 59). With dispositive motions pending along with a number of discovery motions, the Court granted a motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on the dispositive motions. (Docket Nos. 61, 66).

In response to Defendants' 12(b)(6) motions, Gaston then filed her Third Amended Complaint on July 1, 2015 without leave. (Docket No. 67). Because Plaintiff did not ask for leave prior to filing, the Court struck the Third Amended Complaint from the docket for failure to comply with FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2). (Docket No. 68). Gaston then filed the present Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint nunc pro tunc. (Docket No. 69). A copy of the Proposed Third Amended Complaint ( "Third Amended Complaint" or "proposed Complaint") is attached to the Motion for Leave. (Docket No. 69-2). Defendants oppose granting Gaston leave to amend on a number of grounds, but primarily on the ground that the amendment would be futile, asserting that it does not cure the pleading defects in the Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 73).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Gaston works as a police officer for the Borough of Blairsville Police Department (the "Department"). (Docket No. 69-2 at ¶ 2). During the relevant time period, Defendant Caugherty was the Mayor of Blairsville and previously served as its Chief of Police from 1995 to 2003. (Id. at ¶ 5). The Department has seen a number of employment related controversies over the last several years. A former officer filed a lawsuit against the Borough, alleging that she and other female officers faced discrimination on the basis of their sex. (Id. at ¶ 11). The Chief of Police who succeeded Caugherty was fired in 2009, which also resulted in a lawsuit against theBorough. (Id. at ¶ 12). The next chief resigned after only six months in the position. (Id. at ¶ 12). In an effort to "stabilize" the Department, the Borough Council voted unanimously to appoint Gaston as Officer in Charge ("OIC"), giving her "supervisory responsibility over the other officers in the Department, in addition to managerial and administrative duties involved with running the Department on a day-to-day basis." (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 17). As compensation for "the extra duties of running the Department," the Council voted to pay Gaston an annual stipend of $6,000.00 in addition to her regular salary as a police officer. (Id. at ¶ 14). The Proposed Third Amended Complaint avers that as her appointment to OIC made her responsible for running the Department, Gaston understood that her appointment as OIC "gave her the opportunity to demonstrate her competency for permanent appointment to the position of chief." (Id. at ¶ 15). Gaston further alleges that her "promotion to OIC constituted a substantial change in rank . . . ," (Id. at ¶ 17), consistent with her understanding of the appointment and the fact that neither the position of OIC nor the stipend was encompassed within the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") applicable to police officers in the Department. (Id. at ¶ 16).

After Gaston's appointment to OIC, tensions arose between Gaston and Mayor Caugherty, with Caugherty involving himself in day-to-day operations of the Department and undermining Gaston's authority. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-22). There also was confusion among the officers as to the precise nature of Gaston's authority. (See id. at ¶ 22). Borough Solicitor Patrick Dougherty clarified to Gaston that "as the duly-appointed OIC, she was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Department and that Mayor Caugherty's role was limited to oversight with respect to budgetary matters such as approving (for financial purposes) the number of officers on duty at any particular time and the amount of overtime incurred." (Id. at ¶ 23). Gaston prepared a memorandum reflecting her understanding of the Borough Solicitor's opinion and circulated itto the entire Department and Caugherty. (Id. at ¶ 23).

Despite the memo and a follow up meeting with Solicitor Dougherty, which Gaston, the Mayor, the Borough Manager, and most of the Police Officers attended and at which the Solicitor repeated what he had explained to Gaston, Caugherty continued to involve himself in directing the day-to-day operations of the Department. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25). When confronted by Gaston, Caugherty told her that the Borough Council was unhappy with her performance as OIC, that she was about to be fired, and that she should resign from the Department in order to preserve her reputation; Gaston declined. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 26). About a month later, the Borough Council did not fire her and, in fact, voted to reappoint Gaston as OIC for 2012. (Id. at ¶ 27).

In March of 2012, Caugherty went into the office of Executive Director of the Municipal Authority (the "Authority"), Ronald Hood ("Hood"), and told Hood that Gaston, who is married, and a particular male Municipal Authority employee, also married, were engaged in an inappropriate sexual relationship taking place while on municipal property. (Id. at ¶¶ 29, 45). Caugherty then stopped by the home of Terry DeBiase, a member of the Blairsville Municipal Authority Board and a neighbor of Gaston, and repeated the same rumor. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 36). The proposed Complaint alleges that Caugherty knew these statements were false or was at least reckless with regard to the truth. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 42). Specifically, he knew that Gaston had a longstanding practice of bringing in food for Borough and Authority employees and that she was a long-time friend of the Authority employee in question, yet he spread rumors that she brought the food as a masquerade for the alleged affair. (Id. at ¶¶33-34; first ¶39).²

For health reasons, Gaston had bariatric surgery while she was OIC, resulting in a weight-loss of 100 pounds in a matter of months and as she refers to it a "more feminineappearance." (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36). The proposed Complaint alleges that this caused Caugherty to act more aggressively in trying to force her out and helped to fuel his spreading the rumor of an extra-marital affair with inappropriate conduct taking place while on municipal property. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-38, first ¶ 39 and first ¶ 40). This change in appearance also prompted Caugherty to interfere more in the day-to-day management of the Department, to single out Gaston with continual criticism, to issue to her various memos and warnings imposing different standards on her on subjects that generally required uniform treatment, such as absences and use of "comp" time, and that did...