Gaughan v. Rubenstein

261 F.Supp.3d 390

Aylin GAUGHAN, Plaintiff,

v.Lee A. RUBENSTEIN, Defendant.

16 Civ. 8062 (PAE)(KHP)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed July 11, 2017

Aylin Gaughan, New York, NY, pro se.

Stephen D. Hans, Stephen D. Hans & Associates, P.C., Long Island City, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

Paul A. Engelmayer, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Aylin Gaughan, proceeding pro se , brings this action against her former employer, defendant Lee A. Rubenstein, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. , and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). Gaughan seeks, inter alia , unpaid wages and liquidated damages. Gaughan brings this action despite having settled these same claims with Rubenstein on January 25, 2016. She argues that the Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") executed between her and Rubinstein is not binding under Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc. , 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015), insofar as the Agreement purported to resolve Gaughan's FLSA claims.

Two motions are pending. First, Gaughan seeks to amend her complaint, Dkt. 2 ("Complaint"), to add claims against Rubenstein and a new defendant, Jennifer Radwan, whom Gaughan claims jointly employed her with Rubenstein. Magistrate Judge Katharine Parker, in a Report & Recommendation to the Court, Dkt. 38 ("Report"), recommends that Gaughan's motion be granted in part and denied in part. Gaughan objects to aspects of the Report, all involving its recommendation that Gaughan not be permitted to bring certain claims against Radwan. Second, Rubenstein moves to dismiss the Complaint against him, or, alternatively, for summary judgment, on the grounds that her claims against him were resolved and now are now barred by the Agreement.

For the reasons that follow, Rubenstein's motion to dismiss is granted. And, to the extent that it is not rendered moot by that dismissal, the Court, after a de novo review of the objected-to aspects of the Report, adopts the Report in its entirety, and therefore grants in part, and denies in part, Gaughan's motion to amend.

I. Background¹

A. Factual Background

Before the parties formed the employer-employee relationship at issue, Gaughan retained Rubenstein, an attorney, to represent her, post-judgment, in a divorce action. Complaint ¶ 22. Later, in 2013, Rubenstein hired Gaughan as a paralegal, to be paid at the agreed rate of $17.50 per hour, and the agreed overtime rate of $26.75 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 32, 37, 71. Gaughan claims, however, that contrary to their agreement, Rubenstein initially paid Gaughan at the rate of $3.57 per hour. Id. ¶ 37. In 2014, Gaughan alleges that Rubenstein increased her pay to $4.16 per hour, still well below the minimum wage. Id. ¶ 42. Gaughan also claims that she worked on federal holidays without compensation, id. ¶ 39, and that Rubenstein denied her requests for sick time and time off during certain holidays, id. ¶¶ 40–41.

In 2015, Rubenstein allegedly paid Gaughan at an hourly rate of $6.25, again below the minimum wage. Id. ¶ 44. In neither 2014 nor 2015 did Gaughan receive overtime pay. Id. ¶ 42, 44. Gaughan claims that, based on the rates to which the parties agree, she should have been paid a total of $78,890, id. ¶ 71, but that she was instead paid a total of $20,600, id. ¶ 73. Gaughan also alleges that, during 2014 and 2015, Rubenstein's payments to her (reflecting both wage and reimbursement of business expenses) were often untimely. Id. ¶¶ 45, 129, 167, 187.

Gaughan alleges that at no point during her employment did Rubenstein give her a contract that outlined the terms of her employment. Id. ¶ 54. Nor did Rubenstein give her an itemized statement detailing the portions of her paycheck withheld for taxes. Id. Instead, she alleges, Rubenstein "unilaterally imposed what he deemed to be the proper tax withholdings onto" Gaughan. Id. ¶ 65. In general during her employment, Gaughan claims, Rubenstein failed to give her any statements or records detailing, inter alia , the rate of her pay, allowances (such as compensation for meals or lodging), the dates of work covered by each paycheck, and overtime pay. Id. ¶¶ 58, 60.

Gaughan is a cancer patient who suffers from an autoimmune disease. Id. ¶ 93. These ailments make it difficult for Gaughan to perform strenuous tasks, especially in cold weather. Id. Gaughan claims that Rubenstein, on multiple occasions, nevertheless had her perform tasks for him in the midst of a snowstorm or "hurricane like" weather. Id. ¶ 94. Gaughan also alleges that Rubenstein is a chronic "hoarder," and his accumulation of objects spawned a putrid "dead mouse smell" within the office, which, Gaughan claims, threatened her health. Id. ¶¶ 140, 142.

Gaughan further alleges that Rubenstein required her, during non-working hours, to assist his adult daughter transport her luggage from Grand Central Station to Rubenstein's office. Id. ¶ 89. Also during her free time, Gaughan, at Rubenstein's behest, had to listen to CLE courses for him. Id. ¶ 83. Rubenstein also assigned Gaughan the task of serving process papers in an improper fashion and in neighborhoods that she viewed as dangerous, such as Sunset Park, Brooklyn. Id. ¶ 90. Gaughan claims that she suffered from emotional distress as a result of such tasks. Id. ¶¶ 92, 142, 144.

Rubenstein also allegedly offered Gaughan's services to other attorneys, who sometimes tasked Gaughan with delivering documents—services for which Gaughan was not compensated. Id. ¶ 98. At one point, Gaughan alleges, she told Rubenstein that she would no longer work for him seven days per week, id. ¶ 102, yet Rubenstein called Gaughan on weekends and insisted that she come to the office immediately, id. Once Gaughan began to resist Rubenstein's requests that threatened her health and safety, she alleges, Rubenstein responded by either withholding her paychecks or by writing post-dated paychecks that prevented her from cashing them at the time she received them. Id. ¶ 105.

On June 18, 2015, Gaughan and Rubenstein engaged in an argument that concluded with Rubenstein firing her. Id. ¶¶ 214, 219. On June 31, 2015, Gaughan's final day of employment, Gaughan claims that Rubenstein gave her two post-dated checks, but refused to give her a third, $600, check to repay her for out-of-pocket business expenses she had paid. Id. ¶ 249. These travails, Gaughan claims, jeopardized her "emotional and financial well-being" and led her to fear for her safety. Id. ¶ 92.

On August 25, 2015, Gaughan retained the law firm of Virginia & Ambinder, LLP ("V & A") to help resolve her claims against Rubenstein. Dkt. 18 ("Gaughan Aff.") ¶ 72.² On September 2, 2015, Gaughan's counsel at the time, Lloyd Ambinder, sent Rubenstein a demand letter that requested $34,847.04. The amount demanded included $14,826.38 for unpaid overtime wages, $2,597.14 for unpaid minimum wages, and $17,423.52 in liquidated damages. Dkt. 14, Ex. A ("Demand Letter").

After several months of negotiation between V & A and Rubenstein, the parties agreed to settle the claims for a total of $18,000. Dkt. 14, Ex. C ("Agreement") ¶ 1.1. On January 25, 2016, Gaughan executedthe Agreement. Id. ¶ 8.1. In pertinent part, it states:

Both Parties and their respective representatives, employees, agents, partners, heirs, successors, subrogees and assignees, do hereby completely and irrevocably release and forever discharge the other Party and their respective representatives, employees, agents, partners, heirs, successors, subrogees, and assigns (the "Representatives") from any and all claims and rights of any nature whatsoever (including, without limitation, rights of set-off and recoupment, demands, actions, obligations, and causes of action of any and every kind, nature, and character, known and unknown) that either could have asserted in any action, the Pre-existing Action and any and all other claims and rights arising out of or relating to the subject matter of any action (including, without limitation, rights of set-off and recoupment, demands, actions, obligations, and causes of action of any and every kind, nature, and character, known and unknown) that either may have or could have filed or caused to be filed in any court of law or before any administrative agency, state or federal, or any arbitral forum existing prior to the execution of this Agreement from the beginning of the world until the date of this release. The Parties and their Representatives further agree and promise that they will neither bring any further charge, complaint, cross-complaint, action, or cause of action, against the other and its representatives based in whole or in part upon any claims, rights, demands, causes of action, or damages released pursuant to this Agreement, nor aid, abet, induce, or encourage any such claims by any person or entity.

Id. ¶ 3.1.

Gaughan thus agreed to release any and all claims against Rubenstein, including any claims relating to her employment.

B. Procedural History

On October 13, 2016, Gaughan commenced this action, pro se , by filing the Complaint, which brought FLSA and NYLL claims. Construing the Complaint liberally, Gaughan appears to assert claims of unjust enrichment, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and discrimination on the basis of disability. Id. On January 24, 2017, Rubenstein moved for dismissal or, alternatively, for summary judgment as to all claims against him, on the grounds that all are precluded by the Agreement. Dkts. 11, 13. Rubenstein supported his motion with a memorandum of law. Dkt. 17 ("Def. Br."). On February 8, 2017, Gaughan filed a memorandum of law, Dkt. 19 ("Pl. Br."), and an affirmation, Dkt. 18 ("Gaughan Aff."), in opposition to the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.

On February 21, 2017, Gaughan moved to amend the Complaint to add claims against Rubenstein and to add Jennifer Radwan as a defendant, Dkt. 20, and filed a memorandum of law in support, Dkt. 21 ("Pl. Amend Br."). On February 23, 2017, the...