Gatling v. Jubilee Hous.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Florence Y. Pan, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Cynthia Gatling is a wheelchair user who lives in an apartment building owned and operated by Defendants Jubilee Housing, Inc. and Jubilee Housing Limited Partnership. See ECF No. 16 (Amended Complaint), ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that the wheelchair ramp she must use to access the building is unsafe, and that the building's wheelchair lift has been inoperable for years. See generally id. Based on Defendants' alleged refusal to fix these problems after multiple requests, Plaintiff brings this suit, claiming (1) violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (“Rehabilitation Act”); (2) violations under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. (“DCHRA”); (3) breach of her lease agreement; and (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by her lease agreement. See Am. Compl., ¶ 1.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 17 (Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint). Defendants argue that (1) the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff's statutory claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA; (2) the relevant DCHRA provisions do not apply to Plaintiff's apartment building; (3) Plaintiff's lease includes

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no contractual obligation for Defendants to provide reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff's disability; and (4) Defendants have not breached any implied or express duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has filed an Opposition, see ECF. No. 18, and Defendants filed a Reply, see ECF No. 20. Also before this Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite. See ECF No. 21 (Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Resolution of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss). Plaintiff requests an expedited ruling on the Motion to Dismiss because, she asserts, she has been virtually homebound as a result of the alleged deficiencies in the wheelchair ramp and wheelchair lift. Id. at 1-2. For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court also will deny Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite as moot.^[1]

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff resides at the “Mozart, ” a low-income apartment building located at 1630 Fuller Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. See Am. Compl., ¶ 1. Defendant Jubilee Housing, Inc. is a nonprofit in Washington, D.C. that provides affordable housing through various financing programs and structures. Id., ¶ 8. On or about September 29, 2005, Jubilee Housing, Inc. sold the Mozart to Defendant Jubilee Housing Limited Partnership (“JHLP”). Id., ¶ 11. The two Defendants jointly own and operate the Mozart. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, over the last several years, she has fallen out of her wheelchair while entering and exiting the Mozart because the wheelchair ramp at the front of the building is too steep and is not in compliance with architectural standards. Id., ¶ 17. Moreover, Plaintiff allegedly cannot access the building's mailroom because there is a step leading to that room

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which prevents wheelchair access. Id., ¶ 19. Plaintiff also alleges that the wheelchair lift on the side of the building has been inoperable for years. Id., ¶ 20. Plaintiff, her children, and her caregivers have repeatedly requested that the wheelchair lift and wheelchair ramp be repaired or replaced. Id., ¶¶ 21-22.

Plaintiff has a medical condition that requires her to travel for treatment weekly. Id., ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that on at least one occasion in the last 18 months, with the most recent occasion being in November 2020, she has fallen out of her wheelchair and down the ramp when trying to navigate the entrance of the Mozart. Id. Her fall in November 2020 required emergency medical attention and caused both physical and emotional injuries. Id. After the November 2020 fall, Plaintiff again requested that the ramp and wheelchair lift be repaired. Id., ¶¶ 26-27. Defendants have allegedly ignored or dismissed Plaintiff's requests. Id., ¶ 27. Plaintiff asks that this Court (1) declare that Defendants' actions violate the Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA; (2) enjoin Defendants from failing to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff's disability; (3) award Plaintiff economic and compensatory damages; and (4) award Plaintiff punitive damages. Id., ¶ 88.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 552 (2007). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, id. at 555, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe a complaint liberally in the

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plaintiff's favor, “treat[ing] the complaint's factual allegations as true” and granting “plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although a plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if “‘recovery is very remote and unlikely, '” the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

ANALYSIS

Defendants offer four grounds to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. See generally Def. Mot. First, Defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA. Id. at 4-5, 9-10. Second, Defendants contend that certain DCHRA provisions relied upon by Plaintiff do not apply to Defendants. Id. at 10-11. Third, Defendants assert that there was no breach of Plaintiff's lease because that document contains no contractual provision that requires Defendants to provide reasonable accommodations. Id. at 1213. And fourth, Defendants claim that there was no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because there was no breach of contract. Id. at 15. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

I. Count I - Violation of The Rehabilitation Act

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege an actionable violation of the Rehabilitation Act within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 4. Defendants contend that the statute of limitations began to run on the day that Plaintiff first made a request to replace the ramp and wheelchair lift, which was over a year before the suit was filed. Id. at 7.^[2] Plaintiff

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responds that she requested accommodations related to the ramp and the lift in November 2020, less than two months before filing the instant lawsuit, and that her claim therefore falls squarely within the one-year statute of limitations. See Pl. Opp. at 2-3.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not contain an explicit statute of limitations. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 794. It is well established, however, “that when a federal law does not specify a time-limitation in which to bring a claim, courts should look to ‘the state statute most closely analogous to the federal Act.'” Arthur v. D.C. Housing Authority, 2020 WL 1821111, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2020) (quoting N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995)). Courts in this district have found that the “DCHRA is the most closely analogous state statute . . . so its one-year statute of limitation applies to [the Rehabilitation Act] as well.” Id.

In determining whether Plaintiff's claim under the Rehabilitation Act is barred by the statute of limitations, the relevant question is “whether a new limitations clock begins running each time that a request for accommodations is made anew and denied again.” Floyd v. Lee, 968 F.Supp.2d 308, 324 (D.D.C. 2013). While the D.C. Circuit has yet to answer this question, there is conflicting authority on this issue in this jurisdiction. Compare Owens-Hart v. Howard Univ., 220 F.Supp.3d 81, 93 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating that a new request for the same accommodation can restart the statute of limitations clock), with Stewart v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 626921, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2006) (holding that plaintiff's claim was untimely because the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the first request and denial), and Morgenstein v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 2007 WL 315090, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2007) (holding same); see also Floyd, 968 F.Supp.2d at 324 (collecting cases that consider this issue).

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After reviewing the relevant authority, this Court finds the decision in Owens-Hart most persuasive and adopts its reasoning.^[3] See 220 F.Supp.3d 81. In Owens-Hart, the plaintiff first requested an asthma-related accommodation from her employer in March 2009 and made numerous repeated requests for accommodations through July 2013. Id. at 86-88. The plaintiff filed suit on April 30, 2014, bringing claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the DCHRA. Id. at 89-90. In moving for summary judgment, the defendant relied on Stewart and Morgenstein to argue that the claims were untimely and barred by the one-year statute of limitations, because the plaintiff's first request for accommodations was in March 2009. Id. at 92; see also Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *6; Morgenstein, 2007 WL 315090, at *3-4.^[4]

The court in Owens-Hart ruled that Stewart and Morgenstein were no longer applicable due to “developments in the law.” See 220 F.Supp.3d at...