Gates v. United States

1

CHRISTOPHER M. GATES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. C20-0446-JCC

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

December 10, 2021

ORDER

JOHN C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Mr. Gates's 28 U.S.C § 2255 motion (Dkt. No. 1), the Government's answer to Mr. Gates's § 2255 motion (Dkt. No. 7) and Mr Gates's motions for leave to amend his § 2255 motion (Dkt. Nos. 8, 12-14). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds an evidentiary hearing unnecessary and hereby DISMISSES the remaining ground in Mr. Gates's § 2255 motion (Dkt. No. 1), GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Mr Gates's motions for leave to amend his § 2255 motion (Dkt. No. 8, 12-14), and GRANTS Mr. Gates's request for a copy of his amended motion and for excerpts of record. (Dkt No. 8 at 2-3.)

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of Mr. Gates's arrest, prosecution, conviction, and the instant § 2255 motion. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 1-3.) Mr. Gates's § 2255 motion asserted four grounds for relief; the Court dismissed Grounds 2, 3, and 4 and ordered the Government to respond to Ground 1 (“Original Ground 1”). (Id. at 4-6.) The Government did so. (See Dkt. No. 7.)^[1] Mr. Gates now moves to amend his § 2255 motion to assert another 18 grounds for relief. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 12-14.) He also requests (1) a complete excerpt of the record; and (2) a copy of his amended § 2255 motion. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2-3.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Remaining Ground in the Original § 2255 Motion (Dkt. No. 1)

A prisoner in federal custody who believes his sentence violates the Constitution or federal law may petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction or set aside the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A “collateral attack on a criminal conviction must overcome the threshold hurdle that the challenged judgment carries with it a presumption of regularity, and . . . the burden of proof is on the party seeking relief.” Williams v. United States, 481 F.2d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 1973). In reviewing such a petition, a court may rely on the record and evidence from the original proceeding and may employ the court's own recollection, experience, and common sense. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989). A court must grant an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

In Original Ground 1, Mr. Gates argues that the officers' seizure of his identification was involuntary and, thus, an unlawful search and seizure. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) The Government argues that Original Ground 1 is procedurally barred because the Ninth Circuit decided it on direct appeal and, in the alternative, that it lacks merit. (Dkt. No. 7 at 7-8.) The Court need not decide whether Original Ground 1 is procedurally barred because the Court determines that Mr. Gates's Original Ground 1 is barred as a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claim.

Courts enforce the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures through the exclusionary rule, which bars the use in criminal trials of evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976). Because exclusion is an enforcement mechanism and not a constitutional right, a prisoner cannot seek habeas relief based on the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence if he has had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the claim at trial or on direct appeal. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1989). It matters only that there was an opportunity to litigate the issue, not whether a prisoner actually did so “or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015).

Mr. Gates had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in this Court. Indeed, the Court entertained one round of motions to suppress and later granted Mr. Gates's request to reopen those motions, hold an evidentiary hearing, and raise new arguments in a second round of motions to suppress. See United States v. Gates, No. CR15-0253-JCC, Dkt. Nos. 27-28, 72-73, 77, 85, 89, 91 (W.D. Wash. 2016). Throughout those proceedings, Mr. Gates had the opportunity to raise his instant claim, but did not properly do so. The Court, therefore, DISMISSES Original Ground 1. And because the files and record of the case conclusively show that Mr. Gates is not entitled to relief on Original Ground 1, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The Court also finds that no reasonable jurist could debate whether this ground should have been resolved differently and thus DENIES a certificate of appealability as to Original Ground 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

B. Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. No. 8)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires one seeking habeas relief from a federal criminal judgment to file within a year of “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). A conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court denies a writ of certiorari or issues a decision on the merits. See United States v. Aguirre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court denied Mr. Gates's petition for certiorari on March 18, 2019. Gates, CR15-0253-JCC, Dkt. No. 134. Mr. Gates's original § 2255 motion falls within the limitations period, one-year from this date, (see Dkt. No. 1 at 12), but his proposed amendment would not; it is thus time-barred unless it relates back to Mr. Gates's original motion. See Ross v. Williams, 950 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 applies in habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654-55 (2005). Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amended pleading relates back to the original pleading for limitations purposes when its contents arise “out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading.” To determine whether an amended petition relates back, the Court must (1) determine what facts underly the claims in the amended petition; and (2) look “to see whether the original petition set out or attempted to . . . set out a corresponding factual episode, or whether the claim is instead supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Ross, 950 F.3d at 1167 (cleaned up). The “time and type” test “refers not to the claims, or grounds for relief. Rather, it refers to the facts that support those grounds.” Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis original), abrogated on other grounds by Davila v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058 (2017). The Court does this analysis when examining each of Mr. Gates's proposed amended grounds.

1. Proposed Grounds 1-9

Each of Mr. Gates's Proposed Grounds 1 through 9 alleges an unlawful search and seizure or errors in the Court's rulings on his motions to suppress. (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 13-26.) As mentioned, Fourth Amendment claims are generally not cognizable in federal habeas motions if there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Newman, 790 F.3d at 880. Mr. Gates had that opportunity through two rounds of motions to suppress and an evidentiary hearing. See Gates, CR15-0253-JCC, Dkt. Nos. 27-28, 72-73, 77, 85, 89, 91. Mr. Gates does not contend otherwise in his motion to amend. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.)^[2] Amending his petition to assert Proposed Grounds 1 through 9 would therefore be futile, regardless of whether they relate back.^[3] The Court thus DENIES leave to amend as to Proposed Grounds 1 through 9.

2. Proposed Grounds 10 and 11

Proposed Grounds 10 and 11 assert that Mr. Gates's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to expressly argue that the removal of his wallet from his pocket constituted an unlawful search and seizure. (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 27-28.) While Fourth Amendment claims generally are barred in federal habeas proceedings, “Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims which are founded primarily on incompetent representation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue” are not. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382-83. The Court therefore must determine whether Proposed Grounds 10 and 11 relate back to Mr. Gates's original § 2255 motion. The Government concedes that they do, (Dkt. No. 9 at 11), and the Court agrees: Although Proposed Grounds 10 and 11 involve different claims, the underlying facts-officers' removal of Mr. Gates's wallet from his pocket-are the same as for Original Ground 1. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 4; 8-1 at 27-28.)

The substance of Proposed Grounds 10 and 11, however, indicate that amendment would be futile because Mr. Gates cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance. An ineffective assistance claim requires showing that counsel's representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and thus prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984); see also United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In deciding whether that happened, the Court is mindful that:

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in

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